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ABSTRACT
What We Owe to Our Audience:
The Hermeneutical Responsibility of Creators
by
Kathryn Wojtkiewicz
Advisor: Noël Carroll
The goal of this project is to provide a theoretical underpinning for the belief that
creators of fiction should dedicate time to diversifying the cast of characters in their
fictions, and to avoiding harmful stereotypes when doing so. I establish this as a
hermeneutical responsibility: because of the epistemic influence fictions can wield
over their audiences, trafficking in harmful stereotypes of marginalized identities
(instances of which I call Bad Representation Problems) or excluding marginalized
identities entirely (which I call No Representation Problems) from one’s fictions can
reinforce harmful beliefs about real people with those identities. The more popular
the fiction, the more harmful these actions can be.
Borrowing from virtue epistemology, theories of hermeneutical injustice, and social
psychology, I build a case for due diligence, an epistemic virtue specifically for
creators of fiction; those who discharge their responsibility to avoid Bad and No
Representation Problems in their fictions—thereby doing what they can to reduce
their fiction’s contribution to a social group’s hermeneutical marginalization—do so
through practicing due diligence. Those who fail to do so practice either the
corresponding deficient vice, laziness, or the excessive vice, paralysis.
In the process of my argument, I address a handful of possible objections: those
leveraged by non-cognitivists, claiming fictions do not affect us epistemically in any
significant way; those leveraged by radical autonomists, who believe a fiction
creator’s only responsibility is to the quality of their fiction; and anti-intentionalists,
who are skeptical that a creator’s intentions can fix the meaning of a work. I also
investigate the intersection between social stereotypes and fictional stereotypes,
and how the two combined can sometimes result in real world harm.
Through these various steps and an amalgam of examples, I establish a theory that
can be levied by movements like #RepresentationMatters and #OscarsSoWhite to
argue that yes, creators should care about diversity in their fictions.
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Introduction

“It was an aesthetic choice and not a political one, we knew it wouldn’t work for
everyone.” (GrilloMarxauch, 2016)
On March 3rd, 2016, the CW’s The 100 premiered the seventh episode of its
third season. A few hours later, Javier Grillo-Marxauch, the writer of the episode,
tweeted the above message. That message followed on the heels of another: “It is—
it’s also about a brutal, atavistic world of war, most of our characters end badly,
orientation is never why.” (Ibid.)
The tweets were in response to an uprising, of sorts, that was taking place in
the Twitterverse in real time. The 100, a post-apocalyptic series loosely based on a
young adult novel by Kass Morgan, was one of a number of series that debuted in
the post-Game of Thrones entertainment world in which “drama” became
synonymous with “you’ll never see this character’s death coming.” And The 100,
though aimed at a younger audience, did kill its characters; its fictional world is one
in which every day is a fight for survival, and many don’t win that fight. The first
named character dies in the third episode, with a handful of unnamed deaths
coming in the first two. In March 3 rd’s episode, another character died: Lexa kom
Trikru (Alycia Debnam-Carey), the Commander of the Twelve Clans.
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The twelve character deaths1 that preceded Lexa’s had largely been met with
the sort of social media reaction such things typically receive: fans of the character
lamenting their death, speculating about the reason behind it, its effects on the rest
of the fictional world, and the occasional congratulations tossed the creative team’s
way for creating a surprising, evocative moment. Lexa’s death, however, was met
with plain outrage: not two minutes after the episode’s first airing, Grillo-Marxauch
tweeted, “so, should I just livetweet #the100 or should I also livetweet all the death
threats that are coming in?” (2016). Unlike the other characters, Lexa had amassed a
large, fervent fan following not only for being a compelling character, but for being a
compelling queer character—one that had spent the dozen or so episodes prior to
her death developing a star-crossed romance with the series lead, Clarke Griffin
(Eliza Taylor). As that relationship developed, fans praised the creators of The 100
for the powerful, positive representation of queer women2 their show was
providing; now that it was cut short, ended prematurely by a bullet that was meant
for Clarke but had found Lexa instead, the deep love that group of fans felt for the
show turned to anguish. They took to social media to accuse the show’s creators of
queerbaiting (the practice of using queer-coded characters or relationships to draw

1

That is to say, named-characters-with-enough-screen-time-to-be-recognizable deaths. If
we were counting the sheer number of unnamed, inconsequential, “red shirt” characters
who died in that time, the number would be in the hundreds.
2 Adding insult to what would soon be injury, the creative team had spent the weeks leading
up to and throughout Season 3 on social media and in fan forums, hyping up the positive
representation that was Clarke’s and Lexa’s relationship for the queer community. When
queer fans would explain how happy it made them to see positive queer representation in
Clarke and Lexa and express how nervous they were that the relationship would end badly,
members of the creative team—including the showrunner, Jason Rothenberg, and the
producer, Kim Shumway—would expressly assure them it wouldn’t.
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a queer audience to a fiction, only to deny them that queerness in canon) and, more
specifically, of utilizing an old and painful homophobic stereotype colloquially
known as “Bury Your Gays.”3 The episode’s fallout culminated in a months-long
push to raise awareness about the Bury Your Gays trope in the entertainment
industry, and to push industry powers to include more (and better) queer
representation in their fictions (#WeDeserveBetter). A fundraising campaign for the
Trevor Project, which offers suicide prevention services to LGBTQ+ youth, raised
over $170,000 in Lexa’s name. And three billboards went up over Los Angeles,
declaring that LGBT Viewers Deserve Better.
In that time, the show’s creators mounted a two-prong defense of their
decision. On one hand, they appealed to the nature of their fictional world. GrilloMarxauch described The 100 as a “brutal and bloodthirsty show about people in a
desperate struggle for survival and control” (April 1, 2016), “a show whose chief
thematic concern is the possibility of love and peace in a hostile, death-obsessed
world…we have already sacrificed scores of characters, and to us, all things
considered, [Lexa’s] death fit that world-view” (March 4, 2016). Jason Rothenberg,
The 100’s showrunner, put it succinctly: “This is a show in which characters die”
(Holbrook 2016). He and his creative team were “surprised” by the reaction to
Lexa’s death because they’d created “a post-apocalyptic world set 100 years later in
which anyone can die” (Ibid.). In other words, The 100 is about death and tragedy,
it’s about the way a cruel world seeks to crush any kernel of hope and happiness—
only for those left standing to go on surviving anyway. With that in mind, Lexa’s
3

For more on this stereotype and the role it played in The 100, see Chapter 3, section 3.
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death makes perfect creative sense. The creators “wanted the tragedy of a visionary
killed by someone trying to do…what he truly felt was BEST for her…the tragedy of
[Lexa’s killer] is his belief that he could stand in the way of peace and not choke
what he loved most” (Grillo-Marxauch, March 3, 2016). Killing Lexa in the way they
did was a perfect way to highlight the inherent tragedy built into the fictional world
they’d created. Choosing to do so was an act of artistic integrity. Perhaps some fans
don’t like that Lexa died, but the creative team was only doing what they should, qua
a creative team: telling the best version of this story that they could.
The second prong addresses the political aspect of this character’s death,
specifically. Perhaps having Lexa die when and how she did made for an evocative,
emotional moment; the creators still chose to kill a queer character in service to the
plot, and a woman character in service to man’s storyline. Both actions amount to
harmful stereotypes that are repeated ad nauseum in fictions, an opponent might
say. In response to this, the creative team of The 100 returned to the same defense:
they didn’t intend to play into those stereotypes. When asked whether the writers’
room knew about the “Bury Your Gays” trope, Grillo-Marxauch answered, “I
absolutely did, it absolutely was, we discussed it, and yet, in spite of all of our best
intentions and conversations, we were naive enough—or arrogant enough—to
believe that the lgb representation in our show, and out[sic] ability as witers[sic]
would superate[sic]/redeem our use of the trope” (March 6, 2016). Rothenberg
noted that, for all the death that occurs on The 100, a character’s identity is never
the reason for it:

5
…this is a world where we treat everybody equally and I feel like that
includes, by the way, the manner in which people die. Another reason why I
was surprised, to a certain extent, by the negativity in the reaction [to Lexa’s
death] is that we’ve created this world where it doesn’t matter what color
you are or whether you’re a male or a female or who you love, whether
you’re gay or straight. It’s about survival, it’s about ‘Can you help me survive
today?’ […] race, sexuality, those things shouldn’t matter, and that extends to
the way that characters die. In this world, it doesn’t matter, you can die if
you’re gay or straight, you can die if you’re a series regular or not. (Holbrook
2016)
This follows Grillo-Marxauch’s assurance that Lexa’s “orientation” is not why she
died. In other words, the creators of The 100 never meant for Lexa’s death to play
into the harmful tropes angry fans were accusing them of. Lexa didn’t die because
she was queer, or because she was a woman—that just isn’t how the world of The
100 works.
The fallout of episode 3.07 of The 100 follows a pattern that is becoming
more and more commonplace in fan and entertainment spaces. On one hand, the
audience of a fiction—or some subset thereof—take the fiction to be presenting a
harmful stereotype of a real-world marginalized identity. In Lexa’s case, that
stereotype takes the form of Bury Your Gays, but there are countless others: the
fridging of women characters, Mammy characters, Brutal Bucks, Fiery Latinas,
murderous neurodivergence, pedophilic queerness—and this is all assuming there
even are characters with marginalized identities in the fiction in the first place. For
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many such audiences, these stereotypical depictions (or lack of depictions in
general) are more than merely insulting or frustrating. Conversations like the
#RepresentationMatters movement diagnose a kind of psychological harm inflicted
on real people with marginalized identities by fictions that either a) exclude
characters with their identity in their cast or b) utilize harmfully stereotypical
depictions when those characters are present. On the other is the creator(s) of the
fiction, who regularly defend themselves the way The 100’s team did: by denying
responsibility for making their fictions politically correct, and/or by rejecting fans’
interpretation of the work they created. In the first case, creators argue that their
responsibility is to their creation: their job, as creators, is to tell a good, interesting,
entertaining, aesthetically pleasing story, not to correct the world’s social injustices.
The second case implies audience’s understanding of the fiction is simply wrong: the
creator(s) didn’t intend to create a harmfully stereotypical fiction, and those who
have interpreted their fiction as such are missing the point.
But does this defense hold up? Do creators truly have no responsibility for
potentially harmful social-political content in their fictions?
In what follows, I will argue contrary to the claims of The 100’s creative team,
and contrary to any who would claim that creators have no such responsibility. The
absence of such a responsibility rests on the assumption that bad representation—
or no representation—has no ill effects on a fiction’s audience; I will show that
assumption to be a bad one. The absence of such a responsibility also rests on the
assumption that merely not intending to inflict those ill effects is enough to
discharge responsibility; I will show this, too, to be a bad assumption. And finally,
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the absence of such a responsibility rests on the assumption that a creator’s artistic
freedom and integrity only require them to create the best, most aesthetically
valuable version of their fiction they can, real world consequences be damned; I will
show this assumption belongs to a philosophical tradition that is both outdated and
theoretically weak. In the end, I will argue that the epistemic effect fictions have on
their audiences, especially widely popular ones, demands a hermeneutical
responsibility of their creators.
My argument for this is broken into five parts, corresponding to the five
chapters of this project:
In the first chapter, I establish the epistemic effect fictions can have on
audiences that engage with them. Any claim that creators have an epistemic
responsibility requires that our epistemological tools can be affected by the fictions
we consume. Such a belief would be rejected out of hand by non-cognitivist
philosophers of art, who claim that there is no nontrivial cognitive content imparted by fiction. I will argue, however, that
their conception of the cognitive content delivered in fiction, as in Jerome Stolnitz's
position, is artificially restrictive. The instructive focus is not so much what we learn
from fiction, but rather how we learn from it. Recent work in social psychology
suggests that fiction can make the information it imparts
particularly vivid, 'sticky', and therefore influential on the mindsets of its audiences.
Such influence isn’t necessarily bad—unless, of course, it’s wielded irresponsibly.
In the second chapter, I make my case for the hermeneutical responsibility of
fiction creators. Fiction’s ability to impart conceptions in particularly sticky ways is
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a power that must be handled with care. I argue creators of fiction have a
hermeneutic responsibility to include diverse characters in their creations, and to
do so without relying on harmful stereotypes. I cast this responsibility as the
epistemic virtue of due diligence, offset by epistemic laziness and epistemic
paralysis, the corresponding vices of absence and excess, respectively. Practicing
either vice can constitute to a type of hermeneutical gap described by Katharine
Jenkins, which in turn can contribute to hermeneutical injustices.
In the third chapter, I explore instances of hermeneutical irresponsibility in
fiction. With the argument for hermeneutic responsibility established, it’s important
to understand the sorts of stereotypes creators must try to avoid. To that end, I
describe in more detail what I call No Representation and Bad Representation
problems and how some stereotypes in fiction can constitute the latter. I also
propose three ways in which those stereotypes can appear in fictions: a character
can be a stereotype in themselves, their relationship with another character can be
stereotypical, and their relationship to the plot can be stereotypical. With each
venue, I rehearse some well-known harmful stereotypes and the way they have
appeared in recent fictions.
In the fourth chapter, I take to task the belief that creators cannot have the
hermeneutical responsibility I’ve described, because the only responsibility of a
fiction creator is to the aesthetic value of their fiction. Requiring creators to consider
political or moral responsibilities when they create rarely goes without objection. I
address the claim that creators who concern themselves with representation—that
is, those who practice epistemic due diligence—are exchanging political correctness
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for aesthetic value. In the process, I will show that the only perspective with a real
objection against my argument for hermeneutical responsibility is that of the radical
autonomist: a position that not only has a multitude of problems of its own, but also
fails to convincingly disprove my project here.
And in the fifth chapter, I establish that it is entirely possible for a creator to
unintentionally include harmful stereotypes in their fictions. For all that my project
relies on a creator’s intentions to fix meaning in a fiction, actual intentionalism
poses a potential problem for my account: if creators’ intentions determine the
meaning of their work, how can that work be unintentionally harmful? If the
majority of my target cases come down to a disagreement between the audience’s
experience of a work (as hermeneutically harmful) and a creator’s intention for the
work (as hermeneutically benign), wouldn’t an actual autonomist have to side with
the creator? In this chapter, I show that no, an actual autonomist would not. A
Gricean actual intentionalism can account for such a mismatch via a combination of
natural meaning and failed intentions.
The bulk of my positive account will be established in Chapter 2 and Chapter
3, whereas Chapters 1, 4, and 5 supplement the account by addressing possible
objections (non-cognitivism, autonomism, and conventionalism/hypothetical
intentionalism, respectively) and pain points. In the end, I will have developed an
account of authorial responsibility that requires creators to diversify their casts of
characters—and to make use of no harmful stereotypes when doing so—because of
the epistemic harm they can cause their audiences by doing otherwise.

1

Not So Trivial Triviality

I. “I Was Not Enough”
At the 2018 Tribeca Film Festival, Lupita Nyong’o described the negative
experience she has had with representation in popular media: “When I switched on
my television when I was younger living in Kenya, there was never anybody that
looked like me on there, you know? So seldom…And even when they were black,
they weren’t that dark” (Vagianos 2018). Hot off the release of Marvel’s Black
Panther (2018), Nyong’o was participating in a panel on the Time’s Up movement
when a discussion of the effects of diverse representation—and lack thereof—
began. But this was not only a comment on the imbalances present in Hollywood
and other entertainment industries. For her, the absence of characters who looked
like her in the media she consumed had real, negative effects on her understanding
of herself: “It wasn’t until I was much older that I started to realize what was
missing on that screen and how not seeing myself was causing a subconscious selfhate that I only grew aware of when I was a teenager…I started to recognize my
insecurities and started to absorb the language around me that said I was not right,
that I was not enough, and stuff like that” (ibid). For Nyong’o, the absence of
characters that looked like her sent a message: she was “not right,” she was “not
enough.” That message became internalized, until she was the one repeating it to
herself.
Lying beneath her description is a question that we have been wrestling with
socially for some time now, in the form of the #representationmatters movement
and its accompanying commentaries: can the fictions we consume influence the way
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we think of ourselves? Moreover, can they influence the way we see each other, and
the world?
The overarching thesis of my project is that creators of fiction have an
epistemic responsibility to diversify their casts of characters and not rely on
harmful stereotypes when doing so, as homogenous and/or harmfully stereotypical
stories negatively affect their audiences. That fiction can influence our perception of
ourselves and each other, then, is a primary premise of my argument. As such, this
chapter seeks to establish precisely the sort of epistemic influence I claim fiction
has, and why we have good reason, contra skeptics, to think it exists. In short: when
we enjoy a fiction, we temporarily try on its perspective of the world; for that period
of time, we accept, rather than interrogate, the conceptions it presents us with;
those conceptions are then easier to assimilate into our conceptual repertoire,
altering the tools that we use to make sense of the world.
The question of whether and what we can learn from fiction is addressed by
the cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate in the philosophy of art, and I will begin by
sketching a survey of the debate’s main positions. In their most traditional forms,
cognitivist positions argue that fictions can contain some kinds of truths, and can
impart them to their audiences, while non-cognitivist positions argue that fiction
cannot impart truths to their audiences in any meaningful way. But the traditional
debate’s focus on ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ leaves a glaring absence. Truths—or true
beliefs, or however one wishes to label them—are not the only things that populate
our epistemic toolset, and as such are not the only avenue through which fictions
can influence the way we think. To demonstrate this, I will take an argument I
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perceive to be a preeminent opponent of my position—that of Jerome Stolntiz’s On
the Cognitive Triviality of Art—and assume that it is true. Even if all of the would-be
truths in fiction are trivial, I argue, fiction can still exert epistemic influence on us by
shaping our conceptions of things in the world. In other words, rather than influence
what we know about the world, fictions can influence how we understand it.
Having established where my position is within that debate, I will then make
use of Elisabeth Camp’s work on perspectives to establish a cognitive picture, before
turning to social psychologists to suggest one way in which fictions can shape it. The
psychological work will take the form of two points: the first, supported by the work
of Melanie C. Green and her team, is that fiction has a particular ability to bypass our
epistemic defenses. The second, supported by the work of Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, demonstrates how repeated exposure to harmful stereotypes or
absences in fiction can mold an audience’s conception of the subject. In the end, I
will have established a way in which fiction can affect our understanding, and the
tools we use to interpret the world. When Nyong’o and others describe absorbing
messages from fiction, they do not mean they are gathering new facts; they are
having their conceptions shifted or reinforced by the perspectives presented in the
fictions they engage with. And that can have a real, tangible effect on their epistemic
lives.

II. Learning from Fiction
At the core of Nyong’o’s reported experience is the claim that we learn
something from art. In her case, Nyong’o learned a certain kind of self-hate because
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of her race. For her, the absence of characters that looked like her in the media she
consumed instilled the sense that her story, as a dark-skinned girl living in Kenya,
didn’t deserve to be told. Her experience, and the countless ones like it that have
been expressed across social media in recent years, is that the absence of fictional
characters who look like us, or who are depicted as negative stereotypes of us, 4 can
teach us something very real: people with our identity have no value, or—worse
yet—are rife with awful characteristics.
But to what extent can fiction “teach” us anything? How would we learn from
it? Is there even anything to learn? By asking these questions, we enter into the
cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate in the philosophy of art. On one hand are the
cognitivists, who argue that art5 not only imparts true information, but also contains
truths that only art can uncover. On the other are non-cognitivists who find little or
no cognitive value in fictions. They maintain that there are no truths, and therefore
no knowledge, for us to learn from fiction. While the position I argue for is a
cognitivist one, its focus on understanding, rather than knowledge, makes it a
somewhat nontraditional one.
For those who enter the debate with cognitivist sympathies, the
propositional approach to truth in fiction is often the most intuitive. It’s attractive
because it’s simple: we can learn from fictions just in case they contain true

4

Although being depicted solely in harmful stereotypes isn’t at the heart of Nyong’o’s
experience, it can have similar effects. Call this the problem of Bad Representation, and
Nyong’o’s experience a problem of No Representation. For more on Bad Representation, on
harmful stereotypes and how they can appear in fiction, see Chapter 3. For more on the
interaction between Bad Representation and No Representation, see Chapter 2.
5 For the sake of simplicity, I’ll be narrowing the scope of “art” to focus on narrative fictions:
novels, short stories, plays, films, television shows, comic books, etc.
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statements that are new to us. In some sections of Moby Dick or The Princess Bride,
blatantly true statements are readily available: a reader who was not a specialist on
whales or whaling, or had no idea how to create a vegetable soup, could have much
to learn from each respectively. But the sort of truths cognitivists generally claim
fictions have tend to not be about soup. Rather, when we talk about the sort of
knowledge fictions can impart, whether in a high school literature class or a
philosophy paper, we often turn towards something more universal: truths about
the human experience, of a moral or psychological nature (Wilson 1983, 489-491).
This can be a problem, as the vast majority of fictions do not outright state any such
would-be artistic truths. Moreover, it seems unlikely that any of the fictions Nyong’o
encountered explicitly contained the propositions “People who look like Lupita
Nyong’o are not enough,” or “People with very dark skin aren’t worthy of having
their stories told.”
But this supposes that knowledge can only be transferred via explicit
propositions. When Melville wrote, “It yields the article commonly known as
whalebone or baleen; and the oil specially known as “whale oil,” an inferior article in
commerce” about the Right whale, he added an explicit (true) proposition to Moby
Dick (277).6 But Melville did not write anything to the effect of, “Monomaniacal
pursuit of vengeance will end in disaster,” despite this being something generally

6

When William Goldman wrote, “The year that Buttercup was born, the most beautiful
woman in the world was a French scullery maid named Annette”, he also added an explicit
proposition to The Princess Bride (1). Like the above line from Moby Dick, this statement can
be either true or false. Unlike the above, however, what will determine its truth or falsity
lies within the novel. It is important to note that this is not the sort of truth we concern
ourselves with here. Our focus is on truth in fiction, not fictional truths.
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taken to be a lesson of the novel. M. J. Sirridge notes a similar example: “few people
would hesitate to associate with The Scarlet Letter the following general truth:
Unacknowledged guilt leads to perdition, whereas expiated guilt leads to salvation”
(1975, 455), yet “Nowhere in The Scarlet Letter do we find [this] reflection made”
(op. cit., 458). Both are propositions (i.e., they can be true or false), but neither is
explicitly stated in the text. Rather, we are inclined to say that they are suggested by
the work. Thus, we have a second take on the propositional theory: that we learn
from fictions just in case they contain true implicit propositions.
For cognitivists who take the implicit proposition approach, fictions that do
not explicitly state their artistic truths are no issue. Rather, a fiction’s would-be
knowledge lies in the universal truths implied by the text, either through specific
scenes or the text taken as a whole. In other words, “the literary work contains or
implies general thematic statements about the world which the reader as part of the
appreciation of the work has to assess as true or false” (Lamarque 1996, 325). This
is a much better fit for the way we usually talk about artistic truths: hidden
somewhere between the lines, uncovering a fiction’s truths requires the work of
interpretation. The way we interpret Hester Prynne’s or Captain Ahab’s dialogue
and behavior, rather than the way it is explicitly written in the text, is what brings us
to the themes of either novel. What those explicit propositions imply is what imparts
the fictions’ universal truths.
The implicit proposition approach runs into its own problems, however. If
this approach is to get off the ground, cognitivists who maintain it will need to
provide a theory for how fictions go about implying their truths. Unfortunately for
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them, non-cognitivists (or cognitivists with alternative approaches) have torn apart
just about every attempt to do so. Certainly, it can be difficult to defend implicit
proposition theories when none of them seem to know what imply means in this
context, or the mechanism by which a fiction makes its implicature. Recounting the
minutiae of each argument that attacks the implicit proposition approach will take
us further afield than necessary, so suffice to say: whether we suppose the
implication lies in the explicit or implicit descriptions in a fiction (Sirridge 1975),
the creator’s intention in making those explicit or implicit descriptions (Hospers
1960), or is a matter of literary interpretation with textual support (Lamarque
1996), the theory runs into problems. And if we return to our initial example, we
find that the implicit propositional approach is less than satisfying. While the
fictions Nyong’o engaged with may have implied that dark skinned people are not
worth telling stories about by excluding characters of color, it seems unlikely that
this was a universal truth that they were trying to impart. Rather, it is far more
likely that this was a reflection of implicit bias—or full-on prejudice—on the
creators’ parts.
Given this, alternative approaches to explaining the epistemic influence of
fiction attempt to evade such objections by changing the sort of knowledge they
focus on. Propositions are generally described as statements that impart
“knowledge that”—knowledge that unacknowledged guilt leads to perdition, or that
the Right whale creates whale oil. Cognitivists with non-propositional approaches
eschew knowledge that in exchange for knowledge how or knowledge what it is like.
In the case of knowledge how, cognitivists argue that what we learn from fiction is

17
how to apply concepts or try out beliefs in ways that the real world rarely gives us a
chance to. For instance, the real world (hopefully) rarely offers us reason to think
about what we would do given the choice between our convictions and a firing
squad. But a fiction about a character given such a choice can offer us the chance to
practice applying our moral beliefs to such a situation, taking what would normally
be an abstract idea and letting us use it without risking real world consequences (cf
Stecker 2016, Carroll 2008, Gaut 2005). If, by imagining this scenario, we can figure
out how our moral imperatives would require us to act, we learn a truth about our
moral imperatives. If, by imagining this scenario, we can determine how we would
act, we learn a truth about ourselves. Knowing how to apply our ethical beliefs
counts as a kind of knowledge on this account, and fiction’s ability to vividly
describe moral dilemmas we otherwise would never experience allows us to learn
exactly that.
Alternatively, cognitivists can suggest knowledge what it is like. Cognitivists
who take this approach argue that fictions are particularly well equipped—more
than something like a textbook is—to tell us what it may be like to be in a certain
situation we otherwise would never occupy (cf Dorothy Walsh, 1969, cited in
Wilson 1983). Using well-developed characters and narrative techniques, a fiction
about women’s suffrage activists can tell us what it was like to be on the front lines
of that fight—or “what it is like to…fall suddenly in love, lose a child to death, or
undergo religious conversion” (Wilson 1983, 491-492, emphasis hers). It can
illustrate something outside of our experience for us in ways that purely factual
accounts cannot, by drawing on emotional responses and asking us to imagine
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having these direct experiences. In engaging with such a fiction, we gain a kind of
truth about the depicted experience we did not have before.
How do non-cognitivists respond to such approaches? In answering this
question, I will establish what I take to be a quintessential opponent to my view: the
accusation of triviality leveled by Jerome Stolnitz.
Among the most cited non-cognitivist arguments, Stolnitz lays two charges
against cognitivism: first, fictional “truths” share none of the characteristics of other,
accepted forms of knowledge; second, any “truth” we might learn from fiction both
comes from another, non-fictional source, and is better learned through that source.
To the first: Stolnitz begins his argument by noting a number of characteristics
shared by domains of truth that are generally accepted to be…well, true. Things like
scientific truth and historical truth have specific things in common. They have a
process by which they arrive at their truths: science has the scientific method, while
history derives knowledge from artifacts and contemporary records (Stolnitz 1992,
192). But “artistic truth”, such as it is, has no such process. Science and history both
work to break down apparent contradictions within their truths, but art doesn’t;
they have evidence with which they can “confirm [their] truths”, but art doesn’t (op.
cit., 196). There can be specialists in certain domains of science and history, and the
truths discovered by one specialist or in one domain connect to and support those
from another—but “the truth derived from one work of art never confirms that
derived from another work of art”, and “there are no specialists because almost
anyone can learn” the truths cognitivists propose art teaches (op. cit., 197). Those
that might be considered specialists are the art critics, but they—unlike the
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scientists and historians—don’t participate in the creation of the would-be
knowledge. That is, they “are not, it is sometimes deplored, artists themselves” (op.
cit., 198). So, the artistic knowledge cognitivists argue for doesn’t look much at all
like other types of knowledge, according to Stolnitz. And if it doesn’t look like a duck
or quack like a duck, why should we think it’s a duck?
Which brings us to point two: any truth art may be able to convey isn’t
original to art and can be better learned elsewhere. Stolnitz notes that cognitivists
could argue artistic knowledge is different in kind from scientific and historical
knowledge. Like religious knowledge, it simply doesn’t have the same sort of
processes or evidence. Though that being said, even religious knowledge shares
some characteristics with scientific and historical knowledge; it finds its evidence in
scripture and revelation (though neither would hold up against the skeptic in the
way scientific or historical evidence would), it experiences contradiction and
attempts to diffuse it (sometimes by “absorb[ing it] by faith”), and has those who
believe in it and those who do not, just as there are those who believe in science and
its truths and those who don’t7 (Stolnitz 1992, 196). The only evidence to support
artistic truths comes from real experiences, we don’t experience Artistic Truth A as
being contradictory to Artistic Truth B even if they tell us opposing things about the
world, and “we have never heard of artistic believers” (op. cit., 193). But more
importantly: so-called artistic truths aren’t unique to art the way religious truths are
unique to religion. Perhaps we can learn something of human psychology from
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An especially painful reminder in the era of anti-vaxxers, anti-maskers, climate deniers,
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reading a great novel, but it would still be a psychological truth conveyed through
fiction. Moreover, uncovering that truth requires us to abstract away everything
that makes the novel a novel. To understand the supposed universal truth of Pride
and Prejudice, we must abstract away its specific locations, its specific descriptions,
its specific characters, its specific dialogue, so that we can get to a lesson that applies
to someone other than Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy (op. cit., 194). Once that is
done, there is nothing specifically artistic that remains.
This in particular strikes a blow against those who hold that fiction teaches
us knowledge what it is like. Cognitivists who argue that fiction excels at teaching us
what it is like to have a certain experience or be in a certain time rely on the
mechanisms of art to stake their claim: fiction excels at teaching us what it is like
because descriptions, characters, dialogue, plot structure, etc. all contribute to
driving home the point in a way no other method of communication can. But if it’s
true that we must abstract away those same features in order to see the truth a
fiction is trying to convey, what remains appears to be little more than a truth
discovered by some other method, recycled through an artistic lens. A seminal
example of a fiction that teaches us what it is like, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle
Tom’s Cabin is often credited with making the experience of slavery in the Deep
South so real to white Americans that it fueled the Civil War. However, Stolnitz
notes, the novel’s attempt to show its audience what it is like was not sufficient: “Her
description of slavery…had been found powerfully persuasive by a large audience,
though other readers were incredulous. The fiction was not enough. The fiction had
to be shown to be true…Thus: A Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin; presenting the original
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facts and documents upon which the story is founded. Together with corroborative
statements verifying the truth of the work [was published]” (Stolnitz 1992, 197).
Beecher Stowe not only required sociological and historical knowledge to write her
novel in the first place, but also, Stolnitz alleges, needed to release that data in a
separate book for her novel to have its full effect. None of those facts were
discovered or established by the fiction she wrote. Art, according to Stolnitz, can
only parrot back truths that could have been (and were) discovered through other
means, owning no particular knowledge of its own.
More than this, he argues, it is likely that much of the knowledge considered
particular to art is already known by the reader, making the art’s imparting of it
trivial. For instance, the classic tragedies of ancient Greece have long been touted in
literature classes as stories ripe with lessons about the human condition. But for
Stolnitz, there is nothing novel in their would-be knowledge: “Oedipus certainly
acted without understanding and came to realize it. So have we all, much of the time.
It is less certain that those who have read the play—leave out those who have never
heard of Oedipus Tyranus—had not previously learned this truth, at the cost of their
own less dramatic pain” (Op. cit., 195). The lessons about the human condition that
we so regularly attribute to fiction, from the dangers of vengeance to the allconsuming nature of power, that pride cometh before the fall or that
unacknowledged guilt leads to perdition, hardly seem to be the sorts of things one
learns of first through fictions. Surely a reader who is cognitively capable of
engaging with The Brothers Karamazov would know that murder is wrong before
ever reading the book. This sort of knowledge would, at best, be illustrated by a
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fiction, not taught; an audience cannot be taught what it already knows. And though
Stolnitz would not have had the specific theories gestured to above in mind, this can
be a problem for cognitivists who take the “knowledge how” approach. While fiction
may indeed be able to illustrate the challenges and effects of applying a given moral
imperative, there is no promise that this would be information we did not—to some
degree—already know.8 Perhaps we would have a slightly better sense of the
intricacies of that moral imperative, but seeing it applied to a fictional situation,
even one that challenges us to apply it ourselves, is not enough to guarantee the
acquisition of non-trivial knowledge.
As such, Stolnitz’s claim against the cognitivist is two-fold: not only does art
not produce anything that looks like knowledge, but the information it does manage
to transmit is both generated by and easier to learn from other means. In other
words, the would-be truths of fiction are “preponderantly, distinctly banal” (Op. cit.,
200).
Such is the accusation of a non-cognitivist: fiction cannot impart unique
knowledge of any kind, and so we cannot learn from fiction. Moreover, the
cognitivist approaches visited thus far do little to explain Nyong’o’s experience. We
have seen why propositional approaches fail, but knowledge how and knowledge
what it is like approaches are ill suited to our purpose as well. When she learns a
kind of devaluation of herself from the absence of people of color in the fictions she
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Proponents of the “knowledge how” approach view their positions as an immediate
response to the triviality accusation, and so would likely reject this out of hand. However,
since they are not my targets here—and I have no desire to defend Stolnitz’s position more
than necessary—I will leave a more thorough examination of this conflict for another time.
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engages with, Nyong’o isn’t learning how to apply some moral imperative or some
new knowledge about how she might behave in a similar situation. Nor is she
learning what it might be like to be a person in such a situation; as a Black, African
woman, she hardly needs to learn through fiction how people of color are erased
from white stories. But if these cognitivist approaches fail, is there another way in
which her experience can be explained? Or does my project flounder on the noncognitivist rocks?

III. Shifting Perspectives
Let us suppose that Stolntiz’s non-cognitivist position is correct. For the sake
of argument, let’s say that fiction cannot impart any information that is non-trivial,
and in the cases that it seems to, the knowledge it passes along was discovered first
(and is discoverable) by other means. Is my project then scuttled?
In the following section, I will argue that the view of “learning” that
Stolnitz—and the cognitivists he takes aim at—has in mind is too narrow. Why
should we assume that fiction must impart unique artistic truths in order for us to
‘learn’ from it? Certainly my project doesn’t require fiction to teach us deep,
unerring truths about the human condition found nowhere else in order to get off
the ground. Rather, so long as we have reason to believe fiction can influence the
way we think about ourselves, each other, and the world, I can argue creators have a
responsibility to wield that influence responsibly. So long as even the most
unforgiving non-cognitivist position—like Stolnitz’s—fails to refute that, we can
move forward. As such, in the following section I will argue that we are better able
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to understand the epistemic effect of fiction by attending to its effects, not on our
collection of new or truthful knowledge, but on our understanding. Some
cognitivists, such as Catherine Wilson and Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen,
gesture at such an approach, and I will begin by briefly recounting their positions.
My own position solidifies their accounts by demonstrating fiction’s ability to
influence our conceptions, one of the many tools we use to make sense of the world
around us. Before I make that argument, however, I will first establish what I mean
by “conceptions” with the help of Elisabeth Camp’s work on perspectives and
characterizations. With my toolset thus fleshed out, I can illustrate one way in which
fiction can influence us epistemically—in which we can “learn” from fiction. From
there we can begin to see what sort of responsibilities one who wields that influence
may have.
Seeing the arguments arrayed against previous cognitivist positions, Wilson’s
1983 paper issues what she perceives as a corrective: to learn does not necessarily
mean collect new facts. By limiting themselves to such a definition of learning,
cognitivists have restricted themselves to fighting on the wrong turf. Rather, it is
more accurate to say “that the term ‘learning’ applies primarily to a modification of
a person’s concepts, which is in turn capable of altering his thought or conduct, and
not primarily to an increased disposition to utter factually correct statements or to
display technical prowess” (Wilson 1983, 495). As such, “a person may learn from a
novel…if he is forced to revise or modify, e.g. his concept of ‘reasonable action’
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through a recognition of an alternative as presented in the novel” (Op. cit., 494).9 To
Stolnitz’s point, the reader in this case will already have a concept of ‘reasonable
action’ before they engage with the novel; by making use of the concept the novel
introduces trivial information. But we do not only learn by introducing brand new
concepts into our repertoire. Lamarque and Olsen take a similar approach, as they
too reject the idea that introducing brand new concepts is the only way in which we
learn. Rather, by tasking us with adopting its perspective, a fiction can influence the
conceptions we make use of:
The point is that fiction can provide an occasion for imaginative reflection
that perhaps otherwise would not be available to us. Even being in the
position of bringing to mind certain imaginary states of affairs can enrich, as
we might say, our conceptual repertoire. Through reflecting on certain
conceptions in works of fiction, we learn to reflect with those conceptions in
other contexts. Similarly by adopting other points of view towards imaginary
states of affairs, under the direction of a storyteller, we might come to adopt
those same points of view in comparable situations elsewhere. (1996, 137)
Merely by exposing us to some conception or other and tasking us with thinking
about or through that conception in a specific way, fiction has the ability to expand
our “conceptual repertoire.” Because we bring that repertoire with us into our real-
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I should note that there’s nothing here requiring that modification to be for the better. Our
conceptual repertoires are regularly altered to be less truthful, less reflective of reality, or
however else one would want to characterize a shift for the worse. For the sake of
simplicity, I’ll refer to any modification of a person’s concepts, whether for the better or the
worse, as “learning.”
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world experiences, those new conceptions might not remain in the fiction; they may
become part of the toolset that we use to make sense of our daily lives.
Both approaches shift away from the focus on learning as new knowledge—
as a matter of truths and true beliefs—and towards learning as a change in
understanding, in the use of our concepts and conceptions. But neither provides a
fleshed-out view of how fiction would prompt this kind of learning, or even what it
means for a concept or conception to be changed. What do we mean when we talk
about concepts and conceptions? What is the difference between the two, and which
one does fiction influence?
Elisabeth Camp’s work on perspectives in fiction offers some answers to
these questions. When we talk of concepts and conceptions, we shift into the
epistemic realm of understanding. Work on the understanding is not so much
concerned with the acquisition of new knowledge, but “how you manage the
information you possess—what you can do with it, and the sorts of patterns you can
“see” within that information” (Grimm 2017, 3). The understanding, then, is our
capacity for making sense of the complex information we encounter, whether in a
quantum physics classroom or on the commute home; it is the step that comes
before knowledge, as we have to understand something before we can justify that
we know it.10 Concepts and conceptions are the main tools of understanding, and
differ “in at least three respects: their content, structure, and stability” (Camp 2019,

10

See Zagzebski 2019 and Hills 2017 for a more comprehensive breakdown of the
relationship between knowledge and understanding.
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19).11 Because the primary work of concepts is identification, their content is sparse
and general; the details of a concept are necessarily abstracted away, so that it can
be applied across a multitude of situations without fluctuating over time. Thus,
when someone tells you that a friend of theirs is a doctor, the concept of doctor
brings something like “advanced medical professional” to mind. But a conception is
inundated with other information, not just a simplified definition of a thing but all
the characteristics we associate—explicitly or implicitly—with that thing. In which
case, your conception of doctor might mean imagining this friend as attractive,
intelligent, wealthy, confident, or any number of other things you think a doctor is
or ought to be (Camp 2019, 20). Conceptions are highly malleable and are often
influenced by external forces without our awareness (Camp 2019, 23). One such
source of influence, Camp posits, is fiction.
Engaging with fiction requires trying on its authorized point of view. When
we pick up Lolita we are tasked with seeing the world through Humbert Humbert’s
eyes, and when we tune into the latest Marvel movie we are asked to adopt its
morals and lore—at least to some extent. These worldviews are what Camp
describes as perspectives: “an open-ended disposition to construct rich, intuitive
representations of particular individuals and events, and of relations among them”
(2017, 78). Epistemic agents have perspectives, and are able “to assimilate,
extrapolate from, and respond to particular bits of information as they come in, and
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The difference Camp characterizes in her paper is actually between concepts and what
she calls “characterizations.” However, because she notes similarities between conceptions
and characterizations “in many cases” in the cited paper without specifying important
differences, I will refer to them as conceptions for the sake of simplicity.
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how to navigate among the bits of information they already have” (Op. cit., 78)
because of them. It is our perspectives that cause us to notice certain things, or
connect certain dots; in other words, our perspectives are what cause us to form the
conceptions that we have and wield them in the ways we do. By making us try on a
perspective different than our own, fictions cause us to adopt their authorized
conceptions12 while we’re engaged with them (Op. cit., 85-86). Doing so is what
Lamarque and Olsen describe as “adopting the fictive stance” 13towards a work, and
is required to fully appreciate it. I propose that it is also how fictions can influence
our conceptions and affect the way we view ourselves and each other.

IV. Transportation Theory and Accessibility
It remains to be seen whether or not fiction actually has this influence,
however. Philosophy has few tools to answer this question; theorizing from an
armchair cannot tell us about the cognitive effects of fiction any more than it could
tell Plato. As such, in this section I will turn to the work of social psychologists who
have taken on this question and show that it is at least possible that fiction does. The
work of Melanie C. Green and her team suggests that the very activity of engaging
with a narrative means lowering our epistemic defenses, causing us to scrutinize
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What it means for a fiction to have “authorized conceptions,” a “worldview,” or a
“perspective” is an open question; surely we would have to know how to reliably fix a
fiction’s perspective in order to adopt it in the way Camp suggests. I explore possible
answers to this problem in Chapter 5.
13 Lamarque and Olsen describe the following activities as part of adopting the fictive
stance: “We reflect on the propositional content, we make-believe that there are actual
instances, we import what we know about the world, we supplement imaginatively, we
entertain thoughts and hypotheses, we adopt points of view, we assume attitudes and values”
(1996, 137, emphasis mine).
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what is presented in those narratives with less rigor than we might that which is
presented in, say, a political speech. I join this conclusion with Amos Tversky’s and
Daniel Kahneman’s work on the availability bias to suggest how this lack of scrutiny
can, with repetition, affect the heuristics that we use to fill in gaps in our knowledge.
All of this together will show one way in which even the trivial things we learn from
fiction can epistemically influence us.
I have proposed thus far that fictions can influence us epistemically by
influencing our conceptions. A number of studies conducted by social psychologist
Melanie C. Green and her team suggest that this is not only true, but also posit what
it is about narratives that makes this happen.
They call their theory the Transportation-Imagery Model: the more
“transported” a reader is by the narrative they’re engaged with, the more persuaded
a reader is by the point of view presented in the narrative. 14 They define
transportation as “a distinct mental process, an integrative melding of attention,
imagery, and feelings…a convergent process, where all mental systems and
capacities become focused on events occurring in the narrative” (Green and Brock
2000, 701). When an audience is transported by a narrative, it tends to have two
consequences pertinent to our project: first, they lose some connection to the real
world “in favor of accepting the narrative world that the author has created” (Op.
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It is important here to note: narrative is not the same thing as fiction. Newspapers and
history books make use of narrative, but purport to impart real events. However, Green’s
experiments show that the process and effects of being transported by a narrative are the
same, whether fictional or real (2000, 718). The narratives I target here are fictional;
whether or not my argument can be used for nonfictional narratives is a question for
another time.
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cit., 702). This can be as simple as becoming physically unaware of the space around
them—as when the details of where we’re sitting or the noise that surrounds us
fades from our attention when we’re engrossed in a novel—or, more interestingly
for our purposes, as deep as to affect us epistemologically: “While the person is
immersed in the story, he or she may be less aware of real-world facts that
contradict assertions made in the narrative” (Op. cit., 702). (Perhaps, in such an
instance, we know Baker Street is nowhere near Piccadilly Circus in the real world,
but are so engrossed in a novel that we don’t bat an eyelash when it depicts the two
locations as next to each other.) And second, the audience “return[s] from being
transported somewhat changed by the experience” (Op. cit., 702). For the purpose of
these experiments, that change is instantiated in what Lamarque and Olsen would
call the audience’s conceptual repertoire.
The results of said experiments suggest that these consequences of
transportation—in particular, the lowering of our epistemic defenses—mean that
we are prone to taking up ideas presented in highly immersive narratives more
easily than those that might be presented in other ways. In one experiment, 97
undergraduates were provided with a story about a little girl who was the victim of
a random act of violence, perpetrated by an unsupervised psychiatric patient (Op.
cit., 705). The students were then surveyed 15 to determine their level of
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The survey was built on earlier research into the transportation effect; it presented the
participants with 15 statements “intended to capture [transportation’s] major dimensions,
including emotional involvement in the story, cognitive attention to the story, feelings of
suspense, lack of awareness of surroundings, and mental imagery” (Green 2000, 703).
Participants would answer on a scale of 1 to 7 how accurately each statement described
their experience of the narrative they read.
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transportation by the story, as well as the degree to which their beliefs regarding
core themes of the story changed or remained the same. To a student, those who
had higher transportation scores were more likely to take on beliefs that reflected16
the story’s content—that the world was a violent, dangerous place, that the world
has no real justice, and that psychiatric patients should have restricted freedoms in
order to protect the larger population—even when regression analysis controlled
for pre-existing beliefs (Op. cit., 706).
These results replicate those of previous experiments 17 and were reproduced
in another three experiments. The last of these experiments also demonstrated a
correlation between transportation and the ability to circle “parts of the text that
rang false” (Green 2000, 711); those participants who scored low on transportation
were more likely to circle parts of the text they thought were false or inaccurate
than those who scored highly, suggesting that the more wrapped up in the story a
person became, the less they evaluated the content of it. As such, they conclude that:
Transportation into a story causes people to be less motivated (or less able)
to disbelieve any particular conclusion; transported individuals are so
absorbed in the story that they would likely be reluctant to stop and critically
analyze propositions presented therein…stories are generally presented as
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This too was tested through a series of statements, this time on a 0 to 60 scale.
Statements related directly to the story (how often a stabbing occurs at US malls, that the
world is a violent, unjust place, whether the characters were good people) and tangentially
(that psychiatric patients should be allowed in public without supervision) were measured
based on the degree to which participants agreed with them after reading the story. This
same questionnaire was given to participants 5 to 9 weeks prior to the study as a pre-test
control.
17 See Gilbert 1991, Prentice 1997, Wheeler 1999.
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entertainment, rather than as vehicles for attitude change. These qualities of
public narratives provide few explicit triggers for critical thinking, and thus
counter arguing is less likely to occur. (Op. cit., 703).
When we engage fully with a fiction, we adopt its perspective. Unlike
advertisements or political speeches, narratives do not trigger our epistemic
defenses; rather than approach a narrative as something that needs to be
investigated and interrogated, we are more likely—at least, at first—to take on the
conceptions presented in our favorite narratives without thinking. The more we
enjoy the story, the more we engage with its imagery and appreciate the
characters,18 the less likely we are to flag its perspective as something that needs to
be questioned—and, as the follow up surveys demonstrate, the more likely we are
to carry them with us into the real world.
Important to note: the beliefs being examined in these cases are not in any
way new to the audience of the narratives. That the world is unjust, or violent, are
precisely the ‘trivial’ sort of would-be knowledge that Stolnitz argues is the only
kind of knowledge fiction is capable of conferring. Trivial though it may be, it is clear
that audiences swept up in a fiction are less likely to challenge its presented view of
the world. By trying on the story’s perspective, the audience adopts its conceptions

18

It may be worth it to emphasize the subjectivity of transportation here. Transportation
requires a certain level of engrossment, and an audience is unlikely to be engrossed in a
fiction they aren’t enjoying. This means different audiences can be transported by the same
fiction to different degrees, with the perspective of the fiction affecting those who are highly
transported more acutely than those who are less transported. As an avid fan of genre
fiction who generally detests emotion-driven dramas, I’m more likely to find myself
transported by Atomic Blonde than Little Women—meaning Atomic Blonde is more likely to
influence my conceptions than Little Women would be. For my sister, it’s the precise
opposite.
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even after putting it down—suggesting that even trivial information can have an
effect on their epistemic resources.
That being said, this cannot provide a full explanation for the power I suggest
fiction has. Let’s assume that Green’s results are accurate; there is still nothing in
her team’s studies to suggest that this influence lasts any longer than it takes the
participants to fill out the survey. Perhaps, for the first few minutes following
engagement with the fiction, the conceptions it presents ring true to the audience,
only to fade and be overtaken by the audience’s previously accepted ones. In this
case, Green’s work is hardly enough to demonstrate that fiction has a lasting effect
on how we view the world. Short of asking Green or others to study the duration of
this effect, how can we know that fiction’s influence sticks around long enough for it
to affect the way we interact with each other?
The answer comes from older work in social psychology surrounding
accessibility bias. As proposed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, accessibility
bias is the tendency humans have to use the availability of examples of a thing to
determine the frequency or probability of that thing’s occurrence. For example,
when 152 participants of a study were asked if there were more English words that
had the letter R in the first place or the third place, 105 of them answered the first
place — despite there being vastly more words in which R is the third letter
(Tversky 1982, 167). The explanation, they reasoned, is that words in which R is the
first letter are easier to think of (red, right, rib, rivet) than words in which it’s the
third (tire, tarp, barge…), leading 105 participants to answer that there are more
words with R as the first letter than the third. In other words, the easier it is to come
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up with examples of one, the more likely we are to think that there are more
instances of it out there than the other.
Doing so is a type of heuristic, a shortcut we use to fill in the blanks when we
do not or cannot have all the information. There is likely not a single English speaker
or reader who knows exactly how many English words start with R, or how many
have R as the third letter. In light of this gap in information, we use instances in our
memory—and how readily accessible they are—to essentially make an educated
guess. There is little doubt that this tool, general though it may be, is helpful in most
of the instances we use it; we wouldn’t be so likely to apply it if it didn’t help us get
through the average everyday situation. But, as we saw above, that doesn’t mean it
can’t lead us astray.19
What does this have to do with the power of fiction? So far, we have
proposed that, because fully engaging with fiction means trying on its perspective
for a time, the conceptions presented by a fiction have a route into our conceptual
repertoire not shared by other forms of communication. We have also seen, through
Green’s work, that we have some reason to believe that’s true. Suppose then that we
watch a superhero movie, and in engaging with it we adopt its conception of ‘hero’
for its two-and-a-half-hour runtime—a conception that, in this instance, is applied
to the straight, abled white man who plays the lead role. If fiction has this influence
on our conceptual repertoire, after watching a movie like this we might pick up the
conception that heroes are straight, abled white men with square jawlines and high
cheekbones. Now, let’s say that it isn’t just one fiction that is asking us to think
19

For more on the social effects of the accessibility bias, see Taylor, 1982.
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through this conception, but dozens.20 In nearly every superhero movie we see, the
fiction asks us to work through a perspective in which ‘hero’ is applied to, associated
with, a white man. Each time, we pick up the connection the fiction is presenting
between white men and ‘hero,’ because our epistemic defenses aren’t triggered
while we are being entertained. We now have dozens of instances of that connection
in our conceptual repertoire, a number that might dwarf other instances of ‘hero’
that are not connected with white maleness.
In this case, the way accessibility bias functions means that there is a higher
chance of us filling in the blank ‘hero’ with the image of a straight white man. These
examples of ‘hero’ might be fictional, but if they outnumber other instances of ‘hero,’
and more of them come to mind faster than other instances, they will be the most
accessible examples. As such, when someone describes a superhero to us in the
future, we may very well automatically imagine a white man—as we might
automatically assume a doctor is rich, or intelligent.21 Our concept of hero may
remain agnostic, as someone who shows great courage, who helps people, who’s
worthy of respect and admiration. But our conception fills in the blanks around that
concept with maleness, whiteness, straightness, Adonis-esque muscles, chiseled
jawlines, and on and on. When our conception of hero becomes so inundated, white,
straight, male, muscley heroes become the default assumption, and that leaves little
room for others who are not white, not straight, not male, or differently abled to be
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By 2018, there were more white men named Chris playing superheroes in the Marvel
Cinematic Universe than there were Black women playing heroes, super or otherwise—of
which, Nyong’o was one.
21 Unless explicitly told otherwise.
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associated with that conception. Thus, we get audiences that ask why Captain
Marvel has to be a woman, or why Spider-Man is Black, or why Harley Quinn is queer
(though, admittedly, her status as ‘hero’ is a little less clear-cut than the other two).
In the minds of such an audience, superheroes just are white, straight men. Any
superhero depicted as not male, not straight, or not white have to have a very good
reason to be any of the above—to explain why they diverge from the accepted
conception of what a hero is. Given what Green has shown us about our proclivity
for taking these conceptions with us into the real world, this bias becomes
dangerous.
And as for duration? Accessibility bias suggests that the bias lasts for as long
as a preponderance of examples remain accessible to us. As those examples fade
from our memory and/or are replaced with contrary examples, our bias will change.
But if those examples remain fresh, or are repeatedly reinforced with other, newer
examples, it won’t. The superhero genre has been dominated by white, straight,
abled men since its inception in the early 20th century. As such, fans of the genre
have had a cavalcade of perspectives to try on that associate heroism with white,
straight, abled men for over a hundred years. The instances in which the superhero is
not white, not straight, differently abled, or not male—and, importantly for our
larger project, not harmfully stereotypical—are severely dwarfed in comparison. It
isn’t hard to imagine that fans have had plenty of occasion for their examples of
white, straight, abled, male heroes to be replaced and refreshed with other, newer
examples of white, straight, abled male heroes.
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Note, however, that in doing so, the fictions do not impart anything other
than ‘trivial’ information to those that engage with them. There is nothing new
about gender, race, or heroism imparted by superhero movies; in fact, they, as a
genre, thrive on formulaic plot structures and character archetypes. 22 And yet, if
repeated exposure to them influences our conception of ‘hero’ in this way, this
trivial information still has an effect on our conceptual repertoires—and as such, an
effect on our epistemic lives.
Now suppose that these are the films that Nyong’o engaged with as she was
growing up. If the vast majority of movies—and in the case of Marvel, a number of
television spinoffs, video game adaptations, and a legion of comic books—she
enjoyed had the perspective that white men are heroes, she might find her own
conception of hero incorporating those same characteristics. By trying on the
perspectives of those movies, TV shows, video games, and comics over and over
again, she is collecting innumerable examples of “hero” as a white man. With those
examples then far outnumbering any examples of “hero” as someone who isn’t
white, or isn’t male (or isn’t straight, or able, or thin), 23 they become the examples
that are most accessible to her when she reaches for the concept of “hero.” Would it

22

See Noël Carroll 1998.
Thus far I’ve focused predominantly on identities—race, gender, sexuality, ability, etc—
rather than on something like a person’s occupation, or their interests. This is because
identities, like one’s race or gender, have a stronger effect on our sense of self than our
occupation or hobbies do; where I can largely separate myself from negative stereotypes
about philosophy professors, it’s much harder to separate myself from negative stereotypes
about women. This is, in part, because my identity as a woman follows me in every aspect of
my life, where my occupation as a philosophy professor doesn’t. For more on this
distinction and the role it plays in my theory, see the section on tracker prejudices in
Chapter 2.
23
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be any wonder, then, that she might start to think that people like her aren’t the sort
of people stories are told about? That she, because she is not white, because she is
not male, is somehow less than? Because fictions can bypass our epistemic defenses
in ways that other forms of communication cannot, and because those same fictions
are making use of the same conceptions ad infinitum, they can shift or reinforce our
own conceptions. Because they can affect our conceptions, we can learn from fiction.

IV. Conclusion
If we are to determine whether and what responsibilities a creator of fiction
has in regard to diversifying their cast of characters, we must first understand
whether and how we can learn from fiction. In this chapter, I’ve surveyed possible
ways to approach this question, from explicit and implicit proposition theories to
knowledge-how and knowledge-what-it-is-like theories, and the position of one who
outright rejects the possibility of learning from fiction. Non-cognitivists like Jerome
Stolnitz argue there is nothing that fiction can teach us that can’t be learned from
some other source, and so anything we may learn from fiction is cognitively trivial.
However, my theory doesn’t require fiction to teach us something new and unique
in order to get off the ground; it needs merely to influence our cognitive toolset in a
way that other forms of information sharing do not. And by shifting our focus away
from ‘learning’ as ‘acquisition of new and unique true beliefs’ and towards ‘learning’
as ‘changing or revising concepts and conceptions’, as Wilson does, we can see that
fiction is capable of precisely that.
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The cognitivist position I sketch out above reflects this shift by
demonstrating fiction’s influence on our understanding. An epistemic agent’s
understanding is the toolset with which they manage incoming information—how
they interpret it, what connections they make, the patterns they see, etc. An
individual epistemic agent’s tendency to make certain connections and spot certain
patterns more than others is their perspective, and while any given agent has one
perspective of their own, it’s possible for epistemic agents to temporarily try on
other perspectives. This is precisely what happens when we are engrossed in, or
transported by, a fiction; we try on the fiction’s perspective, meaning we make the
same sort of connections and see the same sort of patterns the fiction does for the
time we engage with it. But as Camp notes, adopting another perspective isn’t
always a temporary thing. By rehearsing a perspective other than our own, we may
find our own perspective altered, such that the associations we make reflect those
made in the fiction even after we’ve returned to the real world. In other words, we
may change or revise our conceptions to more closely mimic those we temporarily
adopted through the fiction, whether consciously or not. This, then, is how I propose
we learn from fiction: when we enjoy a fiction we adopt its perspective, and in the
process of rehearsing that perspective we edit and adjust our own.
And there’s good reason to believe fiction has this power. Green’s
experiments demonstrate that the more transported we are by a fiction—the more
engrossed we are by it, the more we’re enjoying it—the more likely we are to adopt
its worldview as our own. Couple this with our use of accessibility as a heuristic, and
we can begin to see where fiction’s epistemic influence becomes a problem. When
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uncertain of the likelihood of something, we tend to guess how likely it is based on
the accessibility of examples of it. Someone who enjoys learning about serial killers,
and thereby has more examples of serial killings readily accessible than someone
who doesn’t, might feel it’s more likely they’ll be the victim of a serial killer than the
non-aficionado. If every fictional perspective we try on reflects the same
stereotypes, then—depicting white, straight men as superheroes, white, thin,
emotional women as desirable, or Black and Latinx characters as violent,
unintelligent, irrational thugs—we’ll accumulate a cavalcade of examples that will
make those associations (whiteness with heroism or desirability, non-whiteness
with villainy or violence) more accessible to us. In turn, we will begin to see
whiteness as a good indicator of heroism and desirability, and non-whiteness as a
good indicator of villainy or violence, even outside of the fictions we engage with.
This, then, is how we can explain Nyong’o’s experience. Because a majority of
the fictions she engaged with told the story of white characters, she was repeatedly
asked to adopt the perspective that white folks matter, that they’re worthy of having
their stories told. The accessibility of examples for people who mattered, then,
people who were desirable, or interesting, or enough, skewed white—leaving her
with the inverse conclusion. If all of the people who were enough were white, then
dark-skinned people like herself were not enough. And this is the message she
learned and internalized from fiction.
The ability to influence our conceptions in this way is the reason I argue for a
hermeneutical responsibility for fiction creators. If wielded carelessly, this influence
can cause the sort of internalized harm Nyong’o describes—and, moreover, can
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reinforce prejudiced beliefs we have about others. In the next chapter, I will expand
on this epistemic power, and solidify my theory of epistemic responsibility.

2

A Creator’s Responsibility

I. “Ain’t No Bitches Gonna Hunt No Ghosts”
In a 2016 post, Reddit user Crazylegsmurphy explored their conflicted
feelings about a movie that would have its theatrical release the next day: Paul Feig’s
Ghostbusters. As a childhood fan of the original film, Crazylegsmurphy mused that
the soon-to-be-released addition to the franchise left them feeling uncomfortable
with wearing their Ghostbusters t-shirt in public:
The good feelings that were once there, are now tainted with the controversy
surrounding the new film. The pride of wearing the logo, has now been
replaced with frustration and negative feelings…when I say, "It ruined my
childhood" what I am really saying is that many of the positive associations I
had with the franchise have been replaced with negativity. In essence, the
little memories in the corners of my ever failing mind are now clouded by a
slimy coating of "Girl Power" and shooting ghosts in the dick.
(Crazylegsmurphy 2016)
The “controversy” they refer to surfaced long before the film premiered and
centered on a single aspect of it: the all-male cast of four ghost-hunting scientists of
the 1980s had been replaced by a cast of all women. This had many fans of the
earlier films up in arms, claiming that in making this change Feig and his creative
team had betrayed the spirit of the franchise, thereby “ruining their childhoods”
with this “slimy coating of “Girl Power.” Like Crazylegsmurphy, most who railed
against the film assured their feelings did not center on the gender of the new
characters per se, and were neither sexist nor misogynistic. Rather, they were a
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response to what they perceived to be a betrayal of the franchise’s authenticity:
changing the cast’s gender wasn’t a choice made for artistic purposes, but
specifically to pander to an overly politically correct audience (Masood 2017). Such
changes, the argument goes, ruins perfectly good stories for the sake of appeasing a
small group of people who were never the stories’ target audience in the first place
(Ibid). In other words, the creators who make these changes are meddling in things
they have no business being concerned with; a creator of fiction’s responsibility is to
the fiction, to telling a good, entertaining story, and not to the social concerns others
attempt to press upon them.1
The claim that this rejection of the new film—and those like it—has little to
do with gender is somewhat undercut by the sort of online treatment the stars and
creative team received, however. Trolls created a “fake Twitter account set up in
[Feig’s] name that sent out racist tweets”, Melissa McCarthy, Kristen Wiig, and Kate
McKinnon received hateful and threatening tweets, and Leslie Jones was first
doxxed, then had her private pictures stolen and posted online, and was ultimately
forced off Twitter for a time by the racist and violent messages she had been
bombarded with (Rogers 2016). A “coordinated campaign by a group of mostly male
naysayers” ensured that “the first trailer for the new film, released in early March,
became the most disliked trailer in YouTube history” (Cieply and Barnes 2016).
Crazylegsmurphy themselves later updated their post to include a link to their
answer to “the sexism/female responses” to the cited post that had been deleted

1

Some readers might note a familiar strain in this complaint; it stems from similar
sentiments as those found in autonomist arguments, that the responsibility of an artist is to
their art alone. I take up the autonomist objection to my theory in Chapter 4.
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from “this and other subreddits” but had found a home on “the Mens Rights
subreddit” (2016). (I will not reproduce the contents of that response here but will
instead leave it to the reader to imagine what it contained.) The nature of this
response seems to indicate that, whatever their claims to betrayal of the fiction’s
authenticity, those who were angered by the new film were concerned more with
the gender of the main characters than the quality of the movie itself. Aside from the
gendered nature of most of the online attacks, nearly all the above backlash
occurred before the film premiered—at a time when the quality of the film could not
be known by the posters, but the gender of the main characters certainly was. The
film itself acknowledges the gendered aspect of the attacks against it by having
Kristen Wiig’s character read a YouTube comment on an in-fiction video of her
encountering a ghost: “Ain’t no bitches gonna hunt no ghosts” (Ghostbusters 2016).
In the controversy surrounding Ghostbusters (2016), we see in microcosm
the negative2 results of a No Representation problem. As we’ve seen in the previous
chapter, engaging with a fiction requires us to try on the fiction’s perspective for a
time, which in turn requires us to adopt the fiction’s conceptions as our own; if
those same conceptions appear ad nauseum in the fictions we engage with, they
become more and more immediately accessible, and we are therefore more likely to

Though I focus here on the negative aspects of the power of popular fiction, on the harm
that can come from its irresponsible use, my account necessarily invites exploration of the
positive aspects of this power: its ability to break the same stereotypes if done well.
Certainly the reaction to Feig’s Ghostbusters wasn’t entirely negative, as social media posts
and think pieces in line with the #RepresentationMatters movement acknowledged the
importance of having an all-women cast (Mack 2016). The scope of the current project,
however, demands that the positive account be dealt with at a later date; until then, see
Cunliffe 2019.
2
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think they’re true. The Ghostbusters franchise belongs to a subgenre of comedies
that focuses on nerdy scientist-types, a subgenre that had a heyday in the 1980s and
1990s but existed before then and has persisted since. Fans of that genre will have a
cavalcade of examples of scientist-types3 that, like the superheroes in Chapter 1, all
share an extremely similar identity: white, straight, and male. With this in mind, it’s
easy to see how detractors of the film could think the new Ghostbusters was a
betrayal of the original, a violation of its authenticity: according to the conception of
the nerdy scientist-type that typically heads such movies, characters like the
Ghostbusters just are white straight men, and casting actors who are not white, who
are not straight, and who are not men to play the part is merely pandering to a new,
politically correct audience. That white women, queer women, and women of color
are just as capable of being scientists—and, for that matter, funny—is a reality that
is rendered inaccessible by such a stereotype.
That inaccessibility is precisely the danger that I propose hermeneutically
irresponsible creators pose to their audiences. In this chapter, I will lay out my
argument in three points: first, because of fiction’s ability to affect our conceptual
repertoire as discussed in Chapter 1, fictions that are popular among a population
can affect that population’s shared hermeneutical resources; second, because of that
effect, fictions that present a No Representation or Bad Representation problem
contribute to the hermeneutical marginalization of the communities targeted, and
thereby contribute to hermeneutical injustices against them; and third, in light of
this capacity for epistemic harm, creators of fictions have a hermeneutical
3

We’ll visit this in more detail in section 3.

46
responsibility to represent a diverse cast of characters, and to avoid using
stereotypes of those characters in harmful ways. Much of the groundwork for the
first point has already been laid; in this chapter, I will expand on the influence
discussed in Chapter 1 beyond its effects on the individual, to the compounded
influence of a fiction widely engaged with by a population. To do so, I’ll be making
use of collective epistemic tools variably called “shared hermeneutical resources” by
Miranda Fricker and the “social imagination” by José Medina. Once that influence
has been established, I will show that No Representation and Bad Representation
fictions reinforce a specific type of hermeneutical gap in those shared hermeneutical
resources developed by Katharine Jenkins: one in which an incorrect conception is
more accessible to an epistemic agent than the correct conception, rendering the
correct conception less usable. Because hermeneutical gaps are the cause of
hermeneutical injustices, a relationship I’ll return to Fricker to explore, fictions that
reinforce those gaps contribute to the hermeneutical injustices experienced by
members of hermeneutically marginalized groups. Assuming that any epistemic
agent has a responsibility to avoid inflicting epistemic harm on others, then,
creators of fiction have a responsibility to avoid making No Representation and Bad
Representation fictions.
I close out this chapter by framing that responsibility in terms of virtue
epistemology: hermeneutically responsible creators are practicing the epistemic
virtue of due diligence, whereas those who create No Representation and Bad
Representation fictions are practicing either the vice of epistemic laziness or
epistemic paralysis. Practicing due diligence tasks creators with the responsibility of
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seeking out, learning about, and avoiding the harmful deployment of stereotypes by
engaging with the work of creators and theorists who are either affected by or study
such stereotypes and their presence in fiction. Those who choose to include
characters with marginalized identities in their fictions, but do not take the time to
learn about or avoid the harmful use of stereotypes that may surround that identity
exhibit the epistemic vice of laziness. Those who choose to exclude characters with
marginalized identities from their fiction, rather than doing the work of learning
about and avoiding harmful stereotypes about them, exhibit the opposing vice of
epistemic paralysis. Thus, by the end of this chapter I will have not only argued that
creators of fiction have a hermeneutical responsibility to create diverse casts in
their fictions without including harmful stereotypes, but also shown what it means
to carry that responsibility out.

II. Hermeneutical Gaps and Social Imaginations
The overarching claim of this project is that the creators of fiction have an
epistemic responsibility to include diverse characters in their fictions without
resorting to harmful stereotypes. In this section I will build the foundation for that
responsibility by demonstrating that the epistemic power of fiction, as discussed in
Chapter 1, can cause or perpetuate hermeneutical gaps in a population’s social
imagination. A fiction that is popular enough in a population can influence the
hermeneutical resources of more than just a single viewer; by influencing the
collective hermeneutical resources of an entire audience, it influences that
population’s social imagination. If it does so irresponsibly, by making use of harmful
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stereotypes or excluding characters with marginalized identities entirely, it can
create or reinforce a particular type of “hermeneutical gap” in that social
imagination, in which correct conceptions of a thing are obscured by false ones.
These gaps are what prime individuals to experience the harms of hermeneutical
injustice, which will motivate the hermeneutical responsibility of creators in the
next section.
In Chapter 1, I used the work of social psychologists to argue that fiction has
the ability to influence what Lamarque and Olsen called our conceptual repertoire.
When we engage with a fiction, we temporarily adopt its perspective as our own.
That means making the connections, seeing the patterns, and coming to the
conclusions authorized by the fiction. For the time that we adopt the fiction’s
perspective, we stop challenging the veracity or accuracy of the information
presented with us: for the sake of engaging with the fiction, we set that epistemic
work aside—we suspend our disbelief. Adopting a fiction’s perspective is required
for engaging with it, in a way it isn’t required to engage with a political speech or a
commercial or some such thing. There’s reason to believe that in practicing “seeing”
through the fiction’s perspective, we adopt some of the same connections, patterns,
and conclusions as our own, as the work of Melanie C. Green demonstrates. If the
fiction draws a connection between “heroism” and “whiteness” or “maleness,” for
instance, we will walk away with a conception of heroism that auto-populates with
whiteness and/or maleness. If a majority of the fictions we engage with draw that
same connection, we’ll have a plethora of instances to reinforce that conception.
And, if those instances outnumber instances of “heroism” that isn’t connected with
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whiteness and/or maleness, we’ll be more likely to believe that heroic people just
are male and white, courtesy of the accessibility bias. So, in short: we try on a
fiction’s perspective, adopting its conceptions; those conceptions linger with us after
we leave the fiction; if those conceptions outnumber other conceptions, they’re
more accessible to us when we’re filling in gaps of information; therefore, we’re
more likely to think they’re true. Because we have to try on their perspectives,
fictions can influence the epistemic tools we use to process information and fill in
gaps in knowledge.
If any given fiction has the capacity to alter an individual’s hermeneutical
resources4 if it is transportive enough (ie, we enjoy it and get caught up in it),
fictions popular among a given population have the capacity to alter its social
imagination. Individuals of a given population5 will often share the same sorts of
conceptions, stories, and patterns, and those collective hermeneutical resources
available to them are referred to as their “social imagination.” Miranda Fricker
describes it as “our shared tools of social interpretation” (2007, 7) while José
Medina defines the social imagination as “the repository of images and scripts that
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For our purposes, an epistemic agent’s “hermeneutical resources” includes what
Lamarque and Olsen refer to as our “conceptual repertoire.” Because the former is the
accepted nomenclature in epistemic injustice theories, I’ll be making use of it going forward.
5 My use of “population” here is purposefully vague. Because a social imagination is the
collective hermeneutical resources of those who participate in it, there can be any number
of social imaginations across any number of social groups. We may be able to say that there
is a social imagination that belongs to people raised in the United States, but there will also
be a social imagination belonging to Latinx folks raised in the United States, or women
raised in the United States, or queer folks raised in the United States, or fans of science
fiction raised in the United States, or queer Latinx women who are fans of science fiction
raised in the United States. Medina (2013) explores this plurality of social imaginations
more thoroughly.
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become collectively shared…[which] constitutes the representational background
against which people tend to share their thoughts and listen to each other in a
culture” (2013, 67). In other words, the social imagination serves as an epistemic
baseline; the basic conceptions, beliefs, stories, images, and patterns that a
population shares about what the world is like—that freedom isn’t free, or that
bootstrapping is possible for anyone in America, for instance6—that we use to
organize and describe our experiences, collected together form the social
imagination. Those things that compose the social imagination often go
unchallenged; they’re so widely accepted as true that it doesn’t always occur to us to
question them in the first place.7 Moreover, the social imagination is so thoroughly
accepted by its population that agents will actively try to ignore or reject something
that challenges its scripts: “Those under the sway of this social imagina[tion]—
essentially all those who have been raised under the influence of these imaginings
and the cultural representations they produced—are likely to develop epistemic
habits that protect established cultural expectations and make them relatively blind
and deaf to these things that seem to defy those expectations” (Medina 2013, 68).
If you react with skepticism towards the “unchallenged” nature of these stories, you aren’t
wrong to do so; the reason why they stand out as possible examples for me is because their
veracity has been tested, and their nature as stories (rather than objective fact, or some
such thing) exposed. It’s much harder to locate an example that, to one’s knowledge, hasn’t
been tested—because we wouldn’t know to view it as a mere tool, rather than some kind of
fact.
7 It’s important to note here that this is particularly true for populations that are
hermeneutically privileged—that is to say, those whose hermeneutical tools are already
reflected and accepted by the social imagination they participate in. Those who are
hermeneutically marginalized in that population likely have a higher dose of epistemic
friction coming their way, and so are more likely to challenge the assumptions of their
shared hermeneutical resources. A white queer person may have a better time identifying
the heteronormative assumptions in the white social imagination they participate in, for
instance. But more on hermeneutical privilege and marginalization in a bit.
6
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They are ingrained in us through social forces, and are accepted as true—until
something presents a significant enough epistemic conflict, the “epistemic friction”
(Op. cit., 50) to cause us to wonder if they’re not.8 Even then, we are more likely to
explain those challenges away than we are to change our conceptions in response.
Suppose that a film depicting a group of scientists, engineers, and computer
whizzes becomes popular among a population that has little contact with those
occupations (or those who have them) in their daily routines. As a film that
transports not just one, but most of the members of this population, it may be that
the depiction of that group of scientists, engineers, and computer whizzes as
straight men who are socially awkward and enjoy comic books and Dungeons and
Dragons is picked up as a shared hermeneutical resource. Now, when hearing the
word “scientist,” “engineer,” or “computer whizz,” members of that population may
fill in the image with the conception of “a straight man who is socially awkward and
enjoys comic books and Dungeons and Dragons”—and if interacting together, those
occupations can become shorthand for those characteristics between those
epistemic agents. Because this conception is shared by most, if not all, of the people
in this population, it is a shared hermeneutical resource; it’s part of their social
imagination, and it will become a script through which they make sense of the world
around them.
While the ability to affect our social imagination is not a necessarily negative
thing, it does mean that using negative stereotypes of marginalized groups in

8

This is the positive effect fictions can have when they successfully avoid stereotypes and
include diverse characters in diverse roles; by providing an example that breaks the
stereotype, they can cause us to examine the veracity of that stereotype.
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popular fiction, or leaving them out of the fiction completely, can cause real harm.
The main threat posed by popular fictions that do this is their capacity to create
and/or reinforce what social epistemologists call hermeneutical gaps by spreading
these stereotypes, or otherwise allowing them to be more accessible than nonstereotypes. Gaps in a population’s social imagination are dangerous because they
are what prime individuals for the harms of hermeneutical injustice.
A hermeneutical gap (or lacuna) exists when no hermeneutical resource is
available to accurately explain or describe the experience a marginalized person
has, and it can take shape in three ways9. In one, a concept exists within a social
group, but because that group is hermeneutically marginalized, it stays confined
primarily within that group. This may be the sort of gap that exists between various
groups of color and white populations that makes conversations about white
ignorance and privilege difficult to have (see Medina 2013, 30-39). Certainly
communities of color have concepts within their own populations to make sense of
their experiences with white folks, but if the avenues of hermeneutic creation 10 are
dominated by white folks (as they have been for centuries), it’s unlikely that those
concepts can quickly and easily make the jump to other communities. Due
simultaneously to the absence of group members from the avenues of
hermeneutical creation, and the failure of those in the avenues to consult group

The language of “gaps” was used by Fricker to describe this phenomenon, and has been
adopted by Medina and Jenkins in turn. For a longer discussion of the three types, see
Jenkins 2016.
10 More on this later.
9
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members for their experiences, these concepts remain restricted to those
marginalized groups and appear as gaps to others. 11
Another form of gap occurs when the concept simply does not exist for
anyone. While this would encompass the same difficulties as the first type of gap—if
it doesn’t exist for anyone, the concept won’t exist between social groups—this gap
can be particularly harmful to individuals. Fricker points to the relatively recent
development of the concept of sexual harassment as an example of such a gap. Prior
to the popularization of the concept, women attempting to explain their experience
to others were often met with incredulous responses: surely her boss was just doing
some harmless flirting, or paying her a compliment, or just being a man, or she was
encouraging it, none of which adequately describe the experience of someone being
sexually harassed at work (Fricker 2007, 150-151). Worse yet, those who were on
the receiving end of such behavior found it difficult to make sense of their
experience, even to themselves (cf Carmita Wood’s experience, referenced in Op. cit.,
149-150). It wasn’t that they couldn’t comprehend their discomfort without the
literal phrase “sexual harassment” to use, but the reason for the persistent anxiety
and stress, the way to convey it both to themselves and to others, defied description.
An accurate rendering of the experience had not yet been made, leaving them
without the means to even explain to themselves why they were feeling the way

Medina does note, in a point that ought not be overlooked, that this marginalization need
not be due simply to the ignorance of the privileged group. It may behoove the marginalized
group to keep the concepts to themselves, as a matter of protection. Unfortunately, I do not
have space to further explore this idea and its relation to this topic.
11
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they were. This hermeneutical gap existed not only for others, but for those who
experienced it directly as well; the concept simply didn’t exist yet.
The third form of hermeneutical gap—and the one most suited to our
purposes here—exists when some incorrect understanding of a thing prevents an
epistemic agent from accessing and/or applying the correct understanding to an
experience. Katharine Jenkins developed this third form in order to explain the
reticence many regularly show to identifying a certain act as sexual assault, or as
domestic violence (2016). According to this explanation, individuals reluctant to call
a certain act sexual assault often do so because they believe in a rape myth: popular
understandings of sexual assault that require it to be violent, that require the victim
to fight back against their assailant, that require the assailant to be a stranger to the
victim, etc. This myth overpowers a more accurate understanding of sexual assault
as a sexual act intentionally committed against a non-consenting person. Unlike the
previous two types of hermeneutical gap, this accurate understanding likely does
exist for the epistemic agent in question; it isn’t beyond their grasp, or something
that doesn’t exist for them yet. As such, it isn’t ignorance that prevents them from
applying it to an experience they have or are presented with, and thereby being
better able to make sense of the experience to themselves and others. Rather, this
popular but inaccurate understanding of sexual assault prevents them from
recognizing that experience for what it is. If the agent understands sexual assault to
require violence, to require the victim to fight back, or to be perpetrated by a
stranger, then an instance in which a college student too inebriated to consent is
taken advantage of by the person they’ve been dating wouldn’t qualify as such—
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despite that instance fitting the more accurate understanding. The inaccurate
understanding is more accessible than the accurate one, meaning the agent is less
able to apply the latter when it’s warranted. This inability to access the right
understanding effectively creates a (third type of) hermeneutical gap for the agent.
To shift Jenkins’ account into our own terminology, we can understand this
blockage in terms of concepts and conceptions. In Chapter 1, we identified concepts
and conceptions as two tools of the understanding: concepts are fixed tools of
identification, with details abstracted away in order to make the concept as general
as possible; conceptions are more web-like and malleable, populated by
characteristics we associate together. So our concept of “doctor” might be
something like “advanced medical professional,” but our conception of “doctor”
might include intelligent, wealthy, attractive, and whatever else we think a doctor is
or ought to be. In Jenkins’ example, then, we can think of the more accurate
understanding of sexual assault as the concept of sexual assault. The details of any
specific instance of sexual assault have been abstracted away to leave only the bare
bones of what it is: as a sexual act intentionally committed against a non-consenting
person. But the rape myths are conceptions that tie in all this extraneous
information, additional requirements that obscure the concept with their
superfluous associations. Not just non-consent, but violently ignored non-consent. If
that conception of sexual assault is more familiar, more readily accessible to an
epistemic agent than the concept of it, they’ll more readily apply the conception than
the concept even when the concept better fits the experience in question. Thus, the
conception of sexual assault as necessarily violent creates a hermeneutical gap.
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Let’s try a separate example: there is a similar popular misunderstanding of
depression in the US. There are a number of myths12 that circulate in our society,
persuading us that those who suffer from clinical depression are simply wallowing
in their own misery, and they need only to have a change in outlook or even just try
to be happy to overcome their condition. All this, despite having a medical
conception of depression that soundly rejects this depiction. In this case, the myths
that are popularly believed obscure the otherwise accurate conception that already
exists, preventing it from being widely available to the population to apply. Whether
or not you are someone who has experienced clinical depression, such myths can
prevent you from having an accurate understanding of your experience (or
another’s) despite the existence of accurate hermeneutical resources. In that case,
the popular conception of depression as something that’s “all in your head” and a
matter of having a positive attitude is more accessible than the correct concept of
depression, blocking the latter off and creating a hermeneutical gap.
Now: as you will recall, our focus is on the effect of stereotypes in fictions on
our hermeneutical tools. If we are to apply Jenkins’ form of hermeneutical gaps to
our project then, there must be a less accurate understanding, perpetuated by the
fictions in question, that renders a more accurate understanding inaccessible. In the
previous examples this is pretty straightforward—but the previous examples have
legal or medical definitions to rely on as the accurate concept. Perhaps in the case of
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Mental illnesses as a whole are ripe for these sorts of hermeneutical gaps. Stereotypical
depictions of autism (non-verbal, anti-social, easily overstimulated), ADHD (hyperactive
children unable to sit still), addiction (immoral, unhealthy), bipolar disorder (either
romanticized as tragically artistic or villainized as cruelly manipulative), all overpower
otherwise accurate and helpful medical concepts of the disorders.
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“scientist” we still have a definition we can rely on as the accurate concept (more on
that in a bit), but what happens in the case of Bad Representation problems? What
happens when the inaccurate conception in question is, “members of marginalized
group x have characteristic y”? For instance: women are regularly stereotyped in
fictions as being emotionally driven, sometimes to the detriment of rationality.
Though I would classify such a stereotype as an inaccurate conception, answering
that the accurate concept of “women” it’s obfuscating is “rational, not-overlyemotional human beings” is less than satisfying. This is in part because there will be
real women in the real world who fit the stereotype—real women who are
emotionally driven, sometimes to the detriment of rationality. More problematic,
however, is the essentialist suggestion lurking in such an answer. Declaring that the
accurate concept of “women” is as “rational, not-overly-emotional human beings”
would suggest there is only one way to be a woman, and it’s as rational, not-overlyemotional human beings. This would be true of any instance in which we tried to
correct a stereotype by claiming its opposite as the “more accurate” concept of the
targeted marginalized group.
Better then—and more accurate—to say the stereotype is inaccurate because
it suggests there is only one way for members of marginalized group x to be. Recall
that concepts are useful because they’re abstract; because concepts are free of
extraneous details, they allow us to identify whole swaths of experiences, objects,
and people as belonging to the same categories regardless of differentiating details.
But stereotypes are conceptions, associations loosely made between some thing and
all the characteristics we think it generally does or ought to have. When we have the
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stereotype of women as emotionally driven in our hermeneutical tools, 13 we have a
conception of women that tells us they either are or ought to be emotionally driven.
In reality, the concept of “woman” needn’t have that detail. There’s nothing that
defines women, as a category of persons, as necessarily emotionally driven; on the
contrary, there are any number of ways for a person to be a woman, or to
experience womanhood or femininity. An accurate concept of “women” would allow
for that flexibility, such that we could identify any number of persons as women
regardless of the details that differentiate them. As such, it’s the inaccurate
conception that threatens essentialism, not the accurate concept.
While fiction undoubtedly has the capacity to contribute to hermeneutical
gaps of the first and second variety, I am most interested in the ways it can both
create and reinforce the third. Instances of Bad Representation or No
Representation in fictions bolster the accessibility of inaccurate conceptions, which
in turn can render them more accessible than their manifest counterparts. When
this happens, Bad Representation and/or No Representation fictions contribute to
the maintenance of a hermeneutical gap, blocking their audiences from accessing
real understandings of the experiences they purport to represent, even when useful
concepts already exist. In other words, they function like Jenkins’ myths.

13

Note that my framing of these stereotypes doesn’t open with “some” or “most.”
Stereotypes often take the form of generics, rather than quantified statements. Not only has
social psychology shown us that generics are incredibly resilient—resisting revision despite
any number of fact-based counterexamples—they’re the result of some level of
essentialization, as well. Thus, stereotypes about essentialized social groups (like gender
and race) tend to be revision resistant. For more on this, see Leslie 2014.
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As we have seen in Chapter 1, fiction is not only capable of influencing our
hermeneutical resources, but in many cases can do so more easily than other forms
of media. If that fiction is widely engaged with and enjoyed throughout a given
population, it can affect the collective hermeneutical resources of that population,
their social imagination. In some cases, like in that of Ghostbusters (2016), that could
be a good thing; the use of depictions that defy the widely held stereotype can help
us recognize them as harmful and untruthful. But when wielded irresponsibly, that
influence can result in the creation or reinforcement of an inaccurate conception
over and above the more accurate concept already in play. In the case of a popular
film in which scientists are depicted as socially inept straight men with
stereotypically nerdy interests, the population that enjoys it may adopt an
inaccurate conception of “scientist” as being someone who is awkward, male, and
involved in nerdy masculine hobbies—when that is simply not the case. The
popularity of this conception in that population’s social imagination constitutes a
hermeneutical gap, as it renders the incorrect conception of scientist more
accessible than the correct concept: someone who engages in scientific study,
regardless of gender, hobbies, or social skill. These kinds of gaps can create a
number of different harms for those who are affected by them, as we will see in the
next section.

III. Hermeneutical Injustice and Responsibility
Now that we have established the kind of hermeneutical gaps that popular
fiction is particularly adept at creating and reinforcing, we can understand the sort
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of epistemic threat they pose. Once a hermeneutical gap exists in our social
imagination, it can prime hermeneutically marginalized individuals for
hermeneutical injustice. As hermeneutically privileged individuals, creators of
fiction have a responsibility to avoid creating or reinforcing these gaps through the
use of harmful stereotypes in their fiction, or the exclusion of diverse characters
from their casts. In the following section, I will explore how the “myths” popular
fictions can spread can result in hermeneutical injustice for hermeneutically
marginalized individuals, and why that makes creators of fiction hermeneutically
privileged.
In a 2013 study, social psychologist Sapna Cheryan and her team asked US
college students what came to mind when they heard the phrase “computer
scientist.” They discovered that the majority of their test population returned the
same general description: “Both women and men spontaneously offered an image of
computer scientists as technology-oriented, intensely focused on computers,
intelligent, and socially unskilled” (Cheryan et all 2013, 8). The students also almost
unanimously agreed that computer scientists typically were men, who had
“masculine interests (e.g., videogames)” and were “[bespectacled], pale, thin,
unattractive” (Op. cit., Table 2).14 Different groups were then given different fictional
articles reporting on the state of the current computer science field, one confirming
that the stereotypes were accurate, and one that “claim[ed] that computer science

Poignantly, women who had not taken a computer science course while in college were
more than twenty percent more likely to respond with these stereotypes than women who
had experienced the field firsthand—cf Table 4 of the study. This suggests that the influence
of these false conceptions fade when an agent has direct experience of the thing, but this is
an implication that will have to be taken up at a later date.
14
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majors no longer fit current stereotypes” (Op. cit., 10). The students were then
asked if they would consider becoming computer scientists themselves. Since
“undergraduates not only consider required classes and career prospects; but they
also compare themselves to those currently in the field for clues about whether they
belong” (Op. cit., 4), it will be fairly unsurprising to find that men were not
discouraged to join the field by the fictional article which confirmed the stereotype
as true, but women were (Op. cit., 10). When shown the other article, however,
women’s interest in the field doubled (Op. cit., Figure 1). A 2017 survey reveals that
these are not singular results, as such stereotypes—and their effect on women—
have been documented across the computer science, engineering, and physics fields
in research dating back to 1990 (Cheryan et all). The perceived truth of the widely
held stereotype affects women’s ability to envision themselves in these STEM fields.
The results of the study exemplify (albeit, in a sterilized test environment)
the hermeneutical injustice that can occur as a result of the third type of
hermeneutical gap, the “myth.” When an epistemic agent is the victim of
hermeneutical injustice, they suffer “the injustice of having some significant area of
[their] social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to
hermeneutical marginalization” (Fricker 2007, 159). It is “the kind of injustice that
appears when there are wrongful interpretative obstacles that affect people
differently in how they are silenced, that is, in their inability to express themselves
and be understood” (Medina 2013, 91). Hermeneutical injustice then, is the moment
in which a person’s inability to make sense of a lived experience—whether to
themselves or to another epistemic agent—is felt, due to unnecessary, socially
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encouraged, and epistemically vicious conceptual blockages or absences. In the case
of Cheyran et all’s study, the issue is a conceptual blockage: a hermeneutical gap, of
the type discussed by Jenkins, prevents many of the women who participated in the
study from envisioning themselves as members of the computer science field. The
inaccurate conception—or “myth”—about computer scientists, engineers, and
physicists as being typically male, socially awkward, and fans of “nerdy” interests,
dominates the correct concept of a computer scientist, engineer, or physicist, which
is someone who works in one of those STEM fields, regardless of their gender, social
aptitude, or hobbies. Our society generally expects women to be socially adroit,
physically attractive, and more knowledgeable about emotions than the logical
rigors of math and science;15 as such, it should not be surprising that many of the
women who participated in the study did not want to join the computer science field
when the inaccurate conception of a computer scientist was confirmed: it paints a
computer scientist as everything they are not. 16 All this, despite the existence of a
concept of the field that has no requisite gender and no reason why women could
not be equally competent in it. When a woman student is unable to imagine herself

15

Some may note the sort of stereotypes that can be harmful in the way I’ve described don’t
involve one’s occupation. Unlike one’s race or gender, occupations don’t follow a person
through life; they don’t acquire “tracker prejudices” (Fricker 2007) the same way. They are
correct. The harmful stereotype here isn’t that one must be good at math or have nerdy
hobbies in order to be a computer scientist. The harmful stereotype is that being good at
math or having nerdy hobbies are masculine traits—traits that any given woman wouldn’t
and/or shouldn’t have. That typical computer scientist-y traits are all associated with
masculinity is what keeps women out of the field in this example.
16 It should be noted that this result may be just as much about the women who participated
internalizing incorrect stereotypes about what a woman “should” be as it is about them
internalizing this conception of computer scientists. For more on harmful stereotypes about
gender, see Chapter 3.
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as fitting the mold of a computer scientist, perhaps despite having all the requisite
interests and abilities to suit such a career, she is unable to apply the correct
concepts to her experience because stereotypes convince her that her case doesn’t
qualify. This is a hermeneutical injustice.
Such injustices have a number of negative effects that are both epistemic and
practical. Practically, there is material value at stake. Women who are blocked from
picturing themselves as computer scientists are also blocked from any monetary
gain that might come from such a profession; those who are already in the field but
doubt their aptitude in it, perhaps out of a kind of impostor’s syndrome, will not
progress. Similarly, those who have had their experience of sexual harassment
hemmed in by false stereotypes may find it incredibly difficult to get justice, or may
be forced out of their jobs and careers by their harassers. Those whose experience
of depression is obscured by myths can fail to seek out or receive effective
treatment; if their employer’s understanding of depression is obscured by myths,
they can be punished unfairly for effects of their condition that cannot be controlled.
And populations of color whose high incarceration, unemployment, and drug abuse
rates are justified through stereotypes of higher rates of aggression and laziness are
susceptible (at abnormally high rates) to just about every social threat there is.
Issues of hermeneutical marginalization and the injustices that result from them
aren’t merely academic problems; they present very real, very practical dangers in
them as well.
A deeper threat than this, however—one that goes beyond even the day-today material problems above—is the epistemic cost that often comes with such

64
injustices. Whereas most of the above material problems require others to fail to
have some understanding of your experience, the internalization of all of those
stereotypes poses a much deeper, psychological threat: a hit to one’s own epistemic
self-confidence. If all the explanations the social imagination has on offer fail to suit
your experience of an event, there is a very good chance that you will begin to doubt
yourself: “When you find yourself in a situation in which you seem to be the only
one to feel the dissonance between received understanding and your own intimated
sense of a given experience, it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make
sense of the world, or at least the relevant region of the world” (Fricker 2007, 164).
In order to be an effective epistemic agent, one must be able to trust that they are
capable of trusting, to some degree, their own experiences. If they don’t, then
anyone’s interpretation of that experience may seem just as good as any other; there
would be no criteria against which to judge the information that other epistemic
agents may present. Having low epistemic self-confidence can mean doubting
oneself in one of the most fundamental capacities human beings have. It can mean
doubting one’s place in the world, or how to make sense of one’s very identity.
Because it has this peculiar kind of influence over our social imaginations,
this ability to obscure concepts with false conceptions, those who create popular
fiction are hermeneutically privileged. Those who are hermeneutically privileged
are uniquely positioned such that the concepts they create, shape, and popularize
have a higher chance of becoming part of our society’s social imagination, and
thereby part of its shared hermeneutical tools. Fricker offers academics, lawyers,
journalists, and politicians as some examples of people who wield this power, and
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the influence I have argued for would add creators of popular fiction to that list. This
isn’t necessarily a bad thing. That some will have more influence on a society’s
available concepts and stories seems inevitable in one way or another; the problem
arises when hermeneutically privileged positions are dominated by one social
group. Human beings are naturally inclined to investigate those matters that are
closest and most related to themselves because, as Fricker points out, “we try
hardest to understand those things it serves us to understand” (2007, 153). This is
epistemically helpful in many ways, as attempting to investigate every single issue a
person can be presented with would result in paralyzing “cognitive overload” (2016,
144). But if academia, law, journalism, politics, and all those occupations that
produce hermeneutical resources are dominated by one social group—say, white,
straight, wealthy, abled, cis-gendered men—then this tendency means all the
hermeneutical resources produced will be geared towards explaining the world of
that social group. This in turn leaves those who are not members of that social
group—queer, working class, disabled, transgender women of color, perhaps—
without many tools with which to make their experiences understandable to
someone outside their social group. Worse yet, the dearth of concepts suited to
explain their world may be so severe that they cannot even make sense of it
themselves. In other words, it creates hermeneutical gaps that set folks up for
hermeneutical injustice.
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Those who are primed for hermeneutical injustice, in turn, are considered
hermeneutically marginalized. Hermeneutical marginalization 17 stands opposite to
hermeneutical privilege. It’s the experience of having one’s experiences be
underrepresented in the social imagination, resulting in a lack of concepts suited to
explaining and understanding that experience. Hermeneutically marginalized
groups suffer from, as Fricker explains it, “unequal hermeneutical participation with
respect to some significant area(s) of social experience” (2007, 153), and so the
concepts needed to explain those experiences are lacking and the ones that are
available don’t do the job. If all the avenues of hermeneutical creation are
dominated by white, straight, wealthy, abled, cis-gendered men, the natural
tendency of humans to focus on personal interests will mean the majority of the
concepts and tools they develop will suit their needs and explain their experiences;
people of color, queer individuals, working class groups, differently abled
populations, trans, non-binary, and gender-queer people, and women may find the
concepts created by the privileged group do not work well to describe their own
experiences. This is what it means to be hermeneutically marginalized, and thereby
be primed for hermeneutical injustice.

17

I have, until now, been using “marginalized” as a way to describe marginalized social
identities, rather than the hermeneutical marginalization introduced here. This is not an
accidental conflation, however, as many of the individuals who are hermeneutically
marginalized, or otherwise suffer epistemic injustice, are made victims because of their
marginalized social identities. Those identities often come with what Fricker terms “tracker
prejudices” attached: “prejudices that ‘track’ the subject through different dimensions of
social activity—economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and so
on” (2007, 28). Such prejudices are generally responsible for preventing those who have
marginalized social identities from being heard, and keeps them out of hermeneutically
privileged positions, two factors that lead to hermeneutical marginalization.
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As individuals who are hermeneutically privileged, then, creators of fiction
have a hermeneutical responsibility to avoid falling into the traps of epistemic
laziness and paralysis. This is because, unlike other epistemic agents, the works they
produce have the ability to affect the social imagination of the populations that
engage with them. These are the dangers posed by hermeneutical injustice, which is
in turn created by the existence of hermeneutical gaps. By making harmful
stereotypes18 more accessible than the correct concept, popular fiction can provide
“an easily imaginable, ready-made scenario” (Medina 2013, 68) that we can slot our
experiences into, one that is accepted by the majority of folks around us. It can
create and/or reinforce the sort of hermeneutical gaps that Jenkins describes: myths
that cover up the true concept of the thing. This is not only due to fiction’s capacity
to bypass our epistemic defenses, but the sheer repetition of the same stereotypes.
The depictions of computer scientists—and engineers, and physicists—in the study
matches decades of depictions of scientists in popular fiction. Television shows like
The Big Bang Theory, The IT Crowd, or Silicon Valley, or movies like Revenge of the
Nerds, or Weird Science, or WarGames, or—indeed—the 1980s Ghostbusters movies,
all depict their math- and science-oriented characters as nerdy, socially awkward,
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It should be noted that my account diverges somewhat from Fricker’s in this respect.
Fricker acknowledges the role stereotypes have to play in testimonial injustice, the
epistemic injustice that occurs when a speaker’s trustworthiness is unfairly diminished
because a stereotype about their identity is taken as reason to doubt their epistemic
authority. This is what happens when a listener trusts the word of a white man over that of
a Black woman, even when they know she’s an expert in the field and he isn’t. But in my
theory, those same stereotypes can further reinforce a person’s hermeneutical
marginalization by making it that much harder to make their experiences understood—
either because they’ve internalized the stereotype about themselves, or the person they’re
speaking to has.
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unattractive (white) straight men. It’s decidedly unsurprising, then, that so many
fans of these fictions reacted so strongly to the idea of women Ghostbusters; for
decades, the fictions they found most transportive depicted scientists, engineers,
and computer whizzes in the same way, meaning that the most accessible
conception they had of all these things had those same characteristics. First and
foremost, they were men.

IV. Epistemic Virtue and Vices
Because popular fiction can wield this sort of influence over our social
imaginations and potentially cause this kind of harm to real world people, those
who create it have a hermeneutical responsibility to avoid creating fictions that
would cause this harm. Because Fricker and Medina use the framework of virtue
epistemology to construct their theories of hermeneutical injustice, this
responsibility can be understood as a contrast of vice and virtue. Creators who
include characters from marginalized identities but do not make the effort to learn
about and avoid using harmful stereotypes exhibit an epistemic vice that Medina
calls epistemic laziness. Those who choose to exclude characters from marginalized
identities from their fictions rather than learn about the harmful stereotypes that
might target them exhibit an epistemic vice that I call epistemic paralysis. Finally,
responsible creators, who do the best they can to create a diverse cast of characters
without relying on harmful stereotypes, practice an epistemic virtue that I will call
epistemic due diligence.
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Most of us will be familiar with the moral counterpart of virtue epistemology,
the ethical framework that positions what is ethical and right as a kind of middle
path. Virtue, which is behavior that one must practice at to perfect, exists as a
balance between two vices; the virtue of courage is a balance between a deficient
vice (cowardice) and an excessive vice (recklessness). Virtue epistemology
functions on a similar balance,19 but rather than striving for behavior that brings us
closer to the moral Good, it encourages us to model behavior that is most “truthconducing” (Montmarquet 1987, 482). As any epistemic agent’s objective is the
acquisition and maintenance of truth, epistemic virtues are the habitual behaviors
that, when practiced, best allow us to obtain truthful knowledge (op. cit., 486).
Epistemic vices, then, are “a set of corrupted attitudes and dispositions that get in
the way of knowledge” (Medina 2013, 30).20 They are those habitual behaviors that
prevent us from obtaining truthful knowledge.
Using this virtue framework, we can position the two hermeneutically
irresponsible actions creators can take—using harmful stereotypes to depict
marginalized characters, or else choosing not to include them at all—as a deficient
vice and excessive vice, respectively. First, the deficient vice: choosing to make use
of harmful stereotypes in one’s fiction is a form of a vice Medina calls epistemic
laziness. He defines it as “a lack of curiosity about those areas of life that one has
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Not all virtue epistemologists would follow Aristotle’s original structure quite so strictly,
but I find it helpful to do so here.
20 Other epistemic vices might be “intellectual pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice,
conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness,
insensitivity to detail, obtuseness, and lack of thoroughness” (Linda Zagzebski, cited in
Cassam 2019, 14). For a more detailed deconstruction of what epistemic vices are and how
they function, see Cassam 2019, Battaly 2014.
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learned to avoid or not to concern oneself with” (Medina 2013, 33), the absence of
any initiative regarding the testing of one’s own beliefs. To be epistemically lazy is to
have no interest in whether or not one’s beliefs have evidence to support them, or if
they’re more like the myths discussed earlier. It “creates blinders that one allows to
grow around one’s epistemic perspective, constraining and slanting one’s vantage
point” (op cit., 33). Additionally, an agent’s reliance on such a stereotype reflects
ignorance about themselves, as it indicates that they have not interrogated their
beliefs about their own social standing (op. cit., 142). In other words, one has not
done the epistemic work required to notice that the reason they do not need to
think too deeply about the reality of those who are different from them is because
they are socially privileged enough to not have to; they do not know because they do
not need to know (op. cit., 34). Rather than do the work of a responsible epistemic
agent, they are epistemically lazy.
Relying on tired, inaccurate stereotypes that one assumes represent the
experience of a particular marginalized population, rather than investigating the
truth of those suppositions, is a clear instance of such laziness. In this case, creators
who do not themselves embody those marginalized identities do not realize the
harm21 that leaning on harmful stereotypes can cause for those who do.
Alternatively, because so many of these stereotypes have repeatedly appeared in
fiction, they may not even recognize that they have made use of one; insofar as the
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By focusing on the consequences of epistemically vicious behavior, I seem to set myself
up as a virtue-reliabilist. But I don’t see virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism as
mutually exclusive, or even competing, takes on virtue epistemology; as such, I’m happy to
remain agnostic as to which is a better fit here. For more, see Crerar 2017.
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stereotype may exist as part of their social imagination, a creator may make use of it
without even noticing that it is just a stereotype. When a woman character’s main
purpose in a fiction is to provide emotional support and labor to the man
protagonist, who is her love interest, the creator of that fiction may not think to
interrogate that role as being potentially harmful (especially if they are, themselves,
a man). For so long, that is just what women characters have done—it’s a readily
accessible script that is easy to make use of. But failing to be aware of the harmful
stereotype this embodies and perpetuates does not free the creator of culpability,
particularly when such a stereotype has been written about, discussed, and
interrogated as this one has been. Whether out of an ignorance of the stereotype’s
existence or of its harm, the inclusion of harmful stereotypes of marginalized
characters in fictions reflects epistemic laziness on the part of the creator: they do
not need to know, because they do not have to know. By choosing to ignore the
potential hermeneutical harm that their fiction can cause, creators of fiction practice
an epistemic vice.
If there is an excessive counterpart to this deficient vice, it might be
described as an over-abundance of caution. This excessive vice—call it epistemic
paralysis—occurs when an agent recognizes that there is a difficult problem but
chooses to avoid it rather than engage with it, a freedom they have because they are
not directly affected by it. In the case of creators, epistemic paralysis may occur
when a creator recognizes the danger that misrepresenting marginalized characters
poses, and so chooses to not include marginalized characters in their story. Perhaps
a white creator, wary of unintentionally reducing a character of color to a harmful
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stereotype, decides to “play it safe” by creating an all-white cast for their fiction.
While this may initially seem preferable to the outright ignorance or arrogance of
the epistemically lazy creator, the paralyzed creator amounts to the same epistemic
outcome: once more, a privileged agent avoids doing the work of learning about the
marginalized experience in question. They do not need to know because they do not
have to know.
The virtue that sits between these two vices I will call epistemic due diligence.
At the root of this is a virtue that Medina calls curiosity/diligence, reflecting “both
its motivational and performative aspects”, and manifests as “an intellectual
curiosity that motivates [an agent] to fill in their cognitive gaps and to overcome
their cognitive limits” (2013, 43). My change in terminology is to emphasize the
requirement that is placed on creators, specifically; while epistemic
curiosity/diligence is a behavior that would benefit any and all epistemic agents,
Medina discusses it as a kind of epistemic proclivity. I prefer due diligence to
emphasize the call to action that it represents. It is not merely a good thing for
creators to do, as it would be for other agents, but is something that they owe to
their audiences. It is part of their work in creating fictions that creators do the work
of researching and understanding the harmful stereotypes that their fiction could,
accidentally or otherwise, reproduce and propagate. This work should not amount
to merely going to their nearest friend who occupies a marginalized identity and
quizzing them on their experience, however. There are innumerable venues—
particularly with the advent of the internet and social media—in which the
conversation about stereotypes and representation is being carried out. Theorists
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and critics have written books and articles about them, others have created Youtube
channels and Twitter accounts dedicated to collecting and dissecting them, and fans
and laypersons have taken to social media to discuss successes and failures of
various fictions in real time. Once that knowledge has been acquired, it should be
used to interrogate their own creations in order to ensure that they do not
participate in harmful stereotypes. Only in doing so can creators discharge their
hermeneutical responsibility.
There is a facet of this virtue theory backbone that is important to emphasize
here, and that is the habitual nature of it. Whether morally or epistemically, virtues
are not behaviors that one develops overnight. Like other good habits, they must be
acquired little by little, through constant practice. This means that even creators
who aim to practice due diligence may fail to locate and eliminate all harmful
stereotypes from a given fiction—in fact, it is more than likely that most creators
will fail regularly in one way or another. But, as with all virtue theories, discharging
one’s responsibility in this case does not require perfection; it requires only that an
agent try, to the best of their ability, to emulate the required virtue. If one practices
good epistemic responsibility and performs their due diligence, that failure cannot
be blameworthy22 in the same way as one that occurs due to epistemic laziness and
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Fricker 2016 suggests the possibility if no-fault epistemic responsibility: in some cases,
we can criticize a person for behaving viciously, even if they don’t have complete control
over the vice’s influence on their behavior. This is how we might criticize a well-intentioned
person for not recognizing the racially prejudicial assumptions they make, even if those
assumptions are largely due to growing up in a racist society. Cassam 2019 suggests
something similar. However, Battaly 2019 suggests no-fault epistemic responsibility may
cast too wide a net, catching things we wouldn’t call epistemically vicious (blindness,
forgetfulness due to ADHD) under the vice umbrella. Refining our scope is an important
problem to solve, but not one I can undertake here.
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paralysis. In the event that a creator has researched, to the best of their ability, the
harmful stereotypes their fiction may touch upon and still includes one, their
audience is still free to criticize them for it—but there is no need to blacklist or
ridicule them. This is because in many such cases, the creator doesn’t have
acquisition responsibility—in which “they are responsible for acquiring or
developing” the epistemic vice in question—but does have revision responsibility—
in which “a person has the ability to modify their character traits, attitudes, or ways
of thinking…they still have control over them and, because of that, can be
responsible for them” (Cassam 2019, 19). Treating such a failure as a learning
experience and endeavoring to do better in the future—revising their epistemic
traits and behaviors—is all part of the process of habituation.
Before I close, there are a few short points that should be made to clarify my
stance. First, I do not mean for this sort of responsibility to be a replacement for
diversity among creators of popular fiction themselves; the simplest way to prevent
hermeneutical marginalization is to ensure that hermeneutically privileged
positions are not dominated by one (or even a few) social groups. Having highly
responsible white, straight, wealthy, abled, cis-gendered men occupying the vast
majority of hermeneutically privileged positions may help mitigate hermeneutical
marginalization, but it’s very unlikely to solve the problem on its own.23 Second, I in
no way mean to discourage potential creators from representing experiences that
are not their own. On the contrary, asking all heterosexual creators to depict only

This is a subject worthy of its own paper, and unfortunately I don’t have room to discuss
it further here.
23
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heterosexual characters (and so on) has the exact opposite outcome of what I’m
arguing for, and constitutes epistemic paralysis. Rather, my point is a cautionary
one: if you are going to depict something that is outside of your own experience, you
ought to do your best to ensure that you do not misrepresent it—least of all by
falling into the use of the same old damaging stereotypes. And lastly, I do not mean
for the responsibility of the creator to replace the epistemic responsibility of the
audience. By no means should any epistemic agent blindly accept the word of
someone who has been given authority; doing so would be epistemically vicious on
their part as well. Rather, I mean only to argue that there is a certain amount of
epistemic weight given—in many cases, rightly so—to individuals who have
exceptional influence in that epistemic sphere. Saying that some have a particularly
high degree of responsibility does not erase the responsibilities of all.

V. Conclusion
Creators have a hermeneutical responsibility to include diverse characters in
their casts, and to avoid making use of harmful stereotypes when doing so. In
Chapter 1, we saw that transportive fictions have a particular ability to bypass our
epistemic defenses, and through repetition can make their depictions of the world
more accessible than other real-world examples. In this chapter, I have shown that if
these depictions involve harmful stereotypes, or exclude characters of marginalized
backgrounds, they can cause those harmful stereotypes to become the conception of
a thing in the audience’s social imagination. If that inaccurate conception becomes
more accessible than the correct concept, it creates a hermeneutical gap by blocking
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access to the latter with the former. Such hermeneutical gaps can result in
hermeneutical injustices by preventing marginalized individuals from making sense
of their experiences.
This power that popular fiction has over our social imaginations renders
those who create it hermeneutically privileged—and with great privilege, comes
great responsibility. Because creators of fiction have this power through their work,
they have a responsibility to their audiences to practice epistemic due diligence as
best they’re able, by learning about and eradicating harmful stereotypes from their
creations. Doing otherwise is to be epistemically vicious, and can result in real world
harm to real world people.

3

Typifying Stereotypes

I. “A Familiar Status”
“When Daenerys takes her throne,” Grey Worm tells Missandei in the second
episode of Game of Thrones’ final season, “There will be no place for us here.”
In a show that has been plagued by criticisms of the way it represents its
characters with marginalized identities—women characters, queer characters,
differently abled characters—the depictions of Game of Thrones’ characters of color
have drawn particular fire. Two of the only named Black characters in the series,
Grey Worm and Missandei are regarded by the show’s other characters as a capable
military leader and diplomat, respectively. But in reality, as critic Ben Philippe
points out, “Their characters can be summed up by their skin color and their loyalty
to Daenerys; Grey Worm mostly excels at dramatically putting on his helmet”
(2019). Though regularly given more screen time than many other white characters,
much of this time is spent “standing loyally in the background”, meaning that they
“have hardly interacted or formed relationships with the dozens of characters that
surround them” such that “their arcs basically amount to the bond they share”
(Ibid). This place, “on the sidelines of the show” is, as Philippe puts it, “a familiar
status for supporting characters of color” (Ibid). Where other characters are allowed
long, complex arcs filled with switching loyalties and heavy moral quandaries, the
only two Black faces in Westeros are left underdeveloped and one dimensional.
Given the stereotypical way in which the world of Game of Thrones construes
racial and cultural difference, this may not be all that surprising. Westeros, the
continent on which the story of Game of Thrones begins, is the site of the bulk of its
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action. As though its name is not instructive enough—West-eros—it is the home of a
typical European low-fantasy culture, with gods like the Mother and Father, a
monarchy with vassal lords and knights in plate armor who fight with cruciform
swords, and an exclusively white cast of characters. Essos—East-os—is an eastern
counterpart introduced later, populated by gods of fire and death, nomadic, tattooed
raiders who fight bare-chested with arakhs, flamboyantly dressed men whose use of
rapiers is described as “water-dancing”, and terrifyingly competent and perfectly
obedient legions of soldier-slaves who fight with spears. Nearly all of these “exotic”
peoples, who live in tribes or loosely affiliated city-states, are darker-skinned.
Thus far, I have established that fictions have the capacity to affect our
cognitive framework, and that their power to do so can cause real harm to real
people if wielded irresponsibly. In the first chapter, using work in social psychology,
I argued that our tendency to lower our epistemic defenses when being
“transported” by fiction, combined with popular fiction’s tendency to reuse
stereotypes ad nauseam, can cause those stereotypes to become part of our
hermeneutical tools without our noticing. In the second, I demonstrated that this
capacity gives fiction a particularly hermeneutical power, and with the assistance of
Fricker and Medina, established the hermeneutical responsibility creators have to
diversify their casts of characters and avoid using harmful stereotypes when doing
so. In other words, they have a responsibility to avoid creating No Representation or
Bad Representation problems in their fiction to the best of their ability. But thus far,
I have said little about what I mean by the word “stereotypes,” the relationship
between No Representation and Bad Representation problems, and offered little
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suggestion as to how creators can go about avoiding all of the above. Those
omissions will be dealt with in this chapter.
In the following sections, I will offer an account of No Representation and
Bad Representation problems I have charged creators to avoid. The first step will be
to establish the sorts of problems I refer to as instances of No Representation and
the harm they pose to their audiences—both on their own, and in conjunction with
instances of Bad Representation. From there, the chapter will focus on instances of
Bad Representation and the harmful stereotypes that compose them. Doing so will
require us to disambiguate two relevant uses of “stereotypes”: one, as used in social
psychology, and the other, as used in discussions of literature and film. In the
process, I will demonstrate three relevant characteristics that they share: both shift
across time and culture, neither are necessarily “good” or “bad,” and one tends to
reflect the other. The stereotypes I have been talking about thus far lie at the
intersection of these commonalities, stereotypes in fiction that reflect and support
negative social stereotypes. Finally, I present three ways in which harmful
stereotypes can manifest in fiction: one in which the character is a stereotype, one in
which the character’s relationship to another character is a stereotype, and one in
which the character’s relationship to the plot is a stereotype. These examples will
both demonstrate this relationship between the two types of stereotypes, and will
serve as a place to start for creators who would like to carry out their hermeneutical
responsibility.

II. No Representation vs Bad Representation
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In the introduction, I briefly laid out instances of what I’m calling No
Representation and Bad Representation problems in fiction. Representation
problems are the result of fiction creators that haven’t been sufficiently
hermeneutically responsible when creating; depending on the amount of work they
did to avoid representation problems—the extent to which they exemplified due
diligence and resisted hermeneutical laziness or paralysis—and the popularity of
their work, they can be held more or less responsible for creating them. But
regardless of the level of responsibility, it’s helpful to identify the problems when
they occur and recognize the specific sort of hermeneutical threat they pose.
Moreover, it’s important to note the way they work together, whether within the
same fiction or across a number of them, to amplify and sustain that threat. Now
that we have the cognitive and hermeneutical mechanisms of the theory in place, we
can more clearly see the role each has to play in the hermeneutical harms I’ve
argued popular fictions can inflict.
No Representation problems occur when there’s an absence of characters
with marginalized identities in a fiction’s central roles. If we pop on an action movie
and find that the protagonist, the sidekick, their boss, their boss’s boss, the evil
mastermind antagonist, and any role that has direct agency and influence on the
plot are all straight white men, we’ve found a film with a No Representation
problem.1 Though it should be noted the characters needn’t share all three of those

1

The inevitable response to this is that many of those movies do have some characters with
marginalized identities present: the hero has a girlfriend, or the sidekick is a man of color,
or the bad guy is gay. But unless those characters are given the same level of agency and
depth as the characters with non-marginalized identities—and, importantly, don’t fulfill
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identities simultaneously; if the main characters in a fiction are all white (but some
are women), or all men (but some aren’t white), or all straight (but some aren’t men
or aren’t white), or all abled (but some aren’t men, or aren’t white, or aren’t straight,
etc), that fiction still has a No Representation problem. The moniker I’ve chosen is
fairly straight forward, then: there is simply no representation on screen or on the
page for audiences that share in a marginalized identity.
As a result, No Representation problems pose a hermeneutical danger by
associating all the desirable characteristics that go with being a fiction’s central
character exclusively with those non-marginalized identities. For instance: a
fiction’s protagonist by necessity has agency, resulting in some level of control over
the role they have to play in the fiction’s events. They are also typically sympathetic
to the audience (foregoing some failure of the creator to make them so), and as a
result typify some set of desirable traits: they’re knowledgeable, intelligent,
charming, heroic, courageous, attractive, kind, persistent, stalwart, capable, or some
combination of the above. They have flaws of course, but those flaws are sufficiently
offset by their desirable traits such that we like them and want them to succeed.
This is true even of anti-heroes or characters AW Eaton calls rough heroes, wherein
the whole point of the character is that we like them in spite of their overwhelming
flaws. When we try on the perspective of a fiction that has only straight, white,
abled, and/or male protagonists then, we are trying on a perspective that associates

existing harmful stereotypes—they don’t count. Instead, we have a fiction with not only a
No Representation problem, but a Bad Representation problem to boot.
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those desirable qualities exclusively with straightness, whiteness, ableness, and/or
maleness.
The examples levied in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 demonstrate the effect of
that association on marginalized communities and non-marginalized communities.
In Nyong’o’s case in Chapter 1, the vast majority of fictions she interacted with told
the stories of white characters. She consequently began to understand herself as
insufficient, as unworthy of having her story told, because she isn’t white. In the case
presented by Cheryan’s study in Chapter 2, women students believed themselves to
be ill-suited to STEM fields when the stereotype of scientists regularly pedaled in
fictions—as male, and as possessing male-coded attributes and interests—was
confirmed as accurate. In either case, repeatedly assigning the same central roles to
characters with non-marginalized identities left audiences with the opposing
marginalized identity less capable of applying those desirable traits to themselves.
To make use of the framework built in Chapters 1 and 2, No Representation
problems establish conceptions of protagonist or hero or scientist or what have you
that associate the role and all its traits with a non-marginalized identity. That
conception then blocks access to the correct concept of the role, making it harder for
audiences with marginalized identities to themselves, and thereby constituting a
hermeneutical gap.
The associations caused by No Representation problems have negative
hermeneutical effects for non-marginalized audiences as well—but rather than
struggle to apply the role to themselves, they struggle to apply the role or
characteristics to members of marginalized communities. The online backlash to
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Feig’s Ghostbusters, as recounted in Chapter 2, exemplifies this difficulty. Male fans
of previous Ghostbusters installments rebelled against the all-women cast in Feig’s
addition, declaring that it ruined the franchise for them despite never having seen
the film. In this case, fans of the previous Ghostbusters films and the genre to which
they belong had long been exposed to No Representation problems, as the
preponderance of main characters in those movies were straight, white, and male.
The characteristics required of the genre’s protagonists, then, easily become
associated with straightness, whiteness, and maleness, such that the role seemingly
can’t belong to a character who isn’t straight, white, and/or male. For audiences that
are straight, white, and/or male, straightness, whiteness, and/or maleness becomes
an assumed necessary trait for such roles; in other words, the conception of the
nerdy scientist becomes tied up in straight white male-ness, and attempting to place
that role on someone who isn’t straight, white, and/or male meets hermeneutical
resistance. When non-marginalized communities encounter No Representation
problems, they see themselves in the characters they’re engaging with and so have
no difficulty applying the presented conceptions to themselves. However, because
the conceptions presented become so closely entwined with the non-marginalized
identity, audiences who share that non-marginalized identity will find it harder to
apply them to the corresponding marginalized identity. For male Ghostbusters fans,
the conception of “nerdy scientist” was so entwined with whiteness, straightness,
and maleness, that they rejected the application of the proper genderless, raceless,
and sexuality-less concept to characters that aren’t white, straight, and/or male.
This can make it all the more difficult for someone who is a nerdy scientist, but isn’t
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white, straight, and male, to make their experiences understood to those fans. In
other words, No Representation problems in fiction run the risk of increasing the
hermeneutical marginalization of people in the real world.
That marginalizing effect can be compounded when No Representation
problems occur in conjunction with Bad Representation problems, whether in the
same fiction or across a grouping of fictions. Bad Representation problems occur
when a fiction does have characters with marginalized identities but makes use of
harmful stereotypes when characterizing them. The remainder of this chapter is
spent exploring what those harmful stereotypes can be and how they can manifest
in fictions; for now, suffice to say they are depictions of marginalized characters that
make use of—and in turn, reiterate and reinforce—existing negative social
stereotypes of that marginalized group. While No Representation problems threaten
to associate all the good characteristics of main characters exclusively with nonmarginalized groups, Bad Representation problems threaten the opposite. If every
woman character, or every Black character, or every queer character, or every
differently abled character is depicted badly, our hermeneutical resources will be
inundated with those negative examples. When we need to reach for a conception of
that marginalized group then, we’ll find those negative examples more accessible
than other, more diverse examples. As such, the hermeneutical threat of Bad
Representation problems lies in causing the audience to associate a myriad of bad
characteristics exclusively with marginalized groups—not least because that
association already exists at some level, outside of the fiction.
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Taken together, instances of Bad Representation and No Representation
work together to increase the accessibility of inaccurate conceptions over more apt
concepts, creating a hermeneutical gap. 2 Simply put, any given instance of Bad
Representation wouldn’t be as bad if it weren’t the only representation available,
and any given instance of No Representation wouldn’t be as bad if there were other,
good instances of representation to offset it. The reason Bad Representation
problems can cause as much hermeneutical harm as they do to folks with
marginalized identities is often because they’re the only kind of representation out
there; if two out of five fictions feature violent Black men as villains, and the other
three don’t feature Black male characters at all, the conception of Black men as
violent and bad will stick around a lot more than if the other three featured Black
men as heroes or protagonists. For instance: in Feig’s Ghostbusters (2016), the
villain is a straight white man for whom straightness, whiteness, and maleness is at
the core of his villainy. He is the same awkward, nerdy scientist stereotype the
original Ghostbusters traded in taken to its most awful, vengeful extreme. And yet,
this stereotype of a straight, white man doesn’t strike the same harmful note as the
stereotypes discussed below. This is due in part to none of those being marginalized
identities—but it’s also due in part to the sheer diversity in straight, white, male
characters present in our fictions. Yes, some of them may be villains, but many of
them are also heroes, protagonists, love interests, and on and on. In this case, we
have an instance of a character depicted as a negative social stereotype, but because

2

For more on this, return to Chapter 2.
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there is no No Representation problem3 for straight white men in fiction, that
stereotype loses its sting. There is no Bad Representation problem here, because
with so many diverse depictions of straight white men, this one depiction doesn’t
become representative of the straight, white, male identity.
On the other hand, No Representation problems wouldn’t be quite as harmful
if Bad Representation problems weren’t so prolific. One fiction with an all-male cast
would not, by itself, inflict as much hermeneutical harm if all the fictions that did
have women characters didn’t use harmful social stereotypes when depicting them.
There is little hermeneutical harm done to men by a film like Ocean’s 8, despite
every major character being a woman. This is due, in part, because so many fictions
have male characters playing a diverse array of roles; having one fiction in which no
men have central roles will hardly put a dent in the representation of men in fiction
as a whole. But removing women characters entirely from a fiction when the vast
majority of women characters are depicted in ways that align with harmful social
stereotypes robs audiences of an opportunity to add a new, less harmful example to
their repertoire. This in turn allows the harmful social stereotypes to remain as
accessible as they are. If there were fewer instances of Bad Representation, the
absence of a few positive roles for marginalized characters would be less

3

There is an asterisk attached to this statement, as one could argue that there is a No
Representation problem for straight white men—insofar as there are certain roles we
rarely see straight white men take in fiction. Straight, white, male characters aren’t always
emotionally available or healthy, they aren’t often depicted as caretakers or supportive
partners, and otherwise regularly appear in roles or with characteristics inundated with
toxic masculinity. While such characters are still regularly depicted as desirable
protagonists and main characters, this is itself the result of sexist social stereotypes that
oughtn’t be perpetuated by fictions. There is a fruitful line of discussion to be followed here,
but for the sake of present clarity, I’ll set it aside for future research.

87
detrimental. Though ultimately, even if all instances of Bad Representation
disappeared, No Representation problems would still pose a hermeneutical threat to
audiences: a world in which every single character is a straight white man doesn’t
solve the representation problem. Where Bad Representation would, more or less,
cease to be harmful if No Representation problems were no longer an issue, No
Representation problems would endure even if all Bad Representation problems
were erased.
But, where I’ve discussed now several examples of No Representation
problems, I have spent significantly less time investigating what constitutes a Bad
Representation problem. In the following section, I will build my account of harmful
stereotypes in fiction, such that we will have a clearer picture of what a Bad
Representation problem actually is.

III. Stereotypes on Stereotypes
Throughout the last two chapters, I have used the word “stereotype” to mean
two things seemingly interchangeably: stereotypes as we experience them in the
real, social world, and stereotypes as we see them in fiction. In this section I will
disambiguate the two, so as to present a conception of harmful stereotype that fits
with my account. To do so, I will first establish how stereotypes are conceived of in
social psychology, which deals with how those stereotypes appear in the actual
world. I will then address their use in fiction, as an umbrella for things like tropes
and archetypes, and the role they play in the fictions we create. In the process, I will
show that they have three characteristics in common: they change over time and
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from culture to culture, they do not have a necessary valence, and one is generally
based on and/or reflects the other. As such, my use of stereotype is less a conflation
of the two and more a marriage; a marriage that fits well with the hermeneutical
injustice framework established in the previous chapter.
Up first: the use of stereotypes in social psychology. There are generally two
ways in which research about stereotypes has been conducted by social
psychologists, roughly grouped into ‘individual’ approaches and ‘cultural’
approaches (Stangor and Schaller 1996, 65). Individual approaches tend to focus on
parsing out how stereotypes operate within a person’s cognitive framework, on
which model best explains the characteristics we typically assign to the concept of
stereotype, and on “the meaning of the stereotype to the individual” (Op. cit., 66-68).
Cultural approaches, on the other hand, “consider the ways that stereotypes are
learned, transmitted, and changed through indirect sources—information gained
from parents, peers, teachers, political and religious leaders, and the mass media”
(Op. cit., 68). For cultural theorists, “stereotypes only have meaning (indeed
stereotypes are only stereotypes!) to the extent that they are culturally shared” (Op.
cit., 65). While both are complementary, the goals of cultural theorists are more
closely aligned with the topic of our project, so we’ll focus on their approach.
Theorists who take the cultural approach generally note five characteristics
of stereotypes.4 First, stereotypes are epistemically useful. Though they may
sometimes lead us to error, stereotypes can also serve as heuristics when we don’t
have enough information, simplify a chaotic amount of information into manageable
4

The first two of which are shared by both cultural and individual approaches.
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stories when we have too much, and allow us to communicate a lot of information
quickly and easily when communicating with someone who is also familiar with the
stereotype (Stangor and Schaller 1996, 73-74). Second, they can help maintain
group identity; having shared stereotypes of out-group (and often times, in-group)
members can allow an individual to win approval from their peers and thereby
build social bonds (Op. cit., 75-76). Third, stereotypes are language based, being
“learned, maintained, and potentially changed through the language and
communication of a culture…offer[ing] a means of storing stereotypic beliefs at a
collective, consensual level”, with different words able to convey different
stereotypes about the same groups (ex: a category name vs. a slur) (Op. cit., 68).
Fourth, their basis in language means that one of the primary modes of transfer for
stereotypes is “the mass media—literature, television, movies, newspapers, E-mail,
leaflets, and bumper stickers”, in which portrayals of different social groups can be
shared rapidly, widely, and in some cases, instantly (Op. cit., 69). Finally, stereotypes
are tightly bound up in a culture’s social norms, the two having a reciprocal effect on
each other: “Once group stereotypes exist in a culture, expected patterns of behavior
for those group members follow, and these expectations determine both responses
to group members and the behaviors of group members themselves…When group
members willingly (or unwillingly) act in stereotypic ways, their behavior justifies
and perpetuates the stereotype” (Op. cit., 70). According to the cultural approach
then, stereotypes are mental shortcuts that can be epistemically helpful, are based
in language, and are socially shared conceptions that can promote group identity
and be shared through mass media.
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How does this translate into transience, an absence of valence, and
reciprocity with fictional stereotypes? The last part should be fairly evident, given
that social stereotypes’ basis in language means they are easily shared by mass
media; included in that list of mass media are a number of fictional medias, all of
which I am targeting here. Their basis in language also suggests their transience, or
their tendency to change across time and culture: just as language changes across
time and culture, those cultural hallmarks that are based in language will change as
well. The version of English used now, in late capitalist America, is not the same
English that was used in Civil War America. The sorts of social groups 5 we parse, the
words we use to designate them, and the beliefs we have about them are not the
same, either. Similarly, the stereotypes that are popularly known in the US might not
exist in China, or might not exist in the same way. Lastly, their epistemic usefulness
suggests that stereotypes are not necessarily negative or “bad.” While some no
doubt are, others can help us navigate a world in which an individual epistemic
agent can’t know everything and everyone—whether because that information is
unavailable, or because knowing all of it would be unquestionably overwhelming.
Stereotypes about used car salespeople, for instance, do not carry the same negative

5

To identify which social groups do become stereotyped, we need only look at which
groups have been widely essentialized in a society. An “essentialized” category, according to
social psychology, is one whose members are believed to share some underlying, essential
thing, some essence, that explains the existence of any number of physical or behavioral
characteristics among members of that category. While not all social categories are
essentialized, the categories I’m targeting, like gender or race, are—such that we’re prone to
thinking there is something essential shared by all men that causes them to grow facial hair
or be rational, or something essential shared by all women that gives them breasts and
makes them emotional. Because of that essentialism, those categories are more prone to
being stereotyped. For more on this, see Bastain and Haslam 2005, Levy et al. 2001, and
Yzerbyt et al. 2001.
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effect that sexist stereotypes might, and can potentially prevent a buyer from getting
swindled.
With that said, how do they compare to stereotypes in fiction? In this case,
the word “stereotype” is often used interchangeably with words like cliché, trope,
convention, archetype, form(ulaic), etc. All of them carry the connotation of literary
structures that are “relatively compact and incisive patterns”, patterns that are
“conventionally fixed and recurrent structural patterns of representation”
(Schweinitz 2011, 18, 20). In other words, they’re patterns that occur in the plot,
characters, or other narrative element that are made simple and recognizable to
audiences by their repetition in the literary canon. Star-crossed lovers is a
convention most American audiences will be familiar with, as most of us have been
made to read Romeo and Juliet at some point in our academic careers, and have seen
this trope play out again and again in everything from romantic comedies to young
adult fiction; it does not require much for a creator to set up such a scenario in a
story for such an audience, because we are already acquainted with the trope and
fill in the necessary blanks around it. Its mass repetition, wide reaching familiarity,
and structural simplicity are what make it a convention, or a trope. They make it a
stereotype in fiction.
While some associated words, like cliché, generally have a negative
connotation, stereotypes can play positive roles in fiction. Introducing a stereotype
to a narrative, and then playing with its guiding conventions is one way a creator
can add aesthetic value to a work (Schweinitz 2011, 21). A star-crossed lovers story
in which the involved characters are queer, for instance, could use the
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heteronormative form of the trope to make an aesthetically interesting work, even if
the convention itself is tired. Moreover, stereotypes can be used as a kind of
aesthetic shortcut, one that allows a creator to convey a large amount of information
about the setting or characters of their work without spending valuable time filling
in the gaps. There are some forms of narrative that rely on stereotypes as “a design
feature that ensures that people will be able to understand [it] by becoming familiar
with its conventions and formulas” (Carroll 1998, 193). Westerns, sit-coms,
superhero movies—they all rely on stereotypes in one form or another to get their
stories off the ground, and they are stereotypes that most of us are familiar with.
And if we aren’t by the first time we engage with one, we will be by the end of it (Op.
cit., 194). As such, stereotypes in fiction do not necessarily have to have a negative
valence; in some cases, they can be actively helpful to creators and audiences alike.
Between this and its basis in cultural recognition and convention, the
conception of stereotype in fiction shares important similarities with that of social
psychology. Both represent a category of thing that need not be negative in nature,
and neither are static; the details of how any social group is perceived or which
structures are recognized as tropes and conventions can shift across time and
across cultures (such that there may be different stereotypes about women at
different points in US history, or what’s recognized as an archetypical character may
be different in Hollywood and Bollywood). Perhaps most interesting, however, is the
reciprocal relationship the two occupy: while stereotypes in the social sense can be
easily and effectively transmitted by popular fiction, stereotypes in fiction rely on
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widespread social recognition to function. Though different, both conceptions of
stereotype work hand in hand.
The sort of stereotypes I am charging creators to avoid, then, is a particular
subset of these two. They are those tropes and archetypes in fiction that reflect
harmful, real-world stereotypes, included by creators who do nothing to challenge
them in their fiction. These harmful, real-world stereotypes are the very same that
Fricker would call a prejudicial stereotype, one which “embodies an unreliable
empirical generalization about the group in question…a judgment made or
maintained without proper regard to the evidence”, and constitutes the sort of
tracker prejudice that is necessary for hermeneutical injustice (2007, 32). When
these sorts of stereotypes appear in our popular fictions, they are circulated in a
way that further obscures the correct conception of a group or experience with a
negative, harmful one.

III. Characters, Relationships, and Plots
There are at least three ways in which a stereotype can appear in a fiction:
the character themselves can be a stereotype, the character’s relationship to another
character can be a stereotype, and the character’s relationship to the plot can be a
stereotype.6 In each case, the fiction saddles a marginalized character with
characteristics that reiterate, reinforce, or otherwise resemble harmful social
stereotypes associated with that marginalized identity in the real world. I will

6

This need not be an exhaustive list, nor do all three need to operate independently of each
other. Rather than aim to give a comprehensive theory of negative stereotypes in fiction—
which is a project for a later time, perhaps—I intend only to provide a starting point here.
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provide an example for each of these three appearances in the remainder of this
chapter, breaking down the way the stereotype is presented in the fiction—as a
character, relationship, or plot—as well as how it relates to harmful stereotypes in
the real world. To demonstrate how a character can be a stereotype in themselves, I
will turn to the racialized treatment of Missandei by the creators of Game of Thrones.
As to how a character’s relationship to another character can be a stereotype, I will
use the gender roles used to construct the relationship between Ally and Jack in A
Star is Born. Finally, a stereotypical relationship between a character and the plot
can be seen in the homophobic treatment of Lexa in the television show, The 100.

III. A) Characters
First up, then: a character who is a stereotype. When a character is a
stereotype in themselves, the stereotypical characteristics of a real-world
marginalized community are given to a character that, in one way or another, stands
in for that identity in the fictional world.7 This can be because they were explicitly
given that identity in the fiction, are played by an actor with that identity, or are
otherwise described in ways reminiscent of that (stereotyped) identity. 8 Though

7

I emphasize this last aspect—that they are, in some way, a stand in for that marginalized
identity in the fiction—to reiterate a point made in the previous section. If a character with
a marginalized identity is depicted with characteristics stereotypical of that identity, but
other characters in the fiction have the same identity and aren’t stereotypes, there’s a much
smaller chance the stereotypical depiction will be harmful. In other words, if there isn’t a No
Representation problem, there’s a good chance there also isn’t a Bad Representation
problem.
8 In JRR Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, there is no explicit connection between real world
identities and Orcs and Uruk-hai made in the fiction—but the descriptions attributed to the
Orcs and Uruk-hai are, at times, powerfully reminiscent of racist stereotypes of Asian and
Black people, respectively. As such, there’s an argument to be made that the Orcs and Uruk-
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such marginalized characters are often relegated to the sidelines of the fiction,
providing support for those characters who drive the narrative or otherwise filling
in the backdrop, this isn’t necessary to reduce them to harmful stereotype. When a
character is a stereotype in themselves, it’s because the most salient parts of their
characterization reflect social stereotypes about their corresponding real-world
identity.
While stereotypical characters exist for every marginalized community, Black
communities in the US have been particularly subjected to harmful stereotypes of
this form. For decades, film theorists like Donald Bogle and sociologists like Patricia
Hill Collins and Melissa V. Harris-Perry have identified, described, and categorized
them and their evolutions in fictional and real worlds alike. Among the most
pervasive of those catalogued—and the one at the heart of the following example—
is that of the Mammy figure: “the faithful, obedient domestic servant” (Hill Collins
2000, 72). Born of white slavers’ ideal version of Black domestic service, the
Mammy character is a Black woman who serves in a white home, assisting a white
woman in the maintenance of her home and the rearing of her children. She’s caring
and nurturing, and like the Tom character, her male counterpart, will always “keep
the faith, n’er turn against [her] white massas, and remain hearty, submissive, stoic,
generous, selfless, and oh-so-very kind. Thus [she] endear[s herself] to white
audiences and emerge as heroes of sorts” (Bogle 2016, 2). This singularly minded
devotion is crucial to the stereotype:

hai are in fact harmful stereotypes of Asian and Black identities, insofar as they’re coded
with racist descriptions.
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Mammy had no personal needs or desires. She was a trusted advisor and
confidante whose skills were used exclusively in service of the white families
to which she was attached…Her love, doting, advice, correction, and
supervision were reserved exclusively for white women and children.
(Harris-Perry 2011, 72-73)
Taken as a whole, the Mammy figure has no personal ambitions and no social
relationships outside of the white family she cares for. All of her devotion,
knowledge, and skill is dedicated to ensuring the wellness of the white woman who
“employs” her and the white children she looks after. Most of all, the Mammy is
unswervingly loyal to that white family, and understands that her one purpose in
life is to serve and care for them.
As a social stereotype, the Mammy character has long been an excuse for the
mistreatment of Black women. In the real world, the Mammy stereotype is a
“controlling image,” one of a number of popular myths about marginalized groups
that “are designed to make racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of social
injustice appear to be natural, normal, and inevitable parts of everyday life” for
members of Black communities (Hill Collins 2000, 69). If Black women are, as the
Mammy figure suggests, women who are naturally suited to rearing children,
running households, and domestic servitude, then there’s no mystery as to why so
many Black women are/were domestic servants: they chose to become domestic
servants, and are happy to do work their biology is designed for. Or at least, so the
thinking would go:

97
Created to justify the economic exploitation of house slaves and
sustained to explain Black women’s long-standing restrictions to
domestic service, the mammy image represents the normative
yardstick used to evaluate all Black women’s behavior. By loving,
nurturing, and caring for her White children and “family” better than
her own, the mammy symbolizes the dominant group’s perception of
the ideal Black female…She has accepted her subordination. (Op. cit.,
72-73)
While the mammy may not be as immediately identifiable now as she has been in
the past—whether as the main character of color in Gone with the Wind or as the
smiling face on the syrup bottle—she continues to exist as the “yardstick” against
which Black women are judged. Many of the other controlling images of Black
women, from the Matriarch to the Welfare Queen to the Jezebel and Black Lady,
exist in contrast to the Mammy figure: each are failed Mammies in some way,
whether because they’re lacking in devotion to the white folks around them, aren’t
as demure or nurturing as the Mammy is, or experience, express, and/or invite
sexual desire (Ibid.). When the Mammy figure is the dominant conception of Black
womanhood, any Black woman who doesn’t emulate her racist subjugation becomes
vilified.
As such, when fictions use characteristics of the Mammy stereotype in the
depictions of their women characters of color, they reinforce a harmful social
stereotype in the minds of their audiences. This character, who would be a
stereotype in herself, thereby becomes the mechanism through which the fiction can
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contribute to hermeneutical harm of real people in the real world. One such fiction
that makes use of the Mammy stereotype is the most watched television show of all
time, HBO’s Game of Thrones.
While viewers found many reasons to complain about the handling of a
number of characters and their storylines by the end of the series, one character in
particular embodies the Mammy figure, and thereby becomes a stereotype in
herself: Missandei of Naath. As one of the closest advisors to Daenerys Targaryen
(Emilia Clarke), Missandei (Nathalie Emmanuel) stood a chance of being much
needed representation: though a former slave, this multilingual woman of color with
natural hair had risen to the right hand of one of the most powerful contenders in
the eponymous competition for the throne of Westeros. But instead of giving her
any real influence, the show’s creators reduced her to a side character whose main
characteristic was her complete devotion to a white woman.
Missandei fits the Mammy description with a disappointing amount of
accuracy, and does so in two ways. First: despite being a close advisor of one of the
most powerful people in the world, she shows little agency of her own. She rarely
appears on screen without Daenerys, and every time it is only to provide her with
helpful expository information. This absence of interiority is on stark display when,
after Missandei is killed, Daenerys is seen cradling what she describes as
Missandei’s only personal item, and the last thing she has to remember her by: her
old slave collar. There is nothing else—no locket from a lost loved one, no journal of
pressed flowers, no book of poetry, no trinket at all to demonstrate that Missandei
had any other personal interest outside of her servitude. Moreover, it’s the first time
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that the collar is mentioned or seen since Missandei gained her freedom, and there
is no explanation as to why it is the only thing she has kept for herself. Between the
two, we can clearly see the writers gave her no characteristic, no personality trait,
other than “former slave.” With few motivations, desires, or choices of her own,
Missandei’s story is written to revolve around the white woman she serves.
And second: like any good Mammy, Missandei’s dedication to her white
queen is singularly unswerving. In a television show in which loyalties are
constantly challenged, Missandei never so much as questions Daenerys’ goodness.
In fact, she spends two of the final scenes she appears in—and two of the only
scenes she has with characters that do not include Daenerys—defending her queen
and her relationship to her. When Sansa Stark (Sophie Turner), already suspicious
of Daenerys as a foreign invader in her family’s ancestral home, mentions Daenerys
during the Battle of Winterfell, Missandei—who had not been part of the
conversation and had not been included in the scene prior to this moment—appears
from the darkness to defend her. “Yes,” she quips to Sansa, derision in her voice,
“Without the Dragon Queen, there’d be no problem at all. We’d all be dead already”
(Game of Thrones, “The Long Night”). Never mind that Sansa is speaking to Tyrion
Lannister (Peter Dinklage), Daenerys’ right-hand man, who is soon to have his own
questions about Daenerys’ fitness for leadership; he is a fully fleshed character,
allowed to have his own internal struggles and concerns. As a side effect of
Missandei’s missing interiority, she is not allowed to have that complicated
relationship with Daenerys, even at a time when Daenerys’ actions have become less
and less noble, and so expresses only blind loyalty.
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But this is just one instance of an ongoing trend in her character. A season
earlier, she is asked how she, a former slave, came to be an advisor to Daenarys
Targaryan. With a fond smile, Missandei demurs: “She bought me from my master,
and set me free” (Game of Thrones, “The Spoils of War”). One of her interlocutors,
Davos Seaworth (Liam Cunningham), then presents her with a potentially
interesting challenge: “That was good of her. Of course, you’re serving her now,
aren’t you?” (Ibid). To the audience’s knowledge, Missandei and her fellow former
slaves are not being paid for their services, and unlike other allies have not been
promised lands or houses in Westeros once Danaerys has won the throne. As such, it
is unclear what, if anything, has changed since they supposedly gained their
freedom. Here we have a chance to investigate the reality of the relationship
Missandei has to her queen—but instead, we are offered a decidedly uninteresting
answer: “I serve my queen because I want to serve my queen. Because I believe in
her” (Ibid). Thus she “keeps the faith” with Daenerys, and never “turns against her
white massa;” Missandei is reduced to little more than a kind, soft yes man, always
ready to serve and defend Daenerys with little interrogation of the latter’s actions or
intentions. Coupled with her pseudo-spiritual knowledge of Old Valyria, Missandei
fits the criteria for a Mammy character.9

9

It’s also worthy of noting that Black women—particularly those who serve white folks—
are often associated with a certain spiritual connotation that other characters don’t possess.
Some versions of the Mammy character emphasize this spiritual connection, painting them
as religious or mystical authorities (Bogle 2016). Missandei suits this characteristic as well,
insofar as she’s one of the sole providers of information about the magical, mythical
civilizations of Old Valyria. But this characteristic isn’t emphasized in the sociological
accounts I’m borrowing from here, and so is best investigated at another time.
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As such, we have seen two ways in which a character can themselves be a
stereotype. The Mammy figure is a stereotype of Black women that has existed in
the US for centuries, and it both mimics and reinforces real world stereotypes about
Black women. In this case, that stereotype paints Black women as sub-human,
incapable of their own autonomous choices and existing only to help and serve the
more powerful white folks around them. This is, unfortunately, true of the depiction
of Missandei of Naath in Game of Thrones. By depicting their fictional character with
characteristics of a real world stereotype, the makers of Game of Thrones make her a
stereotype in herself. Creators who wish to avoid this fate for their characters can
start by researching the ways marginalized identities have been stereotyped in the
past, both in fictions and in the real world. In the case of the former, there are not
only theorists like Bogle who diagnose and document stereotypes like this, but also
numerous critics and fans who have dissected characters like Missandei in think
pieces and blogs; reading and learning from these observations can make it easier to
recognize and avoid them in one’s own writing.

III. B) Relationships
Next then: stereotypes in which the relationship between one character and
another is the stereotype. To investigate this instantiation of stereotypes in fiction, I
will turn to the relationship between Ally and Jack in A Star is Born (2018), which I
argue mimics and repeats gender stereotypes. I will begin by presenting the
relevant stereotypes about women and men as studied in social psychology, and
then move on to their appearance in A Star is Born.
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In the literature investigating gender stereotypes, stereotypical beliefs about
women and men are encapsulated by two adjectives: women are considered
“communal”, while men are “agentic”. These are umbrella terms for a number of
stereotypical beliefs about these two genders, beliefs that simultaneously “function
as expectations about qualities females and males have…and how females and males
differ quantitatively” (Biernat 2018, 172). In other words, they function on both a
prescriptive and descriptive level; not only do women and men naturally have these
characteristics, but they should have these characteristics. As such, (white)10 women
are believed to naturally be—but are also socially expected to be—“gentle, aware of
others’ feelings, neat, tactful, and expresses tender feelings” (Op. cit., 173). White
men, in turn, are believed and expected to be “aggressive, independent, competitive,
adventurous, dominant, self-confident, and ambitious” (Op. cit., 173). Additionally,
these traits are held in a hierarchy. Those traits associated with women, while
carrying a positive valence in the conceptual web of most individuals, are valued
significantly lower than those associated with men, which despite negative
connotations are considered more valuable (Ridgeway 2011, 67). In turn, the people
who embody these traits generally bear a hierarchical relationship to each other:
“Because of the way that gender is embedded in positional inequalities in economic,
political, and even familial institutions, network studies show that men and women
in the United States most frequently interact with one another in status-unequal

10

Many of the studies regarding gender roles and stereotypes have been conducted with
primarily white subjects, who in turn imagine white folks to be the baseline case; when
similar studies are done with women and men of color, they are often judged in relation to
this baseline (Biernat 2018, 177).
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role relationships, such as mentor and protégée, boss and secretary, and older
husband and younger wife” (Op. cit., 66-67). With one more agentic and the other
more communal, “the high-status person sets the agenda, often talks more, sticks
with his or her opinions, and is more influential. The low-status person reacts to the
high-status person, pays close attention to his or her concerns, offers supportive
comments, and defers when disagreements develop” (Op. cit., 67). White women
who fit their stereotype, then, are empathic and feelings-oriented, their concerns
orbiting around the people they care about more than themselves, while men are
ambitious and action-oriented, their energy dedicated to executing their will in the
world.
These stereotypical characteristics of both of these genders are evident in the
sorts of stories that are typically geared towards them. The stories of “chick flicks”
and other female-oriented genres of fiction tend to focus on romance, friendship,
domesticity and family, and the appearances of white femininity, and generally take
place in mundane, real-world locales (excepting period dramas and the like): “The
cycle [of women-geared stories] coherency derives from its focus on a heroine at the
center of her universe, usually employed and often living in an urban environment,
motivated by individual fulfillment expressed through some form of consumerism
(often manifest in a shopping sequence and a makeover for the heroine)” (Radner
2017, 126). In contrast, those films that are generally directed at men—such as the
Western—depict a white masculinity that is focused on action, freedom, and the
larger world, without the constraints of relationships or concern for others’ feelings:
“The compelling and evocative myth of the Western hero centers on the frontier (a
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battle for territory) and depends on violence; it involves a white American
masculinity which is deemed necessary for the formation of a lawful community,
and thus the definition of the nation, but which cannot be fully incorporated…
Action genres of all varieties feature lone heroes, men unbounded by ties of family
or community” (Tasker 2017, 112-113). That films directed at women tend to be
slice-of-life stories, focused on a professional woman and her immediate
relationship to the people in her life, while films directed at men tend to focus on a
man in a far-flung locale, using his penchant for violence and stalwart determination
to inflict his will upon the world, is a clear reflection of these gendered stereotypes.
Chick flicks, rom-coms, and period dramas are all genres that prize being “gentle,
aware of others’ feelings, neat, tactful, and expresses tender feelings”, while
Westerns, war movies, spy films, and other action genres prefer “aggressive,
independent, competitive, adventurous, dominant, self-confident, and ambitious”
heroes. In this way, these real-world stereotypes have become integrated as tropes
in these genres.11
But beyond these genre tropes, this set of gender stereotypes can appear in
the relationship between two characters in a fiction. The most recent rendition of A
Star is Born focuses on one such relationship, between an aging, alcoholic rock star
and his younger, undiscovered protégée. Note that this relationship already reflects

11

I have said previously that one positive role of stereotypes in fiction is to allow a story to
be recognizable as a member of a specific genre, thereby helping the audience fill in
background so the fiction doesn’t have to. While these characteristics do seem to be tropes
of these genres, their attachment to gender is not. I cannot develop an argument for this
here, and will instead direct the reader to two examples, Atomic Blonde (2017), a spy film,
and Always Be My Maybe (2019), a romantic comedy, as films that have these genre
hallmarks but do not use them in sexist ways.
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gendered stereotypes by putting the male character in two positions of power a man
is generally expected to have in a relationship with a woman: Jack (Bradley Cooper)
is both older and more experienced in the music business than Ally (Lady Gaga), his
long and successful career priming him to be her mentor. Of course, merely having a
mentor-protégée relationship or an age difference does not necessitate a harmful
stereotype; it merely exacerbates one that already exists. The real stereotypical
harm comes from the way their romantic relationship is written.
In their relationship, it is clear that Ally fulfills all of the above stereotypical
expectation we have for a woman, and Jack all of those we have for a man. Ally’s
general role in their relationship is comforter: whenever Jack is in emotional
distress, wracked with guilt, or struggling with his addiction, she is there to console
him. As such, she spends much of the first part of the movie being pulled around—
and ostensibly wooed—by him, as the uglier aspects of his addiction and the cycle of
darker emotions do not appear until they are already securely dating. In the first
instance of this, Jack initiates a fist fight with his older brother after discovering the
latter sold their deceased father’s ranch, condemning it to become a wind farm. 12
While the brothers exchange blows and accusations of thievery and ingratitude, Ally
stands quietly and nervously behind Jack. When the altercation breaks up, she

12

The not-so-subtle imagery should be noted here: Jack’s version of masculinity, which is
celebrated by the film, is tied up in that of a Western hero, from his boots to his hat to his
dedication to rugged independence and stoicism. That his father’s old property—a ranch,
property that is itself associated with that kind of masculinity—is replaced with a wind
farm, a symbol for the technological coastal elitism that is the antithesis of the Wild West, is
a strike against that masculinity specifically. The audience is asked to feel Jack’s outrage, not
only because he lost his childhood home and a tangible reminder of his father, but because
it’s an attack on his identity as a man.
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doesn’t object to his behavior or his violence, but merely provides Jack with
wordless comfort by hugging him. Later, when Jack drinks to the point of falling
over in response to Ally being offered a record deal, Ally’s initial anger at his
jealousy fades quickly and with no clear explanation. After stumbling into a
bedroom in the midst of a party, he smears a cream cheese-covered bagel across her
face; she reacts with understandable astonishment—You jealous fuck!”—that all but
disappears after he does it again, this time with a grin on his face. “I’m so happy for
you,” he tells her, and she repeats her jealousy accusation, but now as flirtation. She
shuts the door on the camera, leaving the audience to assume that she assuages his
jealousy with the comfort of sex.
The rate and intensity of these sorts of exchanges ramp up as the story
continues into its second half. As Ally’s career takes off, Jack’s begins to decline, and
his alcoholism and emotional turmoil spiral out of control; for every shot of her
success we see, there is a shot of him becoming a has-been to match. As Ally records
an album and begins performing at concerts, Jack disappears on a bender. Even in
the midst of her success, we see less of her work and more of her concern for him
(after her manager propose she change her hair color, she responds, “I don’t want to
be fucking blonde. I am who I am, and I’m worried about Jack”, a line which offers an
unfortunate alignment between her personal identity and her relationship to him),
and reacts with anger when he’s found passed out in the bushes outside an old
friend’s house.13 “I won’t do this again. I won’t come and find you,” she warns him,

13

Said old friend, played by Dave Chappelle, is a bit of a tom in his own right. Never
mentioned before or after, he seems to exist in this scene solely to assuage whatever
concerns Jack may have about falling for and settling down with Ally: “Ain’t nothing to be
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“Next time, you can clean up your own mess.” This anger is somewhat muted,
however, by the fact that she is cradling his (hung-over) head against her chest the
whole time—and that she tearfully, unquestioningly accepts his proposal a few
minutes later, as though none of that had happened. The pinnacle moment of her
role as healer, however, comes when, after winning the Grammy for Best New Artist,
Jack ruins her acceptance speech by stumbling up on stage, so inebriated that he
doesn’t know where he is or that she’s won the award, and urinates all over himself.
Though he has ostensibly ruined what should have been her proudest moment, she
is the one who is cradling him in the shower, still in her gown, after he passes out
(“Baby, sit up! I don’t want you to choke, baby, sit up!”). Her father is allowed to
react with proper outrage, but she feels nothing but sympathy for him even weeks
after, when we rejoin the story with him in rehab. Ally visits him days before he’s set
to come home, and he offers her a vague apology for his behavior (“I’m sorry I did
that”) before breaking down crying, before she instantly assuages him by telling him
it isn’t his fault.14 Finally, on the same day he commits suicide, Ally tells him that
she’s canceled the last half of her international tour: “I have some good news. I’m

afraid of, bro. You know, it’s like…I dunno. You float out […] you find a port. Say, ‘I’m gonna
stay here for a few days.’ A few days becomes a few years. And then you forgot where you
were goin’ in the first place. And then you realize you don’t really give a shit about where
you was goin’ cause you like where you at. That’s how it is for me. I like where I’m at. I
didn’t even realize I liked it so much, ‘til I saw your ass sleeping in the bushes.” He serves to
remind the audience, as well, of the role Ally has played in putting Jack back together again:
“Saw you on youtube. That video with the girl. It made me happy, man, you looked like…you.
It’s just. It’s good […] Maybe she’s a way out.”
14 Perhaps one of the most disappointing aspects of this film is that it feels like someone in
the writer’s room knew that this was a story about addiction, but was overridden at some
point before the final cut. All of the right messaging is there—that addiction is a disease, and
that loving an addict can be a struggle—but it is so buried under the romantic dynamic as to
be almost unrecognizable.
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not gonna go to Europe. We’re gonna cancel the rest of the tour, and I’m just gonna
be here all summer. Isn’t that great?” This, because her manager refused to let her
take him with her to perform on that tour, the implication being that she has once
again sacrificed her career and ambitions to provide comfort for him.
Throughout the movie, then, Ally demonstrates time and again the traits we
stereotypically expect white women to have. Her primary action is taking care of the
men in her life, whether it’s cleaning up dishes after her father and his friends, 15 or
comforting Jack in all his negative emotions. In that regard, she shows more
emotional intelligence than nearly anyone else in the film. That emotional
intelligence is rarely directed inwards, however, and is instead used to assuage
Jack’s guilt and jealousy with soft words and reassurances. As such, she is “gentle,
aware of others’ feelings, neat, tactful, and expresses tender feelings”—all those
stereotypical traits we assign to women in the real world.
If Ally demonstrates all the would-be desirable traits in women, then she
cannot also be ambitious—and that is where Jack comes in. His primary role in the
relationship is twofold: to be her ambition, and to reassure her of her talent and
physical attractiveness when her inability to be ambitious inevitably leaves her
feeling less-than. The film regularly reminds us he is the only one who sees her, who
really knows and understands her talent. When he first sees her, performing in a

15

The first time we see her father, it’s after Ally has been out all night with Jack. She
immediately walks into the kitchen, and is horrified by the dishes and discarded food she
finds there: “What the hell happened in here? My god. This place is a mess!” We learn early
on, then, that she is “neat”—more so than the men in the movie, at least.
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drag bar,16 he wants to see her without all the extra makeup; when she says she will
never make it in the industry because her “nose is too big”, he tells her it’s beautiful;
when she says she never performs her own songs, he assures her that she is a
wonderful songwriter; when her father expresses little confidence in her ability to
have a successful career, he is confident that she has what it takes. His is a kind of
paternalistic care that has his driver following her until she agrees to come to one of
his shows, and has him pulling her out on stage to perform one of her songs with
him (that he took the liberty of arranging with his band ahead of time) after
announcing her to the crowd. “All you have to do is trust me,” he tells her, “And I’m
gonna sing it either way, so.” A video of that performance goes viral shortly
thereafter, triggering her participation in his tour and the start of her career as a
singer. The montage that follows, of them performing and writing songs together, is
capped off with the following exchange, backstage at the end of one of his concerts:
JACK: Alright, listen to me. Here’s what we’re gonna do. You’re gonna do the
song that I said I wanted you to do, remember? The one I love.
ALLY: No, no we’re not. Please! Come on.
JACK: No, you’re gonna do the one that I love. It’s gonna be great, come on.
Without waiting for her to agree, he kisses her and that seals the deal. Despite the
fact that she is clearly uncomfortable with and uncertain about playing the song in
question, he decides that this is the best thing for her. Sure enough, after the show

16

Note that Ally is neither queer nor in drag; she wears fake eyebrows and darkens her hair
with makeup, and that is the extent of her costuming for her performance. We also do not
see any of the queens that are littered throughout the bar perform, we only watch them
fawn over Ally while her flamboyantly gay Latino friend sets her up with Jack. But more on
how queer folks are mistreated in fiction later.
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she is approached by a producer who wants to sign her to his label. When presented
with this possibility, a flustered Ally can offer only a stuttering response: “I—I
don’t—I don’t have…I gotta talk to Jack”. As a woman, she cannot make this decision
on her own. But Jack, who is independent, dominant, and self-confident, can be her
ambition for her. Without him, she would not have made it beyond the drag bar
stage.
This aspect of their relationship is further exacerbated as her career takes
off. As she records an album, performs on SNL, launches a tour, and is nominated for
a number of Grammys, Ally continues to doubt herself; Jack is quick to provide that
confidence for her, telling her she’s beautiful every time she experiences uncertainty
in her ability. However, whenever she does make steps that are independent of him
(though not independent of a man, as they are usually at the behest of her male
manager), he reacts with anger or disappointment. As she develops a pop music
persona (in conflict with his rock ‘n roll sound), gets dancers for her performances,
and changes her hair, he warns her against losing her way:
If you don’t dig deep in your fucking soul, you won’t have legs. I’m just telling
you that. You don’t tell the truth out there, you’re fucked. All you got is you,
and what you wanna say to people, and they are listening right now. They’re
not gonna be listening forever. Trust me. So you gotta grab it. And you don’t
apologize, you don’t worry about why they’re listening, or how long they’re
gonna be listening for, you just tell ‘em what you wanna say…Cause how you
wanna say it is the stuff of angels.
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When she ignores this warning and continues to perform pop music, he tells her that
he “fucking failed” her, that she’s “embarrassing” and “fucking ugly”, as though any
decision she makes that isn’t in line with his vision for her—which seems to revolve
mostly around her performing duets with him, in the musical style he built his
career on—is in violation of her authentic self. At the heart of it remains his role as
her ambition and her confidence: “You’re worried that you’re ugly and you’re not.
I’m trying to tell you that. So you need to get all this fucking approval by all these
other people. Why can’t I just be enough for you?” Her acceptance speech at the
Grammy’s makes this explicit: “Thanks, um. Thanks to my husband, Jack Maine […] I
always wanted to be a singer on a big stage, and because of him, I am.” As such,
when he does ultimately commit suicide, it is not framed as the result of a lost battle
against his addictions, but as a sacrifice for her: rather than stifle her career, he
chooses to destroy himself. Even in this, it is his agency, not hers, that drives the
action.
Ally’s relationship to Jack carries all of the stereotypes generally associated
with men and women outside of fiction. Ally is shown to be communal, her concerns
revolving around the emotional health of others, her words and demeanor gentle,
and her will generally submissive to her lover and mentor, Jack. For his part, Jack is
agentic, providing the ambition necessary for her career to take off, and the
independence and dominance required to move the action of the film. Though A Star
is Born is presumably about Ally’s rise to fame, she plays a passive role for a
majority of the story; it is Jack’s feelings, and Jack’s actions, that propel the plot
forward. In construing her relationship to him in this way, the creators of the film
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recreate the social stereotypes we have for women and men in their fiction. That
these stereotypes about the way women and men are, and the way they interact,
exist is not new; the studies that demonstrate the existence of these stereotypes
date back decades. Again, there is no way to know if the creators of the film knew of
the existence of these stereotypes and ignored them, or were ignorant of them
entirely; as such, I can only speculate if learning about them would have prevented
the creators from including them in their fiction. Responsible creators, however,
would do well to learn about such stereotypes, and ensure that the relationships
between their characters do not reinforce them.

III. C) Plots
That leaves us with one last venue for stereotypes in fiction: the relationship
between a character and the plot. When a character bears a stereotypical
relationship to the plot, they are generally used as part of the plot, rather than a
character — and used in ways that replicate harmful social stereotypes. In a 1999
blog post, comic book author Gail Simone popularized a name for one such
stereotypical relationship: Women in Refrigerators, or “fridging.” When creators of
fiction engage in fridging, they use the gruesome, violent death of a woman
character to fuel the arc of a male character (generally a boyfriend, husband, father,
etc.). As a result, they reduce that woman character—and any existence she may
have had in the story, any other relationship she had, any action she may have
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taken—into a plot point for the man character. 17 A related trope, colloquially known
as “Bury Your Gays,” picks out the tendency of creators to kill their queer characters,
often as a resolution to their romantic relationship with or to propel the plot of
another character. In 2016, the CW’s The 100 engaged in the Bury Your Gays trope
by killing Lexa, a queer character, in order to further the sci-fi plot that had been
established earlier that season. In doing so, The 100 perpetrates and perpetuates the
stereotype that same-gender romance is unhealthy, unhappy, or otherwise bad.
This stereotype of queerness as something negative has a long and shifting
history in the West, but there is one site of it that offers a fairly clear trend:
Hollywood and television. When the Motion Picture Production Code went into
effect in the early 1930s, it did not specifically target the representation of queer
characters in Hollywood films; nevertheless, it effectively put an end to the inclusion
of same-gender loving characters in movies until it fell out of favor in the mid-1960s
(Fejes 1993, 397-398). Prior to this, actors like Marlene Dietrich frequently played
at queerness on screen to titillate and entertain; 18 when queer characters emerged
again in the 1960s, any even remotely positive representation had disappeared:
“Homosexuality was portrayed at best as unhappiness, sickness, or marginality and
at worst perversion and an evil to be destroyed” (Op. cit., 398). (And somewhere in
between, any story that had been adapted from material with explicitly queer

17

There is little doubt that much of what plays into the Women in Refrigerators trope stems
from the sorts of stereotypes discussed previously: men are usually the actors here, where
the women who are killed are their soft, emotional outlets. For the sake of diversity,
however, I will leave it to the reader to draw the parallels from the previous example, and
focus on a different one now.
18 Cf. Morocco (1930) and Blonde Venus (1932), in particular.
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people, like Cole Porter or Leonardo da Vinci, would be sanitized of any queerness
whatsoever.19) Television was not far behind: “Not surprisingly, given television’s
intimate relationship with Hollywood film-making and its need to program for a
mass audience, TV treatment of lesbians and gays roughly parallels that of
Hollywood film. Negative stereotypical presentations of homosexuality were
inserted into television from its earliest days” (Op. cit., 399). Post-Stonewall, queer
organizations managed to make some progress in advocating for better
representation, but with the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s and the rise of the religious
right, that progress was quickly halted: “Yet, overall, in mainstream network
television, which reaches the largest national audience and defines national
programming norms, the presentation of lesbians and gays is problematic…overt
display or discussion of physical and sexual behavior between homosexual
characters is generally off-limits; television homosexuals are de-sexed and without
desire” (Op. cit., 402). For the whole of the history of Hollywood and television, then,
queerness has been relegated to something unhealthy, unhappy, or morally
perverse.
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, to find a strong trend of premature, often
violent death among queer characters in television and film in particular. In a 1986
article, film historian Vito Russo noted: “out of 32 films with major homosexual
characters from 1961 through 1976, 13 feature gays who commit suicide and 18
have the homosexual murdered by another character. The one remaining gay
character in the group…is castrated” (32). This trend continues into contemporary
19

See Russo 1986 for a complete, scathing list.
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film and television; as of 2016, on television alone, 208 lesbian and bisexual women
characters have been killed (Riese 2016). In the 2016-2017 season, there were 92
queer women characters across broadcast, cable, and streaming platforms (GLAAD
2017, 5). In that same season, 40 of them were killed (Riese 2016). If queerness is a
mental illness, then death by suicide is a result that follows easily. If it’s a physical
disease, death by AIDS or cancer is equally so. If it’s a perversion or moral wrong,
then having a queer villain (who is killed by the hero in a climactic struggle) or a
queer character who is otherwise the main point of conflict (as when a queer
character comes between a heterosexual couple, or challenges the sexuality of a
heterosexual character, and dies because of it) can easily follow. All of these easy
scripts, born of these stereotypes about queer love and queer attraction, build into
the Bury Your Gays trope.
In its third season, the CW’s The 100 made use of the Bury Your Gays trope
when the creators killed Lexa, and used her death to propel the second half of the
season’s plot. A recurring character since the second season, Lexa (Alycia DebnamCarey) was the first leader to unite the twelve warlike clans that occupy The 100’s
post-apocalyptic world. After a conversation in which she confesses to the show’s
bisexual protagonist, Clarke Griffin (Eliza Taylor), that she once loved another
woman, Lexa quickly became a beloved queer character; here was a complex young
woman who was a capable warrior, an intelligent strategist, and a respected leader,
whose age, gender, and love for another woman were never presented as something
that made her strange or Other. This fondness only grew as she and Clarke, as
leaders of opposing cultures, developed an on-screen, star-crossed romance over
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the course of the next season. Here was representation that did not recreate any of
the negative stereotypes that surround lesbians and bisexual women, and instead
presented a complicated but healthy relationship between two powerful characters.
Unfortunately, that absence of stereotype was soon filled when, mere
minutes after consummating her relationship with Clarke, Lexa is shot by a stray
bullet and killed. By writing such a death for Lexa, the creators combined a number
of detrimental stereotypes: it often happens that young women in fiction die after
having sex, and this is exponentially true for queer women. Queer characters on
television are “de-sexed and without desire”, with the discussion of—let alone the
depiction of—queer desire is taboo, especially for adolescent characters (Fejes
1993, 402). By killing Lexa so soon after she and Clarke sleep together, and at the
hand of a character that is depicted as her father figure, the creators of The 100
reinforce the stereotype that queer love is wrong, and cannot end happily. More
than this, her death is reduced to a plot point once it becomes clear that it, an
accidental death of a warrior in a bloody and violent world, served one purpose: to
reveal the existence of a microchip that was embedded at the base of Lexa’s skull,
and integrated with her spinal cord. This chip would become the McGuffin that fuels
the sci-fi plot that steers the action of the rest of the season, action that could not
happen without the chip being separated from Lexa. In both regards, Lexa’s
relationship to the plot becomes negatively stereotyped: she is a queer character
whose death is occurs only to serve the plot, fulfilling the Bury Your Gays trope and
erasing any of the other value she had brought to the show.
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By choosing to write Lexa’s death the way they did, the creators of The 100
depicted a stereotypical relationship between her character and the show’s plot.
Fiction, in particular television shows and Hollywood films, have a long history of
killing queer characters, generally after depicting them as unhealthy, unhappy,
perverse, or otherwise morally wrong. While The 100 avoids characterizing Lexa in
this way for much of her story, reducing her death to a plot point and depicting it as
a result of her love for Clarke puts a damaging stereotype at the end of it. By being
aware of tropes like Bury Your Gays, Fridging, and other ways in which a character’s
relationship to the plot can be stereotyped, responsible creators can avoid including
these kinds of stereotypes in their fictions.

IV. Conclusion
Thus far, I have argued a) that fictions can influence our hermeneutical
resources by requiring us to use the conceptions they present, and b) can reinforce
harmfully stereotypical conceptions of real-world people, priming them for
hermeneutical injustices. As a result, creators of fiction have a hermeneutical
responsibility to practice due diligence when creating, and avoid No Representation
problems and Bad Representation problems when doing so. In this chapter, I set out
to explore in greater detail precisely what I mean by No Representation problems,
Bad Representation problems, and harmful stereotypes. No Representation
problems occur when none of a fiction’s main characters have a marginalized
identity; Bad Representation problems occur when a fiction does have a
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character(s) with a marginalized identity, but they’re depicted with characteristics
that match harmful social stereotypes about that identity.
As to what exactly those social stereotypes are and how they appear in
fiction, I have offered three possible avenues: a character in the fiction can be a
stereotype in themselves, as Missandei is in Game of Thrones; a character’s
relationship with another character can be stereotypical, as is the relationship
between Ally and Jack in A Star is Born; or a character’s relationship to the plot can
be stereotypical, like Lexa’s death in The 100. The way that characters are depicted
in their fictions can mimic the stereotypical beliefs about the social identities they
take part in, whether in the way they behave, the way they interact with other
characters, or the role that they play (or don’t play) in the fiction’s plot. Many of the
most harmful depictions have existed for decades or more, and have been discussed
by theorists, historians, and, increasingly, fans on social media. By working to
understand how stereotypical depictions of characters in fiction can replicate and
propagate harmful stereotypes of real-world identities and communities, creators of
fiction would be more likely to catch them when they appear in their own fiction
and eradicate them. Those who do so to the best of their ability are practicing due
diligence, and carry out their hermeneutical responsibility to their audiences.

4

Authenticity and Autonomism

I. “30 Years of Cinema Lore”
It took all of a day for Star Wars: The Last Jedi to go from one of the most
anticipated additions to the Skywalker Saga to being the most reviled. Despite
achieving some of the greatest critical acclaim received by a Star Wars film, selfprofessed longtime fans of the franchise took to message boards and social media to
express their disgust: “#theLastJedi Is just a terrible movie that absolutely ruins 30
years of cinema lore” declared Twitter user @dmoran2218 two days after the film’s
release. “I can’t even fathom how that script was approved,” Reddit user
u/Hatefiend fumed in a post on the r/UnpopularOpinion subreddit, “I can’t believe
there were people that thought it was good…They took the Star Wars brand and shit
all over it.” As it turns out, this was not so unpopular an opinion: when it was
archived, u/Hatefiend’s post had a 92% “Upvote” rating from fellow users who
interacted with it. Hundreds, if not thousands, of tweets, statuses, blog posts, and
think pieces flooded the web in the following weeks, all declaring disappointment
and outright disgust for The Last Jedi; pieces deriding the film even appeared on
Forbes’ and Variety’s websites. All this, despite overwhelming approval by the critics
who attended early screenings.
What happened here? Why were these fans, some of whom have been
following the Star Wars story across multiple medias for multiple decades, so
against its latest installment? To put it simply: It was a bad Star Wars movie.
Different classes of argument are made distinct by the emphasis a given fan puts on
that sentence. For some, The Last Jedi was a bad movie; they criticize the structure,
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the pacing, the lack of originality (Gleiberman 2017), the hollowness of it, or its
runtime (Watercutter 2017). For others, The Last Jedi was a bad Star Wars movie. In
this case, the traditional aesthetic criticisms drop away in favor of those that are
more lore-specific: there wasn’t enough call-back to the original trilogy
(u/Hatefiend 2017), there was too much call-back to the original trilogy
(Gleiberman 2017), beloved characters and tropes were made the butt of
disparaging jokes (Child 2018), there was too much emphasis on real-world
problems (Chamary 2018), or more emphasis on diversity than story (Leeman
2019). Any and all of these characteristics, if true, would make The Last Jedi an
affront to the Star Wars legacy for such audiences. But in particular, those who offer
the last two criticisms—that social justice or diversity in casting become the focus
rather than the quality of the story—would put the theory I am advancing directly in
the crosshairs.
In this chapter, I will consider the objections these fans would raise against
the sort of responsibility of creators that I advance. In the process, I will
demonstrate that all the above positions fall into one of two camps: either they are
moderate autonomist arguments, or they are radical autonomist arguments. The
former, I will argue, have no reason to reject my position, as it remains agnostic as
to whether diversity in characters actually affects the aesthetic value of the work.
Only the latter would reject it out of hand, believing as they do that a creator’s sole
responsibility is to their creation; no moral, political, or other value belong in the
determination of a work’s success. Unfortunately for them, radical autonomism is a
position that has not been seriously argued since the aestheticism movement of the
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late 19th century. Moreover, I will show how that radical autonomism fails to
overcome my epistemic approach to this problem.

II. The Aesthetic and the Authentic
Those who were critical of The Last Jedi can be divided into three main
camps, only one of which is of direct interest to the current project: those whose
complaints are aesthetic, those whose complaints are about authenticity, and those
whose complaints are social or political in nature. In the following section, I will
briefly establish the first two and show that they hold no particular objection to a
hermeneutical responsibility for creators. The only critics who would are those
belonging to the third camp, an investigation of which will round out the section.
The first camp of critics belongs to those who are making expressly aesthetic
arguments against the aesthetic value of the film. Such critics argue that The Last
Jedi is a poorly done film qua film; it fails to use the conventions of its medium in an
effective and artful way. The same way that a painting can be made bad by hamfisted brush strokes, a film can be made bad by poor pacing, acting, cinematography,
etc. For one critic, The Last Jedi’s cardinal sin is the former: “its dramatic tension
isn’t sustained. It wavers and flags. It escalates and then droops. The whole crosscutting and-then-this-happened style of the “Star Wars” films, derived from the old
serials, now becomes an excuse to pile on half a dozen plots that don’t intermesh so
much as they coincide” (Gleiberman 2017). The first Star Wars films “weren’t overly
fussy; they were works of whiz-bang classicism”, but The Last Jedi was neither
(Gleiberman 2017). In this case, what would make The Last Jedi a bad movie is an
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overabundance of plot that the creative team didn’t present in a coherent, engaging
way. Because such criticisms are confined specifically to the deployment of a
medium’s elements—and the creators’ skill in doing so—I refer to them as aesthetic
criticisms.
By concerning themselves only with the aesthetic elements of a fiction when
determining its aesthetic value, such critics stake out something that looks like a
moderate autonomist claim. Moderate autonomist positions acknowledge the
existence of a number of potential domains of criticism; a work of fiction can be
judged according to its aesthetic value, its moral value, its epistemic value, its social
value, and on and on. However, all of “these various levels are independent or
autonomous” (Carroll quoted in Harold 2011, 139, emphasis mine). When it comes
to determining the aesthetic value of a work, then, the only criteria that matters is its
aesthetic characteristics: “a person who makes a global moral judgment μ and a
global aesthetic judgment α of the same object or event is not rationally required to
adjust α in light of μ or to adjust μ in light of α” (Harold 2011, 140). Because
aesthetic criticisms take only the aesthetic elements of a fiction into account—in the
above case of The Last Jedi, the aesthetic elements of pacing and plot were the only
criteria used to make the value judgment—they seem to abide by this dictum; the
moral, epistemic, or political elements of the fiction do not influence the fiction’s
aesthetic valence.
A true moderate autonomist would find no objection to a creator having a
hermeneutical responsibility, however. Because moderate autonomists
acknowledge that fictions have many dimensions and are not limited to the purely
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aesthetic, they don’t need to balk at the possibility that a fiction has the sort of
epistemic dimension I argue it does. If I argued that epistemic dimension necessarily
had to factor into the aesthetic judgment of the fiction, that would be another
story—but I don’t. There is nothing here that requires the potential hermeneutical
effects of a fiction to be taken into account when determining whether it is good qua
fiction. One could argue that using tired, harmful stereotypes like those discussed in
Chapter 3 does negatively affect the aesthetic value of a work, or that using more
original, fleshed out, and diverse characters could improve a work’s aesthetic value.
But neither claim is intrinsic to my argument, and so I will leave that debate to
another time. Instead, it is enough that a moderate autonomist would allow for this
hermeneutical dimension of a fiction. If that dimension exists, then it is one that a
creator can attend to; it may not be the same sort of responsibility the creator owes
to the aesthetic dimension of their fiction, but neither are they in conflict with each
other under a moderate autonomist approach.
The second camp of criticisms of The Last Jedi is based, not on the typical
aesthetic elements of the film, but on the elements it has as one part of a larger
story. For those in this camp, The Last Jedi isn’t judged as one standalone film
produced by a singular creative team, but as an addition to a fictional universe that
existed long before it; it is not a bad movie, it’s a bad Star Wars movie. That Luke
Skywalker, once the bright-eyed, ever-determined hero, is now depicted as a
defeated and cynical old man is a betrayal of the character that makes him all but
unrecognizable—a complaint echoed even by the man who played him (Kohn and
Marotta, 2018). That Rey, our new hero and heir apparent of the Jedi Order, is not a
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member of one of our established and storied bloodlines means the film “weight[s]
the characters’ choices more heavily than their destiny”, a theme virtually anathema
to the Star Wars stories that came before (VanDerWerff, 2017). In fact, for some, the
film seemed to reject—and even worse, laugh at—so many of the tropes that made
Star Wars what it was:
“The sacred Jedi texts!” Luke shouts, as the tomes go up in flame. “Read them
have you?” chides Yoda, pointing out that Daisy Ridley’s Rey has become
hugely powerful without access to such ostentatious resources. It’s a
superbly comic moment, a hilariously radical revision of accepted Star Wars
tropes, but also one that risks undermining any sense of wonder fans might
have had left after the [previous film]. Why bother to whet our appetites for
revelations about the Jedi and their origins, as teased in trailers for Johnson’s
film, only to disappoint us with such a curveball? In one moment, every
ounce of enigma surrounding the brigade of space monks and their ancient
way of life is torpedoed” (Child 2018).
In radically changing already established characters, or laughing at elements of lore
that ought to inspire wonder, or introducing too much new material, or mimicking
the same tropes over and over without any soul, or failing to preserve established
precedents, The Last Jedi makes itself, according to such complaints, a bad film.
Because these complaints largely revolve around The Last Jedi failing to be an
authentic Star Wars movie, I will refer to them as authenticity criticisms.
Determining whether or not these authenticity criticisms against The Last
Jedi are worthy of merit would require more time than I can offer here. What does it
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mean to be an authentic addition to a series that has multiple creators? Or multiple
creative teams? What does it mean to be authentic when the story has spanned forty
years, and captured the hearts of at least three generations of fans? Is there a heart
of Star Wars as a franchise, a certain Star-Wars-ness, that can be cached out like the
characteristics of a genre? Can one creator’s adaptation of those characteristics be
more or less authentic than another’s? All of these are questions worthy of answer,
especially as nearly every medium of storytelling has been shifting away from oneoff works in favor of extended series (cf: the Marvel Cinematic Universe, massively
popular novel series like Song of Ice and Fire, video games like Assassin’s Creed that
have upwards of ten installments, and so on). What does it mean to be an authentic
addition to one of these series? While I must save answering that question for
another time, it suffices to say that those who level such criticisms make use of this
type of authenticity as a kind of aesthetic criteria.
Though such a claim would undoubtedly be met with skepticism by
aestheticians, those who level authenticity criticisms against a fiction hold that its
ability to fit in with the rest of its series—whatever that may entail—is a value
criterion. Just as a film’s cinematography can make it a bad film, so can its lack of
authentic treatment of the source material. The Last Jedi’s mistreatment of classic
characters and themes would be as condemning as poor pacing—perhaps even
more so. It is an aesthetic element of a fiction being used to make an aesthetic
judgment, and in that regard is no different from the sort of judgments aesthetic
criticisms make. As such, authenticity criticisms would also fall under the umbrella
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of moderate autonomist positions, and raise no objection to a hermeneutical
responsibility for creators in the sense I have argued for.
In the next section, we will address the sort of criticism that does.

III. The Political and the Ugly
The final camp of criticisms leveled against The Last Jedi do not concern the
aesthetic elements of the story, but the way some of the creator’s choices seem to
reflect an undue interest in real world politics. Specifically, they target the inclusion
of non-white, non-male characters: the very thing I suggest hermeneutically
responsible creators ought to do.
For members of this camp, The Last Jedi’s cardinal sin was foregrounding
diverse characters at the expense of the overall quality of the film. Doing so, they
charge, is a kind of pandering; rather than creating a story that is the best version of
itself for Star Wars’ loyal fans, they forced in a diverse cast for the sole purpose of
pleasing a small but vocal community. This latest attempt at Star Wars “speaks only
to crowds of keyboard warriors eager to please woke mobs on social media by
praising pictures for putting social agendas above story and character” (Leeman
2019). It “included bizarre speeches about evil rich people and more paper-thin
characters who check off social agenda boxes”, including Rey, who “has been
propped up as our new protagonist and we are supposed to like it because she’s
female…but the writers appear so desperate to appeal to woke crowds that they
forgot to give her flaws, an arc or any basic emotion resembling a human being”
(Ibid.). It is “anti-white, anti-male propaganda” in which “pretty much everything” is
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“a conscious slap to Star Wars’ white male fans” (alexrpt 2017). Rather than
providing “an epic tale of good vs. evil, drawing on the culture motifs familiar to
Americans at the time”, as the original Star Wars trilogy did, The Last Jedi “is highbudget fan fiction with SJW nonsense drizzled on top”1 (Ibid.). By making the
leaders of the heroic Resistance all women, the leaders of the evil First Order all
white men, introducing an Asian American woman and a Black man as main
characters, and tackling topics like toxic masculinity and war profiteering, the
creators of The Last Jedi put social commentary ahead of aesthetic value (Ibid.).
According to such criticisms, The Last Jedi pandered to a subset of the audience that
cares more about the handling of real-world politics than the quality of the movie
and suffered for it. Because of this focus on the effect of real-world social issues on
the quality of a work, I will call such criticisms political criticisms.
Removing some of the more inflammatory language, there is an important
question underlying the above condemnations: should the politics of the moment
influence a creator? Herein lies the objection to my argument. I have proposed that
creators of fiction have a hermeneutical responsibility to practice due diligence in
their creations, an epistemic virtue that sits between two vices. In exhibiting
epistemic laziness, the vice of deficiency, creators fail to do the work of removing
harmful, lazy stereotypes from their works. Performing epistemic paralysis, the vice
of excess, would have them so fearful of including such stereotypes that they avoid
diversifying their cast at all. Practicing the epistemic virtue of due diligence would

1

“SJW” here is an acronym for “Social Justice Warriors,” a nickname given to Internet users
who argue for things like diverse reputation that’s intended to be demeaning. In this case,
“SJW” and the “crowds of keyboard warriors” are one in the same.
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have creators ensuring that their works feature diverse characters that do not fall
into harmful stereotypes, preventing that harm from reaching their audiences. But
any of them—the virtue and vices both—require the creator of a fiction to be aware
of the political climate of their time, of the sorts of harmful stereotypes that exist
and the social groups that are hermeneutically marginalized. Allowing such
awareness to influence the way they create their art would be precisely the kind of
influence political criticisms would preclude.
There are two foundations that political criticisms can generally be built
upon. In one, political criticisms are justified because informing an audience about
political or social affairs is just not what fiction does. By definition, fiction reflects a
fictional world—one that is necessarily not our world, that is not factual or real—
and is designed to entertain, not inform. If audiences are walking away from a fiction
with new or differing information about the real world, they have made a category
mistake by treating a fiction as something that represents the real world or
something to learn from. In the other, political criticisms are justified because
incorporating politics into their work is just not what creators do. A creator’s only
responsibility, qua creator, is to produce the most aesthetically valuable version of
their fiction as they can. To charge them with anything else would be to mistake the
nature of their work. I will address both motivations in turn.
To argue that fictions, by their nature, reflect a world that is not our own and
are vehicles of entertaining storytelling, rather than informative descriptions of our
world, is on its face a sensible thing to do. The more we pull at the details, however,
the more difficult it becomes to maintain such hard lines. That fictions must
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represent a non-real world seems bound up in the very definition of the thing: to be
fictional is to be not real. Genre fiction like science fiction and fantasy are prime
examples of this. If a story takes place in an entirely different galaxy, or only depicts
species and creatures that have never existed in our reality, saying that it also has—
or ought to have—content about our world seems like a hard sell. But even if a
fiction’s cast is entirely composed of fantastical creatures, there is little chance that
no element of the real world makes its way into the text. Amongst the scattered
dozens of fantastical alien species, the heart of Star Wars itself is an order of space
monks, comprised of predominantly human men, who practice a blend of Christian
theology and Buddhist philosophy. Even Tolkien, who is regularly held up as a
pinnacle of Western fantasy, made extensive use of real-world traits to populate his
fantastical world; to say that there are no parallels to be drawn between the cultures
he establishes for his dwarves and elves and hobbits and those of various cultures in
the UK, or parallels between the spread of Sauron’s all-consuming evil and the rise
of European fascism at the time of his writing, would be to argue in bad faith. The
presence of content reflecting the real world only grows when we move away from
such outlandish genres: murder mysteries often rely on real world facts about the
human body or psychology, historical fictions use real world events as plot points or
people as characters, and fictions of countless genres take place in a real world
location. Bring these elements into consideration, and we’ve formed a problem of
heaps. If fictions are defined by the absence of “real” things, how many real things
can it include and still be considered a fiction? Is there some percentage of fictional
content that sets fictions aside from, say, a historical narrative?
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To say that a fiction does not deal in real world information by its nature is to
draw a line that is, at best, difficult to maintain. So much non-fictional content is
regularly used by widely accepted fictions: “As for the portrayal of actual
happenings and actual agents, most fictional narratives contain at least some
narrative elements that, if taken as assertions, refer to and make claims about real
existents. For example, true sentences about coach routes in Victorian England can
be found in Bleak House” (Davies 2013, 331). As a result, there is no fruitful
threshold to establish at which a fiction ceases to be a fiction due to inclusion of
non-fictional or “real” content. Even if a creator set out to make a work that had only
fictional content, the inclusion of some real-world content—underlying assumptions
about the world, that there are genders or that living things have hearts or that
rational creatures use the same reasoning we do—is inevitable. Any fiction drawn
from a creator’s mind necessarily reflects, to one degree or another, their
experiences of the world. Real, non-fictional content will always find its way into the
stories we tell.
Our next question then isn’t whether there is information about the real
world in fictions, but to what degree. For many who would put forward a political
criticism of a fiction, their criticism is justified because engaging in politics isn’t
what a fiction does. Rather, a fiction’s telos, the thing it is designed to do, is to
entertain. When someone complains that they come to a particular fiction because
they’re looking for escapism, they are making a version of this claim. It is the
purview of history textbooks or newspaper articles to consider the state of the real
world; the purview of fictions is to sweep us away: “The author of a nonfictional
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narrative, it is claimed, is constrained by what may be termed “the fidelity
constraint”: include only events you believe to have occurred, narrated as occurring
in the order in which you believe them to have occurred. The author of a fictional
narrative, on the other hand, is not governed by this constraint, but by some more
general purpose of storytelling, such as entertaining the reader” (Davies 2013, 332).
By bringing in too much of the real world’s politics, The Last Jedi not only made it
that much harder to be swept off to a galaxy far, far away, but also violated its very
purpose as a fiction. The creators chose to place social commentary over
entertainment value, and thereby made a bad film.
But this is surely too restrictive of a purpose for fictions. Perhaps there are
some fictions created solely for the purpose of easy entertainment, like many an
action movie or romantic comedy. But suggesting that entertaining the reader and
making social commentary are necessarily incompatible is to ignore entire traditions
of fiction. Plenty of fictions, from classic literature like Catch-22 or Great
Expectations to pulp entertainment stories like Marvel’s Black Panther or Get Out,
have social commentary as a core element of their stories. No one would say that the
political content of those fictions is detrimental to their value or contrary to their
purpose; all of them are just as entertaining, if not more so, than other apolitical
fictions in the same genres. In fact, it seems precisely because of their political
commentary that such fictions are successful. To say then that fictions cannot be
political because they are supposed to be entertaining is to create a false dichotomy.
Even if this dichotomy did hold up, there is no reason to think that such a purpose
for fiction would necessarily preclude it also doing something else. As demonstrated
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in Chapter 1, fictions are more than capable of imparting conceptions to the
audiences that engage with them. Simply because it is not a fiction’s purpose to
impart such information does not mean it won’t. In fact, according to the
psychological work discussed in that chapter, it is expressly because of fiction’s
entertaining nature that it can impart conceptions the way that it does. Even if
entertainment were the sole purpose of fiction, creators would not for that reason
get to disregard the hermeneutical power that their medium has.
That brings us then, to the final potential justification of a political criticism:
it is not the job of a fiction creator to make their fictions politically or socially
correct. For such arguments, the purpose of fiction is to provide something complex
enough to be worthy of contemplation and, as a result, aesthetic enjoyment. Such
contemplation is not created from the consideration of social or political problems,
nor is it born of debating moral quandaries. Rather, a fiction worthy of
contemplation is one that is beautiful. All its pieces—its pacing, its scenery, its
visuals or wordplay—interacting together in a skillful way creates beauty, and that
beauty is what the audience contemplates. Those who would create a fiction, then,
have only a responsibility to making it as beautiful as they can, to ensure that all of
its pieces play together in the best way possible. What makes The Last Jedi a bad film
then, is that the creators neglected their only responsibility. They focused on the
social and moral aspects of their fiction, rather than ensuring that its elements were
harmonized. If making every character white, straight, and male would have meant
that the film’s depiction of them was coherent, the pacing consistent, and all the
cinematographic elements fall in line, they should have made every character white,
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straight, and male. Tasking creators with diversifying their casts for political or
hermeneutical reasons is asking them to put those reasons ahead of the value of
their art. If their fiction will be aesthetically better with a homogenous cast, then so
be it. That is their artistic license, and their responsibility. Leave it to someone else
to correct harmful stereotypes.
The problem with this justification is that it is, in fact, hardly new. For much
of the 19th century, aestheticism argued much the same: it was the form of a work
that gave it value, never the content. The elements of a piece that reflected the real
world, that told a story or seemed to teach a lesson, were never the things that
mattered: “No reformers were these great men [Rembrandt, Tintoret, Paul
Veronese, Velasquez]—no improvers of the way of others!—Their productions,
alone, were their occupation…In all this, their world was completely severed from
that of their fellow creatures, with whom sentiment is mistaken for poetry, and for
whom there is no perfect work, that shall not be explained by the benefit conferred
upon themselves” (Whistler 1994, 81). In fact, content in a piece could ultimately
distract from its beauty, making it a detriment to the work: “Art should be
independent of all clap-trap—should stand alone, and appeal to the artistic sense of
eye or ear, without confounding this with emotions entirely foreign to it, as
devotion, pity, love, patriotism, and the like. All then have no kind of concern with it”
(Op. cit., 52). It is therefore not the responsibility of the creator to consider such
content when creating. They ought to work only on perfecting the form: “My picture
of a “Harmony in Grey and Gold” is an illustration of my meaning—a snow scene
with a single, black figure and a lighted tavern. I care nothing for the past, present,
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or future of the black figure, placed there because the black was wanted at that spot.
All that I know is that my combination of grey and gold is the basis of the picture”
(Op. cit., 51). Doing otherwise, while fashionable, is a betrayal of what art is:
Beauty is confounded with Virtue, and, before a work of Art, it is so asked:
“What good shall it do?”…Hence it is that nobility of action, in this life, is
hopelessly linked with the merit of the work that portrays it—and thus the
people have acquired the habit of looking, as who should say, not at a picture,
but through it, at some human fact that shall, or shall not, from a social point
of view, better their mental, or moral state—Some have come to hear of the
painting that elevates—and of the duty of the painter—of the picture that is
full of thought (Op. cit., 81).
Thus, it is not the responsibility of a creator to consider the potential effects of their
work, how it might make their audience better or worse. Doing so is to mistake the
purpose of art, and the purpose of its creator. For those who would justify a political
criticism by claiming that a creator’s only responsibility is to their work, this is very
much in their wheelhouse.
It is worth noting that all of the above quotations are from a painter, and
have paintings as their primary target. On first pass, it seems much harder to apply
the tenants of aestheticism to fictional narratives, our primary target. When the
morality of characters is so tightly entwined with whether or not we sympathize
with them, when the struggle of good and evil or the individual against a larger
social system is so regularly the driving force of a narrative, saying that the content
of the fiction doesn’t matter to the success of its form seems like a much harder
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thing for a critic to maintain. Yet one need only look at the preface of one of the era’s
most celebrated creators to see otherwise. In the first page of the preface for The
Picture of Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde coins a famous mantra of aestheticism: “There is
no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written or written
badly. That is all” (1993, vii). Despite authoring a book that has morality at its core,
Wilde maintained that art “is absolutely indifferent to fact, invents, imagines,
dreams, and keeps between herself and reality the impenetrable barrier of beauty”
(Wilde 1908, 22). Moreover, “The only beautiful things, as somebody once said, are
the things that do not concern us. As long as a thing is useful or necessary to us, or
affects us in any way, either for pain or for pleasure, or appeals strongly to our
sympathies, or is a vital part of the environment in which we live, it is outside the
proper sphere of art. To art’s subject matter we should be more or less indifferent”
(Op. cit., 19, emphasis mine). The subject of art then, is nothing practical: it cannot
teach us about morality, or depict historical events, or influence our political beliefs.
Its value is purely contemplative, found in the beauty that it conveys. If this is the
case, any moral, historical, or political content in a fiction exists only to structure the
elements of the fiction, and should not supersede those elements in the artist’s
consideration. Even in a novel like The Picture of Dorian Gray, the perceived
morality of the characters is not a judgment or lesson, but present only because it
“was wanted in that spot.” The job of a creator is to perfect the work, not impart a
message.
When fans accuse fictions like The Last Jedi of putting political issues like
toxic masculinity or racism at the forefront of stories that otherwise do not engage
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with those topics, many will come to rest on a justification quite like the
aestheticists’. When a creator goes to work, they should not be burdened with the
weight of society’s issues apropos of nothing; if they choose to make their work
about those issues in some way, then that is their artistic choice. But to require
creators who otherwise would not want to engage with social issues to do so would
be to hamstring them, to force them to make non-artistic choices about work that
cannot be anything but artistic. And, as we have seen in a multitude of examples
throughout this project, the political issue most regularly levied against fictions in
this way is that of diverse representation—the very thing I charge creators to do.

IV. The Objection Considered
This final foundation for political criticisms takes direct aim at the core of my
project. If there were any who would reject the idea of a hermeneutical
responsibility for creators, they would fall in the aestheticist camp. Unfortunately
for them, aestheticism is, by all accounts, outdated. This is not to say that merely
being hundreds of years old is enough to discount a theory; aestheticism isn’t
outdated because of its age. Rather, referred to now as radical autonomism, this
approach to the purpose of art is rejected even by those who consider themselves
autonomists. In the following section, I will present what I take to be the autonomist
objection to my theory. I will then survey the numerous faults that have been found
with the radical autonomist position in recent decades, before detailing its specific
failure against my theory. In the end, it will become clear that there is no reason to
believe a creator cannot have a hermeneutical responsibility.
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More recently, the aestheticist approach to the nature of art has been
referred to as radical autonomism (to be set aside from moderate autonomism,
described in the previous section). According to radical autonomism, “art is a strictly
autonomous realm of practice. It is distinct from other social realms which pursue
cognitive, political, or moral value…because art is distinct from other realms of
social value, it is inappropriate or even incoherent to assess artworks in terms of
their consequences for cognition, morality and politics” (Carroll 1996, 224). Thus, it
“is not and should not be subservient to ulterior and external purposes, such as
promoting moral education” (Op. cit., 224). In other words: art for art’s sake. Where
moderate autonomists are willing to acknowledge that good art can have moral and
social dimensions without either affecting the aesthetic value of the work, radical
autonomists reject that those dimensions even exist in art. Discussing the moral or
political merits of a work of fiction, in this case, is to make a category mistake: there
are no moral or political merits of a fiction, because it only has aesthetic merits.
If a fiction has no moral or political aspects, then those who create them can’t
be concerned with their moral or political aspects. This poses a direct objection to
the hermeneutical responsibility that I argued for in Chapter 2. If radical
autonomists are correct, then it would be perfectly legitimate for a creator to
practice epistemic laziness or epistemic paralysis; they are not epistemologists, they
are not acting as epistemic agents, and so do not need to be confined by epistemic
imperatives. The imperatives for creators are determined by their art, and so are
confined to the aesthetic. Perhaps historians, journalists, and social commentators
ought to avoid epistemic laziness and paralysis, because their work traffics in
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testimony, the transfer of knowledge, and other epistemic action. But fiction is a
different animal. If an aesthetically perfect film also depicts evil characters as
heroic—non-autonomists regularly point to Triumph of the Will or Birth of a Nation
as instances of this—it is still a perfect film, according to radical autonomists (Gaut
2013, 396). That it utilizes and endorses harmful stereotypes, glorifying genocidal
racists while maligning the marginalized communities they target, is immaterial.
The morality depicted within the film is not an additional, separate facet of the
work, able to be discussed on the sidelines; it is merely an aesthetic tool, wielded by
the creator to make the elements fit together beautifully. So long as it serves that
purpose, there is no point in discussing the merits or defects thereof.
Put in such dramatic terms, it can be difficult to see radical autonomism as a
reasonable position (and indeed, most who would be sympathetic to autonomism
opt for the moderated version of it), but it was ultimately conceived to defend
creators against the possibility of moral censorship. Ethicism, the approach opposite
to radical autonomism, holds that all immoral content in a work constitutes an
aesthetic flaw. It isn’t difficult to see why such a theory would worry creators: if all
immoral content is considered an aesthetic flaw, will critics then spurn any work
that doesn’t toe the line of what they consider to be moral? Will creators still be free
to create works that explore inherently immoral characters and topics, as has long
been their prerogative? Or will creators be forced to, more or less, sell the party line
in order to share their work? Such a world not only promises to be a boring one, but
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one in which propaganda replaces art.2 Requiring creators to rework their fictions
into ones that only depict certain characters and in certain ways, as I seemingly aim
to do, presents the same threat to creators that ethicism appears to. Radical
autonomism would seek to reject both in order to protect artistic freedom. The
verdict on things like Triumph of the Will is just a bullet to bite.
The radical autonomist position entails a number of problematic
assumptions, but I will focus on three: it requires an essentialist approach to the
nature of art, it relies on a functioning notion of purely aesthetic experience, and
assumes that epistemic content cannot be an essential aspect of a fiction. The first
two are intimately related, while the third is specific to the case I am making.
The central claim of radical autonomism is the singularity of art. There is
nothing else like it, and nothing else that can serve the purpose that it does. With a
statement like that, one might be left to wonder what it is that sets art apart so
drastically, and yet is shared by all disparate forms of it—fiction, sculpture, music,
painting, architecture—such that they belong to the class of ‘art.’ By “bolding
asserting that art has nothing to do with anything else…a unique form of activity
with its own purposes and standards of evaluation”, radical autonomism “secures
the quest for essentialism at a single stroke” (Carroll 1996, 225). If radical
autonomism is to get off the ground, there must be this essential aspect that all art
has and nothing else does. But as we have seen repeatedly throughout this project,
many of the things we might consider characteristics of various art forms appear in

2

Proponents of ethicism would of course deny this outcome as necessary, but one is free to
question how much of their denial is ad hoc.
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things we might otherwise not consider art. Historical accounts are rarely classified
as artworks, and yet many make use of the same narrative tools that great literature
does. Advertisement jingles might use the same musical theories as great
symphonies, while the commercials they accompany might employ camerawork
that has filtered down from cinema masterpieces. Finding a single technical
characteristic that is not—or could not—be mimicked by things we don’t consider
art quickly shapes up to be a difficult task. Add to that the requirement that
whatever that element may be also needs to be shared by all forms of art, and that
task begins to look insurmountable (cf Carroll 2000). What element could be found
in a Mozart concerto, a Brontë novel, an abstract painting by Abbott, and a Sciamma
film? Even setting aside the wild variations in style and artistic standards of such
artists and the times they were creating in, finding a common denominator in the
mediums themselves seems a Herculean task.
As such, radical autonomists often make appeals to aesthetic experience.
Without a characteristic of form or tool shared by and unique to all art forms,
autonomists argue instead for a common experience that only art can produce. By
engaging with a work of art, we experience “the phenomenologically distinct
emotion that attends [aesthetic contemplation]—an austere, exalted, thrilling,
rapturous, strange, ecstatic emotion” that cannot be produced by anything less than
art (Shelly 2013, 251). This is the kind of experience that Clive Bell, James Whistler,
and Oscar Wilde all point to as the correct way to experience art; it isn’t derived
from the content of the work, of any narrative or morality depicted, but as a result of
“nothing but the purest of sensory-formal compositions” (Op. cit., 251). In other
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words, it is disinterested, taking account of only the formal elements and none of
those that reflect the real world. But as we have already seen, separating the form
from the content of works is not always possible. For some works, the political
commentary they make is an intrinsic element of their aesthetic value. For others,
the morality of characters and their actions are a foundational source of emotional
response for the audience, and therefore would be an essential element of their
experience of the work (cf Carroll 2004, Gaut 2013). There are certainly artworks in
which these elements don’t apply, as when a piece of music has no story or an
abstract painting has no characters, but unless the experience is the same across the
board it is hardly a common denominator. And it very regularly isn’t:
Consider Picasso’s great anti-war painting Guernica. Someone who reacted to
it merely as a set of lines and colors in cubist style would be missing out on a
central item of aesthetic interest: namely, how Picasso uses cubist
fragmentation to convey something of the horror of war and fascism. Our
aesthetic interest is directed, in part, at the mode of presentation of subject
matter; and the way it is presented can and often does manifest ethical
attitudes. (Gaut 2013, 396)
For many artworks, the way the form interacts with the content is the source of the
reaction we have to it. If that content is moral or political in nature, or otherwise
reflects the real world, the response we have to it doesn’t qualify as the kind of
aesthetic experience radical autonomists have invoked to save their theory. Without
a single, unique, and identifiable experience that can be called ‘aesthetic,’ we again
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find ourselves without an essential characteristic of art, and radical autonomism is
in hot water.
The final issue for radical autonomists that I will address centers on a core
assumption the theory makes: that moral, political, or other types of content can be
separated from a fiction’s form. Taking moral value in particular to task, radical
autonomism maintains that it makes no sense to judge a work morally, because
“Ethical assessment is directed at people’s character, motives and actions; yet works
are not persons: they have no will, exercise no choices, have no feelings and do not
act” (Gaut 2007, 70). In other words, moral judgments are passed on agents, not on
works of fiction. Because a work is not an agent, it cannot make decisions, have
motivations, or take actions of its own, there is nothing in it to pass moral judgment
on. Noël Carroll breaks it down into the following premises:
1. If artworks can be evaluated morally, then they must be the kinds of
things that can bear moral properties, viz., persons or person-like entities
to whom the relevant mental properties apply.
2. Artworks are not the kinds of things that can bear moral properties: they
are not persons or person-like entities to whom the relevant mental
properties apply.
3. Therefore, artworks cannot be evaluated morally. (2000, 140)
On this account, when we pass moral judgment on a work we are, at best, passing
moral judgment on the “actual historical author” and not on the work itself
(Devereaux 2004, 4). At worst, we are passing moral judgment on “the work’s
characters and their motivations and actions”, despite none of these things being

143
real (Op. cit., 4). In neither case are we passing judgment on the work itself, because
the work itself doesn’t qualify for moral judgment. As such, when we speak of the
ethical value of an artwork, we gibber.
And yet, as we have already seen, separating the moral element of a fiction
from its aesthetic value is not so easily done. While we do often cast moral
judgments on creators and their characters, when we make an ethical criticism of a
fiction, we speak of the fiction itself (Devereaux 2004, 5). Actively engaging with a
fiction requires us to “not just take in the words and individual incidents”, but also
“[ask] questions about what is going on; about why the characters and their motives
are presented as they are; about the novel’s point of view…And to see a text as
organized in this way is to see it as purposive. The text allows us to ask certain
questions” (Op. cit., 5). In allowing us to ask and seek out the answers to these
questions, fictions become agentive—though there are different ways of
conceptualizing that would-be agency. For some, the purposiveness of a fiction
comes from a posited author, constructed by the audience as a lens through which
they experience the fictional world (Op. cit., 6-7). For others it’s cached out as the
point of view of the fiction, a mixture of the historical author’s perspective and that
of the “persona or role or mask that [they] invents or takes on, much as an actor
plays a character”, in order to tell the story (Carroll 2000, 141). Still others take the
purposiveness of a fiction from the intentions behind the creator’s choices, such that
it is the “derivative intentionality” of the work that gives it its perspective (Gaut
2007, 71). Regardless of how it is framed however, the point remains the same: the

144
target of an ethical criticism of fiction is its perspective. 3 And, pieced together from
the aesthetic choices of the creator and the way they choose to deploy the elements
of their fiction, a fiction’s perspective cannot be divorced from its aesthetic
elements.
But we do not need to find this answer to the radical autonomist’s charge
fully persuasive, because it’s targeting the moral aspect of fictions specifically. We’re
not interested in the moral aspects, but the epistemic. Thus far we have focused on
moral assessments of fictions because the majority of autonomist texts take ethical
judgment to be their main target. But a radical autonomist believes that anything
short of purely aesthetic judgment—of evaluation of a work’s form and composition
alone—is to mistake a fiction for something it’s not. As such, radical autonomists
would balk at my suggestion that creators have to take into account the epistemic
influence their fictions can have on their audiences. A fiction’s only purpose is to be
beautiful and, therefore, a creator’s only responsibility is to make it beautiful. Like
those who level political criticisms against fictions like The Last Jedi, radical
autonomists would claim that saddling creators with considerations of
representation is to make a mistake in kind, and would sacrifice the real value of
artistic work for political pandering. Like moral content, we have no business
judging a fiction on its hermeneutical content.
But in order for this claim to be true, it must first be possible to engage with a
fiction aesthetically and not engage with it epistemically. Let’s assume, for the sake

3

Issues of perspective and how exactly one is built by a fiction are addressed in the
following chapter.
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of argument, that it’s possible to fully experience the aesthetic value of a fiction
without engaging with its moral content; let’s assume that the morality of the
characters’ actions, the developments of the plot, and the overall perspective the
fiction takes of these events has no effect on our ability to appreciate its beauty.
Would it be possible to separate out the epistemic content of a fiction in the same
way? I imagine the radical autonomist would have an even more difficult time
convincing us that it is than they would convincing us of any of the above. As we saw
in Chapter 1, engaging with a fiction epistemically is necessary to engage with it at
all. Perhaps we can engage fully with an abstract sculpture in a purely aesthetically
contemplative way, but engaging with a fiction requires us to try on the perspective
that it presents: we must, for at least the time that we’re reading or viewing it, adopt
(at least some of) the same beliefs, see the same associations, and make the same
assumptions that the fiction does. All of this is epistemic content, and without it the
act of reading a novel is reduced to scanning unconnected words on a page. While
there’s something to be said about the beauty of a well-constructed sentence, surely
there’s more to the aesthetic value of a novel than the literal printed words. If not,
then any sentence could be taken from The Picture of Dorian Gray and made into a
pithy fridge magnet without losing any of the aesthetic value it had in the book.
Fictions are more than sentences on a page or images on a screen. Fictions
are works that use sentences and images to present to us a fictional world populated
by fictional characters and moved by fictional events—and in order to experience
that fictional world, we must adopt the perspective that presents it to us. To read
Dorian Gray, we must adopt a whole swath of beliefs from the small and basic (a
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kind of magic exists in the world that lets a painting absorb the bad things about a
person) to the sweeping and thematic (immoral actions corrupt a person’s soul); the
same goes for watching a Hitchcock film, or reading a Marvel comic book, or
engaging with anything that falls beneath the umbrella of “fiction” as we’ve been
using the word. Engaging with a fiction means adopting its perspective, and
adopting its perspective is an inherently epistemic action. The epistemic content of a
fiction cannot be removed from it or ignored without removing a vital piece of what
makes it a fiction. Perhaps the valence of that epistemic content has no bearing on
its aesthetic value; that is the moderate autonomist position, and as we’ve seen the
moderate autonomist would have no objection against my argument. But the belief
that the epistemic content has no place in the evaluation of a fiction, that passing
judgment on a fiction’s epistemic content and holding a creator responsible for it is
to make fiction into something it isn’t, is a distinctly radical autonomist position.
And as we have seen, radical autonomists will have a hard time getting their
objection off the ground.

V. Conclusion
Whenever a call to improve representation in media is made, there’s
regularly an immediate, almost inevitable objection to it: to demand more diverse
representation in fiction is to saddle creators of fiction with an erroneous
responsibility. Those who make such an objection believe that a creator’s energies
are better spent ensuring their creation is the best version of itself that it can be, not
shoe-horning diverse characters in merely for the sake of pandering to so-called
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Social Justice Warriors. Such claims echo the arguments made by radical
autonomists, and it’s in those arguments that we come across the first major
objection to the theory I’ve laid out here.
I began this chapter by differentiating the three approaches to criticizing
popular fiction that have surfaced in recent years: the aesthetic criticism, in which
films like Star Wars: The Last Jedi are criticized for being bad movies, the
authenticity criticism, which criticized The Last Jedi for being a bad Star Wars movie
(in other words, for not fitting into the genre of Star-Wars-ness), and the political
criticism, which criticized The Last Jedi for being overly concerned with real world
politics, and not concerned enough with being authentic and aesthetically satisfying.
While this third criticism—that in concerning themselves with issues of diversity or
inclusion, creators cheapen their work—is a popular one that looks sound on the
surface, it is derived from the radical autonomist tradition. I traced this heredity in
section 3, before revisiting the numerous flaws with the radical autonomist position.
Those flaws, generally speaking, render radical autonomism difficult to maintain;
more specifically, they cause the objection against my account to fail. Because my
approach is based on the epistemic content of a fiction, a radical autonomist would
need to demonstrate that aesthetic appreciation of a fiction can occur without
engaging with its epistemic content, in addition to plugging the other holes in the
theory.
As a result, I am satisfied that those who would scuttle my argument for a
creator’s hermeneutical responsibility by denying a creator can have such a
responsibility will fail. There is more to be said regarding the interaction of a

148
fiction’s epistemic content and its aesthetic content, in particular whether the
inclusion of harmful stereotypes can negatively affect the aesthetic value of a work,
but I am happy to remain agnostic on that mark for now. In the next chapter, I will
address a second objection that is hinted at in passing above, regarding the role of a
creator’s intentionality in my theory.

5

Unintentional Intentions

I. “The Most Dangerous, Offensive Book I’ve Ever Read”
In 2017, a new Young Adult Fiction (YA) author was about to publish her first
book. The Black Witch, part one of a planned cycle by Laurie Forest, is a fantasy
novel that takes place “in a stratified society where other races (including selkies,
fey, wolfmen, etc.) are considered inferior at best and enemies at worst. But when
[the protagonist] goes off to college, she begins to question her beliefs”, revising her
previously racist tendencies and, in true YA fashion, joining a rebellion against the
oppressive system that inculcated them (Rosenfield 2017). Ostensibly a book
exploring the power structures of racism (albeit in a fantastic setting), The Black
Witch gained early praise from critics—until Shauna Sinyard, a book blogger and
prominent voice in the online YA community, published a review that painted the
novel’s presentation of racism as anything but1 anti-racist: “The Black Witch is the
most dangerous, offensive book I have ever read…[it is] racist, ableist, homophobic,
and…written with no marginalized people in mind” (ibid). That review prompted an
outcry from across the YA community, and authors and readers alike began to
demand its publication be canceled. But Forest defended her work: “My publishing
house and I felt that it was important to listen to the discussion and we were

1

Sinyard accused The Black Witch of replicating, rather than exploding, a number of racist
tropes through the way her main character experienced her world. With a main character
who believes anti-miscegenation norms are necessary, or that certain races are inherently
violent, untrustworthy, or otherwise inferior, Sinyard felt the novel’s treatment of racism
was surface-level and cursory, at best.
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respectful of people’s opinions and the debate…The Black Witch explores what it’s
like to grow up in a closed-minded culture, and its message is that people who may
have been raised with prejudiced views can change for the better. But it takes time
and education” (ibid). In other words: while she respects the debate, those who
think The Black Witch is a racist book are wrong. The depictions of bigotry in the
book are intended to further its ultimately redemptive message; taking them to be
harmfully racist is missing the point.
There are, admittedly, some complications to this story that prevent it from
being a cut-and-dried example: many of those who wanted the book banned hadn’t
read it, as the controversy began before its publication; Sinyard is one contrarian
voice among many critics, and yet hers was the only one amplified; all four books in
the series have since been published without further uproar. But The Black Witch is
just one instance in a string of controversies in the YA publishing world, 2 all of
which see an audience accuse a creator of utilizing harmful stereotypes in their
fictions. Some authors respond by pulling their books from publication, others fight
the accusations as misunderstandings, but all of them raise the same question.
When the creator of a fiction and their audience disagree about the meaning of a
text, whose interpretation is correct? Is The Black Witch a successful and sensitive
depiction of a bigoted mind unlearning its hatred, or is that a failed mission that
results in unnecessarily racist and harmful stereotypes?

2

While Forest is white, such controversy has not been limited to creators with dominant
identities. Creators with marginalized identities have been ‘canceled’ as well, largely due to
their portrayals of characters with other marginalized identities (Waldman 2019).
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Given the structure of my project, siding with the creator—adopting some
form of actual intentionalism—offers the most straightforward answer to this
question, and I will spend the next section detailing why that’s true. But opponents
will note that there is a key problem with actual intentionalism that proves
particularly detrimental here: if the meaning of a work is fixed by the creator’s
intention, and the creator didn’t intend their fiction to contain harmful stereotypes,
then surely that means the fiction doesn’t contain harmful stereotypes. In other
words, it would seem actual intentionalism has no mechanism to deal with a fiction
that is unintentionally harmful to marginalized communities, and that unintentional
harm is precisely the target of my account. Section 3 will establish this objection
more directly.
But in Section 4, I will show that there is a way actual intentionalism—
specifically, an actual intentionalism built on a Gricean framework like the one
offered by Kathleen Stock—can handle unintentional creator meaning in a text. With
the help of Paul A. Taylor’s account of natural meaning in works of fiction, I will
demonstrate how external forces like a harmful stereotype can interfere with a
creator’s intentions for their fiction. Such interference makes for a kind of opaque
reference: if a creator intends to make a not-racist fiction, but gives their character a
set of characteristics that compose a racist stereotype, that intentional action (giving
a character those characteristics) can cause their larger intention (making a nonracist fiction) to fail, even if they didn’t intend to make the character a racist
stereotype. Because of an error in judgment or as a result of ignorance, a creator’s
intentional action can lead to unforeseen consequences. As such, actual
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intentionalism does not need to accept the creator’s anti-racist intention without
criticism or rely on a mechanism outside the creator’s intentions to do so. We can
criticize them for failing to deliver on their intention, and for doing so in ways that
could have been avoided by practicing epistemic due diligence.

II. Perspectives and Intention
While I have thus far ignored the role that a creator’s intention plays in my
account, there is little question that it lurks behind much of the mechanics I have
already spelled out.
In Chapter 1, I make use of Elisabeth Camp’s work to argue that the way
fictions influence us epistemically is by requiring us to “try on” their perspectives.
According to Camp, perspectives are something epistemic agents have; they are a
collection of conceptions that compose “an open-ended disposition to construct rich,
intuitive representations of particular individuals and events, and of relations
among them” (2017, 78). Fictions are one of a select few ways that we can
experience a perspective that isn’t ours, as engaging with a fiction requires us to
step into its world and operate under its conceptions for a time. An audience that
wants to fully experience Pose (2018, 2019) must adopt its perspective, the
connections that it draws between characters and events within the world that it
creates. For those of us who were not Black, Latinx, trans, queer, or AIDS-positive
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participants in New York City’s ballroom scene in the 1980s, that will be a very
different perspective indeed.3
What we have not covered yet is how a fiction’s perspective is built, or how
an audience comes to know it. To that end, creators have a number of tools at their
disposal—though what they are and how they are deployed will differ across
mediums and genres. In film and television, creators can make use of camera angles,
shots, lighting, and sound to suggest to audiences how they should feel about the
event or character being portrayed: a blue-tinted shot-reverse-shot of two
characters in equal foregrounding accompanied by a soft melody in a minor key can
signal the audience that this is a sad, perhaps mournful moment, while a dim
tracking shot, angled from above a character and accompanied by ominous music,
might cause them to view the scene apprehensively. In written narratives word
choice can play a similar role, where value-tinged adjectives or emotion-laden verbs
can color an audience’s imaginings of the described events and characters.
But there is more to a perspective than simplified emotional responses like
these. Which characters are “flat” and which characters are “round”—that is, which
characters “can be described in a single sentence” and which have “a sufficiently
complex inner life, so that they have the same power [as real people] to involve and
surprise us” (Harold 2006, 264)—shapes the perspective of the fiction, giving the
audience a sense of which characters are important and should be given attention

3

This is not to say that a fiction’s perspective can only be different from an audience’s if the
characters or setting involved are different from their own. I can read a novel about a white,
bisexual cis-gendered woman living in New York City in this decade, and still be trying on a
perspective different from my own. It’s merely more likely that the conceptions deployed by
that perspective will be familiar to me, or similar to my own.
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and which are less so. In the same vein, which characters’ interiorities we have
access to and which we don’t structures the perspective of the fiction as well. If we
were to have “immediate imaginings” of Jay Gatsby, such that The Great Gatsby
“invite[d] the viewer to see the events of the fiction from that character’s point of
view” (Op. cit., 264), the novel would have a very different perspective of the
characters and events than is provided by the “mediate imaginings” of Gatsby
offered through Nick Caraway as narrator. Moreover, the way other characters
interact with and respond to the actions of a given character, coupled with the way
we relate to them, can inform how we view that given character. So, we may come to
know the perspective of a fiction “not simply through one voice, but synthetically,
from an amalgam of a narrator and a particular character, or dialogically, from the
interplay among several characters, or privatively, from a negative or ironic
rendering of diegetically authorized narrators or characters” (Lanser 2001, 154).
Who our narrator/protagonist is, how they understand the events happening
around them, how they feel about the other characters involved, how the audience is
meant to feel about the narrator/protagonist, all shape the perspective of a fiction.
And all of this can be signaled to the audience through the mechanics of a fiction’s
medium and genre.
But when all is said and done, all of these things are merely tools. Which
characters we have immediate access to, which have interiority and which don’t,
whether a scene is filmed in blue tinting with melancholic music or in low light with
ominous music, are all choices a creator can make to convey a certain meaning to
their audience. The power underlining a fiction’s perspective, then, is the creator’s
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intention. If a creator wants a character to be perceived as sympathetic, they can
deploy any of the above tools (and more!) to establish a perspective that is
sympathetic towards them. The same can be said of a character the creator wants to
be antagonistic, or desirable, or repulsive; of events that are happy, sad, abhorrent,
terrifying, or ambiguous. As such, when an audience tries on the perspective of a
fiction to engage with it, they are trying on the perspective intentionally constructed
by the fiction’s creator. They are, for a time, adopting the conceptions of and viewing
this fictional world the way its creator wants them to.
Chapter 2 takes this connection to the creator’s own interiority a step
further. Because the perspective of a fiction is so directly shaped by the creator,
many of the problematic aspects of a fiction can be traced back to the creator’s own
epistemic life. This is the premise of Chapter 2’s charge to creators. When a harmful
stereotype unintentionally appears in a fiction, the epistemic laziness of its creator
is a likely culprit. In this instance, the epistemic habits of the actual creator—their
refusal to investigate experiences outside of their own and preference for adopting
easy stereotypes instead—is the source of the epistemic harm in their fiction. The
same can be said when a fiction has a non-diverse cast of characters; it may well be
due to the epistemic paralysis of its creator, who feared misrepresenting
experiences outside of their own so much that they chose to exclude them rather
than chance it. That the solution to the epistemic harms born of each of these
scenarios is for the creator to investigate their own hermeneutical tools assumes
that there is a close connection between the creator’s conceptions and those that are
presented in the fiction they create. And once again, the easiest way to explain this is
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through a framework that fixes the perspective of a fiction with the creator’s
intended perspective for it. If a fiction’s content is fixed by the actual creator’s
intentions, there’s a much clearer line of effect between the actual creator’s
epistemic habits and the harmful (or not!) epistemic content in their fiction.
Finally, Chapter 4 does not directly address a fiction’s perspective or the
creator’s intentions for it, but it does rely on anti-autonomist accounts that make
heavy use of a fiction’s perspective. Berys Gaut’s rejection of autonomism requires
works to be forms of “derivative intentionality;” like other symbols, he argues, “the
intentionality of artworks derives from the intentional acts of the artist in
representing and expressing certain things…words have meaning ultimately
because speakers employ words meaningfully” (2007, 71). Creative works are
subject to moral evaluation, then, because a work’s depiction of its events and
characters is a direct result of its creator’s intentions: “one may, without change of
meaning, say either that Eliot’s ‘Prufrock’ is a compassionate poem or that Eliot
portrays Prufrock compassionately in his poem; that Poussain paints his violent
scene in an aloof detached way or that the Sabine picture is an aloof, detached
painting” (Guy Sircello, quoted in Gaut 2007, 72). Though taking a slightly different
tact, Noël Carroll’s anti-autonomist argument also has a work’s perspective at its
foundation. A work’s aesthetic value can be subject to moral criticism if the
perspective of the work is immoral—as in the case of Sade’s Juliette, which asks its
readers to find sexual torture titillating rather than repugnant—because “the point
of view is something the novelist has constructed and, therefore, is part of the
artwork proper” (Carroll 2004, 141). Because the perspective of a work is
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intentionally made by the work’s creator, using the same sort of tools they used to
make other, more ‘traditionally’ aesthetic aspects of the work, its moral value can
affect its aesthetic value. While my account targets the epistemic content of a work
rather than the moral content, the framework that I use to answer the autonomist is
similar: the epistemic commitments a fiction makes can influence its audience, and
because those commitments are the result of its creator’s artistic choices, it is part of
their artistic responsibility to avoid harmful ones. Once again, the actual intentions
of the work’s actual creator are the crux.
Running beneath the entirety of my project, then, is this actual intentionalist
current. Perhaps, then, it is time to establish what an actual intentionalist 4 account
of interpretation looks like.
Among the most recent and comprehensive takes on actual intentionalism is
that put forth by Kathleen Stock. Stock adopts a Gricean approach to actual
intentionalism, adapting his theory of non-natural meaning—which fixes the
meaning of speech acts—to written fiction. In that adaptation, utterance meaning
becomes text meaning, and speaker’s intention becomes author’s intention:
An author Au’s utterance x (or set of utterances S) has fictional content that p
if and only if: Au utters x (or S) intending that i) x (or S) should cause Fimagining that p in her intended readership; ii) R should recognize this

4

Actual intentionalism is only one among a number of approaches to interpretation; others
include hypothetical intentionalism, conventionalism, and pluralism. While Stock goes to
great lengths to defend actual intentionalism against proponents of these other approaches,
that is not my occupation here. I intend only to show that relying on actual intentionalism as
I do doesn’t undermine the rest of my account. For an introduction to the various
approaches to interpretation, see Irvin 2006.
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intention, and iii) R’s recognition of this intention should function as part of
R’s reason to F-imagine that p. (Stock 2017, 16)
Put another way:
For an author’s utterance to have fictional content that p, the author must not
only intend readers to imagine that p, but she must also intend that readers
recognize this intention, and also intend that the reader’s recognition of this
intention function as part of their reason to imagine that p. In other words,
the intention in question has a relatively complex ‘reflexive structure’ that is
borrowed from Grice 1975 (Op. cit., 19).
Under this account, the meaning of the novella that I write is fixed by what I
intended that novella to mean. But that simple intention—I intend my story x to
mean y—is not enough: I must not only intend for my novella to have a certain
meaning, but I must also intend for my audience to, first, understand that I intended
that meaning, and second, to take that as a reason to entertain 5 that meaning.
These additional requirements limit a creator’s intentions in important ways.
One of the charges regularly levied against actual intentionalism is that it allows
creators to “intend” meanings that are wildly unsupported by the fiction they
produce, like a sculptor “tell[ing] us that his statue was intended to be smooth and
blue, but our senses tell us it is rough and pink” (Monroe Beardsley, cited in Carroll

5

A regular source of criticism for Stock’s account centers on her use of imagination (Kind
2019, Lorand 2019, Green 2019). How exactly imagination functions in an audience’s
engagement with a fiction—what type of imagining it requires, how robust it must be,
whether imagination is required at all—is not something I will be litigating here. For now, it
is enough that a fully engaged audience imagines or entertains the creator’s intended
meaning in some way.
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2001, 158). If a creator’s intention is the only thing that fixes the meaning of a
fiction, then a creator can write the sentence “Josephine woke up the next morning”
and intend it to mean, “This is the best of all possible worlds,” and we would have to
accept it as the actual meaning of the sentence. We would have to accept it, the
objection goes, despite the intended meaning having absolutely no connection to the
conventional meaning of the sentence as written.
While that would be an untenable outcome for any theory of interpretation, it
is luckily not an outcome of actual intentionalism. While the conventional meaning
of a sentence, phrase, or word is an important factor in interpreting its actual
meaning, we would be wise not to tether ourselves to it too closely; while the
sentence “Josephine woke up in the morning” doesn’t conventionally mean “Marcus
failed to kill her”, we can easily imagine a scenario in which a creator can intend it to
have that meaning and succeed in conveying it to their audience. And that is the key
aspect of a Gricean actual intentionalism that the above objection overlooks: if a
fiction is to have the fictional content that p, a creator must intend for their
audiences to recognize their intention for it to mean that p (Stock 2017, 40). Part of
the structure of any kind of intention is the belief that one can actually achieve what
they intend: “to intend to A entails (at least) that one does not believe that one
cannot or could not A. This is arguably because one cannot be rationally committed
to trying to get or achieve A where one also believes that getting or achieving A is
ruled out as impossible” (Op. cit., 18). As such, in order for a creator to actually
intend a word, phrase, sentence, or entire work to have a particular meaning, they
have to believe that there is at least a good chance their audience will recognize that
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intention. If they don’t, they can’t be said to actually intend that meaning. 6 To that
end, it likely behooves a creator to make use of the conventional meaning of words
and sentences in the creation of their fiction, except where they can be reasonably
certain an alternative meaning could be understood.
Under this form of actual intentionalism then, there is a role for conventional
meaning in the process of interpretation—but it is not the deciding criteria. Rather,
that lies in the reflexive intention of a work’s creator. As in Gricean accounts of nonnatural meaning, Gricean actual intentionalist accounts argue that communication is
inherently intentional: with a goal of creating some state of mind in one’s audience,
the emphasis isn’t on the words used but on what those words get you to do. This
means creators can’t just “intend” meanings willy-nilly, causing any number of
mismatches between a word’s, phrase’s, or text’s conventional meaning and the
would-be intended meaning. In order for their work to have fictional content p, they
must not only intend that it have p, but also intend for their audience to recognize
that they intend it to have p. Finally, they must intend that this recognition be taken
by their audience as a reason to entertain or imagine fictional content p. If any one
of these parts is missing, then it isn’t a genuine intention and cannot be considered
part of a work’s fictional content.

6

There is, of course, the possibility that a creator miscalculates how good that chance is. In
such a situation, a creator might think they have conveyed their intention better than they
actually did, and the audience misses their intended meaning. Put another way, the creator
failed to use the tools of their chosen medium to effectively convey their intention: “I may
try to make a beautiful wedding cake, which turns out via my incompetence to be an ugly
mess, but nevertheless the choice and placing of decorations, the texture of the icing, and so
on, will allow a viewer to reconstruct my original intentions, even though they were
unsuccessful” (Stock 2017, 89-90). Such a creative failure doesn’t necessarily change or
obfuscate the meaning of the work, but it may weigh on the aesthetic value of it.
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With the role of creators’ intentions throughout my project now highlighted,
and a working version of actual intentionalism now established, we can begin to see
why one might object to my use of actual intentionalism.

III. Unintended Consequences: A Problem
To establish that objection, let’s return to our opening example.
In the case discussed at the start of this chapter, there is an inherent
disagreement about the meaning of a fictional work. On one hand, there are
members of the audience who claim the work is racist in its depictions. On the other,
the creator defends their work as intended to be anti-racist, with all racist
depictions in service of the overarching anti-racist project. Who is right in such a
case? Which is the correct interpretation, the actual meaning, of the work? If we take
an actual intentionalist position, the answer seems like it should be fairly
straightforward: the creator is correct. Because they intended the work to be antiracist, and intended their audience to recognize that intention, the work is in fact
anti-racist. The racist depictions aren’t harmful, because they are intended as
support for the overarching anti-racist perspective. Anyone who engages with the
fiction and thinks it is racist isn’t understanding it correctly; they’re ‘reading it
wrong,’ or ‘missing the point.’
However, taken together with the overarching goal of my project—to
articulate a kind of epistemic responsibility creators have to diversify their casts and
avoid harmful stereotypes when they do—this verdict can pose a bit of a problem. If
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indeed we side with the creator’s interpretation of their fiction in such a situation,
we will quickly find our pool of cases significantly truncated.
Consider the following two hypothetical novels. Novel A is written by a selfproclaimed homophobe. This individual vehemently opposes the normalization of
queer lifestyles, as they believe that all queer love is unnatural and immoral. They
write Novel A about a gay man who is in charge of a Boy Scout troop, and in the
course of the novel is driven to abuse the boys in his care by his unnatural desires.
The characterization of gay or men-loving men as hypersexual, voracious,
predatory, and pedophilic, is an old one; it has been used for generations to instill
fear and disgust of gay men in straight populations, and to justify both the
criminalization of men-loving men and the legalization of obstacles to them having a
family. The creator of Novel A intentionally uses this characterization to build a
perspective that endorses all of the above, in service of furthering their homophobic
beliefs through their audience. In contrast is the creator of Novel B, who is not
particularly homophobic but also is not part of the queer community.7 Their novel
also focuses on a pedophile, and, in the vein of AW Eaton’s “rough heroes” (2012),
investigates his struggles to contain his sickness in a light that both acknowledges
the monstrosity of his desires and causes its audience to find him sympathetic

7

I don’t add this caveat to signal that someone from within the queer community would
never be able to create a fiction with this sort of harmful oversight. Rather, my hesitation is
that the characteristics that code or signal a character as queer are much more likely to be
immediately epistemically available to a member of the queer community than someone
who is not queer. Alternatively, if this stereotype is used by a queer creator, it’s much less
likely to be done accidentally. Intentionally using a stereotype to interrogate it, or as one
way of instantiating an identity among other depicted ways, are examples of how an
otherwise harmful stereotype can be deployed benignly.
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anyway (a la Nabokov’s Lolita). However, in the process of describing and
characterizing this character, Novel B makes use of a number of characteristics that
code him as stereotypically gay: perhaps he is slim, effeminate, and has a flamboyant
way of speaking or dressing. In this case, the creator of Novel B did not intend for
their character to be gay—but because of the way they characterized him, their
audience not only reads him as gay but accuses the creator of making a harmfully
homophobic book. If the character of Novel B is gay, Novel B would make use of the
same harmful stereotype as Novel A.
If we subscribe to the reading of actual intentionalism presented at the start
of this section, then we would have to determine that Novel A is harmfully
homophobic but Novel B is not. Because the creator of Novel B did not intend8 their
character to be coded as gay, Novel B does not have the fictional content “[character
name] is gay”; reading it that way is to misunderstand the meaning of the novel, and
to mischaracterize the character in question. That the character has certain
characteristics that, taken together, signal that he is gay may be an unhappy
accident—but it is an accident nonetheless. And if the character is not canonically

8

There is an underlying problem here that I have not addressed: in order to make the
determination that the creator of Novel B did not intend their character to be gay, we first
have to know what they did intend. In the age of social media, it can be passingly easy to
know what a creator did or didn’t intend for their fiction; a Tweet is enough to immediately
inform anyone who might wish to know whether or not Dumbledore is gay. But this
becomes much more of a problem of historical creators, some of whom have left very little
documentation of the intentions underlying their fictions. The question of just how much
statements exterior to the work should influence our reading of the work, and how much
we can know of a work’s fictional content without them, is one that has long plagued every
form of intentionalism—but delving into this intractable debate would take us too far afield.
I am happy to remain agnostic as to how (and whether) we come to understand the One
True intention of the actual author, and to limit my current sample set to recent creations
with living creators, setting aside historical complications for another time.
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gay, then he cannot be a harmful stereotype of gay men. Novel B is therefore
excluded from consideration of my theory, as the creator has performed their due
diligence and did not make use of a harmful stereotype.
Novel A, on the other hand, fits precisely within the parameters. The creator
did intend their character to be gay, and for him to manifest a harmful stereotype of
gay or men-loving men. Far from performing their due diligence, the creator has
intentionally made use of a harmful stereotype in order to inflict hermeneutical
harm on those who share their character’s identity in the real world. Yet, to focus
our criticism of Novel A’s creator on the epistemic responsibility they shirked in
creating their fiction feels toothless, inadequate; surely there is a much bigger, much
more dire moral problem in need of address if someone intentionally uses their
platform to inflict harm on other people. That their story trafficked in a harmful
stereotype of a real-world population is merely a symptom of that moral problem,
one that’s small potatoes in comparison.
So, it may be well worth it to ask: if the only cases my theory has jurisdiction
over are those in which creators intentionally include harmful stereotypes in order
to inflict harm on real world people, what really is the point of it? Diagnosing that
such a creator has neglected their hermeneutical responsibility of due diligence is
like telling someone with a broken arm that they also have a bruise on their bicep;
while the latter may be related to the former, it isn’t really the biggest concern.
Additionally, such cases don’t seem to fit in either vice that I have described as being
counter to the epistemic virtue of due diligence. Intentionally using a harmful
stereotype in a fiction as a weapon against a real-world population is not an
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instance of epistemic laziness, in which a harmful stereotype appears in a fiction
because its creator does not engage in the work of identifying a) the stereotype’s
existence in their own epistemic framework and/or b) its existence in their fiction.
Neither is it an instance of epistemic paralysis, in which a creator chooses to exclude
characters with identities other than the creator’s own, rather than risk
representing such characters as harmful stereotypes. One vice captures a creator
that understands the harm that harmful stereotypes can inflict on real world people
and is paralyzed by the fear of that harm, while the other captures a creator who is
so comfortable in their privileged identities and ensuing epistemic pictures of the
world that they choose not to investigate them. Neither captures the actively
malicious deployment of harmful stereotypes in the way of Novel A.9
By relying on actual intentionalism to back my model, I seem to have shot
myself in the foot. The majority of the examples I use and the cases I want to target
are instances in which a creator has unintentionally included a harmful stereotype
in their fiction—but actual intentionalism has long been criticized for precluding the
possibility of unintended fictional content. Under numerous criticisms, “[actual]
intentionalism implausibly entails that there are no genuinely unsuccessful
intentions that a text mean something”, such that a creator cannot mistakenly

9

Moreover, the phenomenological experience of an audience encountering an intentionally
harmful fiction would be quite different from the phenomenological experience of the cases
I’m targeting. Much of the audience responses to the fictions cited throughout this project
range from exhaustion to frustration to anger; it’s the disappointing experience of viewing a
film about your favorite superheroine, only to find that she’s reduced to a sexist stereotype.
The phenomenological experience of viewing a film in which the creator is intentionally
misogynistic, by contrast, subjecting their women characters to any amount of mental and
physical abuse and portraying them as every negative stereotype in the book, might amount
to something more like fury or disgust.
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include unintended fictional content or fail to convey their intended content (Stock
2017, 38). Stock acknowledges these criticisms, and offers somewhat of an
explanation in response:
The cases described had a similar structure: the author intentionally did A in
order to achieve B, but doing A did not in fact achieve B because of some
inadvertent interference from elsewhere. Through inadvertent misspeaking
or malapropism, or failing to anticipate how readers would interpret one’s text
in a certain respect, or unconscious promulgation of racial stereotypes, or a
failure to anticipate readers’ emotional response to certain descriptions, what
the author does to produce effect B in fact does not produce it (2017, 89,
emphasis mine).
However, Stock’s goal in acknowledging the possibility for mistakes or failed
intentions is to protect actual intentionalism from another of its long-time
criticisms. According to this criticism, mistakes like typos and malapropisms—as
when a creator describes something in their novel as being green, when in fact they
meant it to be black (Noël Carroll, cited in Stock 2017, 87)—or failed intentions—as
when an creator intends “it to be imagined that her main character was a strong and
courageous person…yet many have found him to be a servile racial stereotype, no
doubt owing to [the creator’s] unconscious adoption of white cultural influence”
(Stock 2017, 87)—can, according to actual intentionalism, prevent a work’s
audience from ever understanding the actual, intended meaning of the work:
Now, the worry about extreme [actual] intentionalism seems to be that in
such cases the original authorial intention that B should be achieved gets
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radically hidden (for after all, B was not achieved). But in fact this is not true
for most or perhaps any cases: for there will usually be evidence potentially
available of the person’s trying to do B by A-ing, even if they have not succeeded
in doing B” (Op. cit., 89).
While Stock cogently argues that the intended meaning of a fiction can be broken
down into secondary and tertiary intentions that, when recognized as such, provide
evidence of the larger intention they serve—as when my intending to raise my arm
and my intending to throw a dart is evidence of my intention to hit a dartboard,
even if I fail to do so (Op. cit., 86)—she does not provide a mechanism by which a
creator can fail to convey their intended meaning or unintentionally include fictional
content. Without such a mechanism, my account appears to be dead in the water.

IV. A Solution: Reading Between the Lines
In the case of a creator who unintentionally includes a harmful stereotype in
their fiction, can actual intentionalism still account for the presence of the harmful
stereotype in the work’s fictional content? Or does actual intentionalism condemn
us to a theory of interpretation that takes every creator’s declaration about their
fiction as the final say about the work’s meaning? 10

10

Worth noting here: actual intentionalism is, technically, an ontological theory. It’s a
question of what actually fixes the meaning of a fiction, and what actually fixes the meaning
is the actual intention of the creator. What a creator says their intention is or was, as we’ll
soon see, isn’t necessarily the same as their actual intention. However, insofar as much as
the debate over harmful stereotypes in fiction semi-regularly orbits around creators’ public
attempts to defend their works against criticism through the language of intention, keeping
such statements in mind is important to this project. Thanks to Noël Carroll for bringing this
to my attention.
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To answer these questions, we should first set aside some outlying cases. The
problem currently set out to be solved regards a creator’s genuine intentions, but
not all instances in which a creator’s intentions appear to conflict with the fictional
content of their work are predicated on their genuine intentions. In some cases, an
apparent conflict between a creator’s intentions and their work’s content can be
traced back to their “wish to deceive us after they have created their artworks [or]
because sometimes their memories are imperfect” (Irwin 2015, 143). It is entirely
possible that, in receiving and wanting to escape criticism from their audience, a
creator might misrepresent the intentions they had in creating their fiction. Perhaps
the creator of Novel B had originally intended their character to be gay, but after
receiving negative publicity or complaints by their critics and audience they make
use of the ambiguity left in their novel to say they intended otherwise. Perhaps
another creator declares, some time after their fiction was published, that they
intended a character to be queer, or Black, or trans, or some other marginalized
identity to make their fiction appear more diverse than it is. In both instances, the
intentions in question are not “the intentions the author has with respect to the final
version of her copy” (Stock 2017, 17). As such, they are not the intentions that fix
the meaning of their fiction.
The same can be said in the event a creator misremembers their intentions.
Perhaps fifteen years down the line, a creator is asked about the meaning of a
particular passage of their work; in responding to the question, they do their best to
remember what their intentions were in writing it the way they did. But, through
the influence of time or of others’ opinions, the answer they give does not reflect
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their original intentions for the passage’s meaning. Once again, because it does not
reflect the original intentions the answer does not change or conflict with the
meaning of the passage.
But actual intentionalists do not need to explain away every apparent conflict
between a creator’s intentions and an audience’s reading of the text by proving
them to be one of these two cases. Actual intentionalism can account for a genuine
mismatch between the creator’s genuine intentions and the audience’s experience of
their fiction like the one described at the beginning of this chapter, as I will now
demonstrate.
The chief problem of this chapter is that in relying on a creator’s intentions to
fix the perspective or meaning of a fiction, I appear to significantly hamstring my
own account. This seems to be so because allowing a creator’s intentions to fix the
meaning of their fiction excludes the majority of my target cases; if an audience
accuses a fiction of being sexist, but the creator didn’t intend for the fiction to be
sexist, then it seems an intentionalist account like my own would have to accept that
the fiction is not, in fact, sexist. But if it isn’t sexist, we can’t say the creator made a
hermeneutically harmful fiction, and so they did not violate their hermeneutical
responsibility. However, a more nuanced view of actual intentionalism will show
that we do not, in fact, need to abandon any complaint against a creator who
genuinely intended to make a non-problematic11 fiction. Actual intentionalism of the

11

Stock notes that “problematic” has become a kind of catch-all term to describe issues of
sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, classism, etc. in media. I use it here as
well, as a shorthand way to refer to the same.
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kind described above can fully account for a failed intention of the form “I intended
to make a non-sexist fiction.”
The explanation I propose hinges on the possibility of unintended—or, more
specifically, unanticipated—consequences to intended actions. Outside of the
fictional realm, unintended consequences to intended actions are a regular part of
life: I intend to raise my arm, I intend to throw the dart, I intend to hit the dartboard,
but I do not intend to put a hole in the wall next to the dartboard when I miss. Yet,
that hole in the wall is a consequence of intentional action. If I am someone who
truly does value good penmanship and punctuality, I may honestly intend to
compliment a student when I write of their excellent penmanship and punctuality in
a recommendation letter for them. But, when the reader of that recommendation
letter takes my meaning to be that the student has no skill in research to report on,
that conclusion is an unanticipated consequence of my intentional action. That an
agent can intend to achieve a particular effect of their actions and fail to do so is
accepted in the non-fictional realm with little question. An actual intentionalist
account that neglects this possibility is one that ignores an essential facet of
intention setting. Recall that Stock makes precisely this point in her assessment of
actual intentionalism: “The cases described had a similar structure: the author
intentionally did A in order to achieve B, but doing A did not in fact achieve B
because of some inadvertent interference from elsewhere…what the author does to
produce effect B in fact does not produce it” (2017, 89). Merely having an intention
is not a guarantee that we’ll achieve it.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I will offer an actual intentionalist
explanation for the failure of a creator’s intentions, with an eye to allowing actual
intentionalists to account for and criticize creators who fail to make nonproblematic fictions. That explanation, in short, hinges on this idea of a failed
intention: a creator can have the overarching intention of creating a fiction that is
not epistemically harmful, but can themselves intentionally make creative choices
that cause that intention to fail. When a creator’s intentional actions result in
epistemic harm they didn’t anticipate, an actual intentionalist can still hold them
accountable for those consequences—just as we can hold any agent responsible for
the unforeseen consequences of their intentional actions.
Paul A. Taylor begins down this path by drawing a creative comparison to
Grice’s natural meaning. The majority of interpretation techniques focus on the
obviously intentional meaning of a work, like “whether a word, phrase, or passage in
the work is ironic, a joke, metaphorical, allegorical, or an allusion”, or “what literary
genre the work, taken as a whole, belongs to” (Taylor 2014, 379). These are all
instances of what Grice would call non-natural meaning, which he explains by
saying “that ‘A meantnn something by x’ is roughly equivalent to ‘A uttered x with the
intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention’” (1957,
384). Though Grice uses non-natural meaning to describe utterer’s meaning, we
have already seen in Stock’s account that there is a parallel to be drawn to creator’s
meaning. By writing a phrase in their fiction and intending it to be metaphorical, and
also intending their audience to recognize that they intended it to be metaphorical,
the creator is deploying a kind of non-natural meaning. But Taylor argues that just
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as there is a natural counterpart to non-natural meaning in Grice’s explanation of
utterer’s meaning, so there is a natural counterpart to a creator’s non-natural
meaning.
For Taylor, the important comparison to be drawn is between unintentional
human behavior and what a creator does in creating their fiction. He presents the
example of someone snapping a pencil while they’re angry as a kind of natural
meaning in human behavior; just like seeing smoke means fire, seeing someone snap
their pencil means that they’re angry (Taylor 2014, 381). The meaning at work here
isn’t the intentional sort of meaning imbued into a speaker’s words or actions, but
an evidentiary kind of meaning: “Smoke naturally means fire not just because it is
caused by it but because it is one of its characteristic and familiar effects and
therefore tells us of its presence…Because you know what anger is, hence know that
intemperate or aggressive behavior is one of its characteristic effects, you are able
to interpret that my [snapping my pencil] (naturally) means I’m angry” (Op. cit.,
381). And, just as anger can cause intemperate or aggressive behavior, Taylor
claims, so too can the emotion a creator is experiencing at the time of writing alter
the way they write their fiction: “a quality of feeling or an attitude unintentionally
shows through in the way a work is written, which is to say the work gives the
impression—offers evidence—that it was written under the influence of that feeling
or attitude without the author having composed the work in order to convey that
impression and hence without her cuing or inviting her readers to view the writing
as expressive in that way” (Op. cit., 383). The suggestion here is that writing while I
am feeling nostalgic may influence the sort of word choices I make or sentence
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structures I use, such that the passage I write under that influence may come off to
the reader as nostalgic even if I do not intend it to be. So too, can my dislike for a
particular character come through in the negative connotations of the adjectives I
use to describe them—or the positive connotations of adjectives I use to describe a
character I like—even if I don’t intend the audience to immediately assign a valence
to that character:
For example, a noteworthy feature of Henry James’s way of writing about
Lambert Strether in The Ambassadors is his compassion for Strether, and I
take Robinson to be saying that James’s compassion causes him to write
about Strether in the way he does, so that his way of writing is evidence of
his compassion and in that sense expresses compassion. It expresses
compassion because it is caused by it, putting the reader in mind of
compassion by exhibiting its characteristic effects. It is clear that these
conditions can be fulfilled without James intending to disclose, or even being
aware that he is disclosing, an attitude of compassion.” (Op. cit., 384)
That, Taylor claims, is the way natural meaning manifests in fiction.
I will begin by saying that I am not fully persuaded by Taylor’s account. On
one hand, I am not convinced that what he describes is in fact a kind of natural
meaning in the Gricean sense. While Grice differentiates between natural meaning
and non-natural meaning in the paper Taylor cites, he doesn’t offer a working
definition of natural meaning. Instead he gives only a handful of examples, such as,
“Those spots mean (meant) measles” (Grice 1957, 377). While “those spots mean
measles” and “smoke means fire” seem to follow the same evidential use of the word
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“mean,” and so both qualify as Gricean natural meaning, it is not clear to me that
“snapping my pencil means I’m angry” does. I can imagine a world in which I might
snap my pencil out of nerves, rather than anger—or in which this behavior is
interpreted differently by someone from a different culture—and so anger doesn’t
have the same characteristic relationship to pencil snapping that fire has to smoke
or “those spots” has to measles.
Moreover, the extrapolation he makes from this behavioral natural meaning
to fictional natural meaning (that is, natural meaning in fiction) is equally tenuous.
Requiring the audience to be able to make a solid judgment between non-natural
emotional effects or valences in a fiction—that is, those that the creator intends—
and those that are imparted naturally, or unintentionally, requires a significant
amount of speculation about the creator’s psychology at the time of writing. Taylor
acknowledges this necessity, determining that the sort of interpretation performed
when considering a work’s natural meaning is inherently different from the sort
done when considering its non-natural meaning:
Interactive interpretation [the interpretation of non-natural meaning] is
collaborative and ostensibly under the author’s control, the interpreter’s task
being to attune herself to the authorial viewpoint and follow the author’s
textual cues to her intended meaning. By contrast, external interpretation
[the interpretation of natural meaning] is non-collaborative: the interpreter
adopts an independent rather than an author-centered view of the work and
seeks the best psychological explanation for the way the work has been
written, regardless of the author’s intentions. (Taylor 2014, 384)
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Not only does Taylor’s account of interpreting natural fictional meaning require
audiences to play the role of armchair psychologists then, but also necessarily
decentralizes the creator’s intentions as the thing that fixes fictional meaning in a
work. If we are trying to defend a kind of actual intentionalism like the one sketched
in Section II, neither of these things will work. That actual intentionalism requires
too much speculation about the creator’s interiority is an objection regularly raised
against it, and one that intentionalists go to great lengths to beat back (Stock 2017,
17-19). Embracing the psychologizing of creators in this manner will not assist us.
Neither will decentralizing the creator’s intentions; while Taylor argues that doing
so actually furthers the actual intentionalist cause, finding “the best psychological
explanation for the way the work has been written, regardless of the author’s
intentions” is more akin to hypothetical intentionalism than actual.12
That being said, there is value to be found in Taylor’s accounting of what a
creator actually does. The difference I will emphasize is that doing so does not mean
taking into account the fictional meaning of the text, and how that might change if
we determine how the creator was feeling in the moment of writing it. Rather, I am
interested in the way the creative moves a creator makes lead to the successful—or
not—conveyance of their intentions for a fiction.

12

According to hypothetical intentionalism, the meaning of a work is “fixed not by anyone’s
actual intentions, but by attributions of authorial intention made by a competent audience”
(Irvin 2006, 123). This “external interpretation” Taylor describes specifically sets aside a
creator’s actual intentions in favor of allowing the audience to assign their own
interpretation, theorizing what meaning might have been intentional on the creator’s part
and what might not. As such, external interpretation has more in common with hypothetical
intentionalist theories than actual intentionalism.
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Stock acknowledges in her account that creators can intend to convey certain
fictional content in their work, and yet fail to do so because of some “external
interference.” The creator may overestimate the likelihood that their intention will
be understood by their audience, as when an allusion goes unnoticed because its
connection to another text is subtler (or more tenuous) than the creator realized.
They may fail to anticipate how an audience will react to a certain scene, as when
the dialogue they write for a heartfelt and emotional romance scene comes off
saccharine and boring to their audience. In both instances, the intentional creative
choice of the fiction’s creator, what they do in their fiction, does not achieve their
desired goal—but the first failure doesn’t make the allusion disappear from the
fiction, nor does the second make the scene no longer a romance scene. The first is
just a bad allusion and the second is a bad romance scene.
When a creator defends their fiction against accusations of deploying
homophobic, racist, sexist, transphobic, ableist, classist, or other harmful
stereotypes by saying, “My fiction isn’t x-ist,” they are expressing that they had a
certain intention (or set of intentions) when they set out to create their fiction. It
seems likely that most creators will have an intention like, “I intend my fiction to be
not-problematic” when they create their fiction, an intention supported in turn by
any number of smaller intentions (“I intend my fiction to be not-homophobic”, “notracist”, “not-sexist”, etc.). An actual intentionalist account of interpretation can
account for a difference in a creator’s intended non-harmful meaning of their work
and the audience’s experience of it by demonstrating that something they chose to
do in their fiction caused one of the above intentions to fail.
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One way for such intentions to fail is in the event that the characteristics a
creator intentionally gives to their character constitutes a stereotype. The creator of
Novel B intended their novel to be not-homophobic. But they also intended their
pedophilic character to be a cis-gendered man who behaves effeminately and
dresses flamboyantly, and described their character as such in their fiction. Though
they may not intend their character to be perceived as gay—and therefore as a
harmful, homophobic stereotype—exterior to the fiction, a cis-gendered man who
behaves effeminately and dresses flamboyantly is a stereotypical way to depict gay
men. Combined with the long history of homophobic representations depicting gay
men as pedophilic, it becomes very likely that an audience will see the character in
Novel B as a harmful homophobic stereotype. The existence of the homophobic
stereotype in the world external to the fiction, combined with the creator’s
intentional choice to assign their character those characteristics, interfere with the
creator’s larger goal of creating a fiction that’s not-homophobic. This is true in spite
of, or perhaps especially because of, the creator’s ignorance of the stereotype.
As we saw in Chapter 3, stereotypes are socially shared hermeneutical
devices, a sort of shorthand that fills in a set of characteristics for a particular social
group. Because they are hermeneutical devices, they can operate on both the
conscious and subconscious level, and because they are social, they exist
independently of any one epistemic agent. Imagine then that there is a harmful
stereotype S for a social group G. S is widely recognized as composed of
characteristics a, b, and c, some of which are embodied characteristics (a gender, a
race, a disability) that define G in the world, and some of which are behavioral (a
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style of dress, a way of talking, a level of aggression, an emotional capacity) that
purport to be the way members of G “typically are.” So in the case of harmful
stereotype S, S = a + b + c. If a creator gives one of their characters characteristic a,
characteristic b, and characteristic c, it seems more than likely an audience in which
S is active will see that character as an instance of S. That a creator was not aware
that a + b + c = S does not preclude this possibility, any more than the creator of a
romance scene’s ignorance of the saccharine effect of their dialogue precludes their
audience finding the scene as such. If anything, the creator’s ignorance of a + b + c =
S is precisely the source of the problem. Recall from Chapter 2 that one of the vices
opposite the virtue of epistemic due diligence is epistemic laziness; an epistemic
agent practicing this vice chooses not to pursue knowledge of experiences outside
their own. If a creator doesn’t know harmful stereotype S exists or that their
character fits S, that is due to their own failure to pursue that knowledge. Worse yet,
the fact that their character fits S may indicate that S is a stereotype operating in
their own epistemic field, influencing the way they characterized their character
without their knowledge.
Ultimately, the characteristics given a character in a fiction are an intentional
choice by the creator. They intend their character to have characteristic a,
characteristic b, and characteristic c. If those characteristics add up to a harmful
stereotype, intending their audience to recognize intended characteristics a, b, and c
may result in their audience recognizing their character as a stereotype. When that
occurs, the intentional action of the creator has unforeseen consequences: it
undermines their intention to have a “not-problematic” fiction and causes it to fail.

179
They intended their fiction to be not-problematic, but didn’t do enough to ensure
their audience recognized that intention in the fiction itself. Despite using the
creator’s intentions to fix the meaning of the work, an actual intentionalist can still
criticize the creator for failing to actualize that intention.
A second way in which such a failure can occur has less to do with what a
creator does, and more to do with what they don’t do: the absence of certain
characteristics or depictions of a character can amount to a stereotype as well. Take,
for instance, the way that many creators choose to describe their women characters.
I am certain every woman who has engaged with fictions has come across at least
one in which the physical aspects of a woman character are emphasized above and
beyond any other of her characteristics: descriptions in novels that linger lavishly
on the details of a woman’s comely hips or shapely breasts, the innumerable buttshots of women in action movies and prioritization of cleavage in other films and
television shows, or dialogue that foregrounds a woman’s physical appearance as
reason for her value (or lack thereof). None of these things are necessarily
condemning on their own. But a familiar harmful stereotype of women is that they
are, essentially, beautiful wallpaper and/or sexual objects; they have no agency or
interiority of their own, and are primarily good for being looked at and lusted after
by men. So, if a creator intentionally includes this sort of emphasis on a woman
character’s appearance, and also neglects to give her much agency or interiority of
her own in their fiction—call it S = a + b + ~c—it is likely this harmful stereotype will
be activated for their audience as well. Just as before, this can happen whether the
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creator intended it to or not, and will undermine any intention they may have had to
create a not-sexist fiction.
In both cases, the creator of a fiction intentionally took some set of actions to
convey their intention to their audience: that their character had some set of
characteristics. That intentional action had an unanticipated consequence: that their
character takes part in a harmful stereotype. That intentional action, in turn,
resulted in them failing to communicate another of their intentions to their
audience: that the created fiction is not-problematic. The failure to communicate the
overarching intention of their fiction does not change that it was an intention for
their fiction to be not-problematic, and so need not change the meaning of the
fiction (or depart from the creator’s intentions in an attempt to do so). But neither
do actual intentionalists need to accept that such a fiction is not-problematic and the
creator that accidentally included those harmful stereotypes is fully blameless. We
can criticize a creator for failing to make good on such intentions, just as we can
criticize them for failing to make a romantic scene not-saccharine or an allusion notopaque.

V. Conclusion
When Laurie Forest defended her novel from critics who described it as
racist, she did so by making claim to her intentions. In writing The Black Witch,
Forest intended to make an anti-racist book, one in which a bigoted protagonist
served as a lens through which to study racism in society; anyone who sees the
racism of the protagonist and thinks the book itself is racist is missing the point. But
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accounts that rely on an actual intentionalist theory of interpretation need not take
such declarations as reason to drop any such criticism. A creator does not have a
“get out of jail free card” in appealing to anti-racist intentions.
While actual intentionalism uses the genuine reflexive intentions of a creator
to fix the fictional meaning of their work, it does not necessitate that every such
intention is automatically successful. That Forest (genuinely, reflexively) intended
her novel to be anti-racist does not mean that she succeeded in making it so.
Through misunderstanding the structures of racism, simplifying them, or leveraging
harmful racist stereotypes in ways that replicate them instead of challenging them
(as she has been accused of doing), she can have undermined that overarching
intention with her other, smaller, conflicting intentional actions. I have shown how
this can happen, in particular, to creators who do not intend to make harmful
fictions, and perhaps are not even aware of the harmful stereotypes their fictions
make use of. And by criticizing creators for failing to deliver on their intentions,
actual intentionalists can hold creators accountable for such depictions even if they
were unintentional.
As such, my account’s reliance on an actual intentionalist backbone—from a
fiction’s perspective to a creator’s epistemic habits—does not undercut my
argument.

Conclusion
So. You’ve created a fiction that has, through no conscious decision of your
own, perpetuated a harmful stereotype. What happens now?
Due diligence is an epistemic virtue; like all virtues, most of us will fail before
we can emulate it at all, let alone perfectly. When that happens, creators generally
respond in one of two ways:
They can reject out of hand any criticism that comes their way, and
obstinately maintain they have done nothing wrong. This is the route Jason
Rothenberg took in response to criticism over episode 3.07 of The 100. In every
interview, in every online comment, he acknowledged in one breath that fans were
upset while denying any wrongdoing in the next. Though fans tried to express to
him why the decision to kill Lexa mattered, both in person at panels for pop culture
conventions and on social media, he recited the same tired response: it was an
artistic decision, not a political one. This is the response of an epistemically ignorant
creator; he had the opportunity to listen and learn, but as the experience of queer
women was not his own experience, he felt he didn’t need to.
Alternatively, a creator can listen to valid criticism of their artistic choices,
and then incorporate that new knowledge into their next creation. This was the case
with Javier Grillo-Marxuach. Though he initially denied responsibility for the harm
caused by 3.07, that response faded the more he interacted with fans: “what has
happened here is a huge lesson for me: it tells me that no matter how ultra-liberal i
may be in my own mind, i was still a party to something that wounded a lot of
people with whom i sympathize politically” (Grillo-Marxuach, March 8, 2016).
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Grillo-Marxuach acknowledged that the criticism he received for the episode now
“informs everything” he works on, and pledged to do better in “what i do moving
forward” (Ibid.). This is an emulation of due diligence: not performing perfectly in
every instance, not always diversifying casts and never stereotyping marginalized
characters, but always learning and always trying to do better next time.
There are plenty of other questions we’ve come across whose answers are
much less readily available, of course. What does it mean for a work to be an
authentic member of a series or a fictional universe? How much, if any, of this
theory can be helpfully applied to non-fictional narratives? And what do we do with
fictions written in different time periods, or with unfamiliar stereotypes? Or with
authors who are intentionally wielding the power of fiction to harm marginalized
communities, as one might with propaganda? To be sure, though this project draws
to a close, its line of investigation is hardly spent.
But for now, suffice it to say: we have a better idea of what we owe to our
audiences.
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